740.00119 Council/4–1448: Telegram
The United States Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Reber) to the Secretary of State
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1557. Delsec 1670. From Reber. Although it is still not yet clear whether Soviet intentions are to execute a tactical maneuver or to reach agreement on reasonable terms, events of the past few days are significant in this connection and may throw further light on Soviet objectives.
Kurasov’s approach to Figl reported in Vienna’s 474, April 131 taken in connection with Soviets concessions on assets and Soviet willingness to discuss other articles in treaty, is first clear indication that Soviets may now desire treaty and may be prepared to make the necessary accommodations in their positions in order to achieve one. There is further evidence of Soviet possible objectives in statement of aims in Cominform Journal, Belgrade’s 89, April 22 and recent strengthening of factory guards in Soviet Zone. If interpretation these facts is correct, fulfillment of Soviet objectives in Austria would be facilitated by withdrawal of western forces, even at the expense of accepting conditions in the treaty which they have heretofore opposed. Even if treaty concluded in these circumstances might appear to be satisfactory as far as our previously expressed conditions are concerned, Soviets might be in a position to utilize Austria’s exposed geographic position and the economic foothold acquired in Austria through assets settlement already agreed to bring sufficient pressure on Austrian Government to enable Soviets to maintain direct or indirect control. Austria might then find it difficult to withstand this pressure.
In these circumstances USDel considers it can no longer readily be assumed that Soviets will not accept conditions which we have stipulated essential for Austrian independence, and we therefore may be faced with the possibility of rejecting the treaty on strategic grounds after reaching agreement in principle. Rejection of treaty at that time would place us in same position in Austrian opinion as British suggestion for using Congress as an agency for delay. While there are possibilities of delay in current negotiations, this tactic cannot be utilized to gain the time required to judge whether in terms of general situation western troops should be withdrawn from Austria.
[Page 1496]This proposal and the implications of Kurasov’s approach to Figl were discussed with British and French deputies today. It was made clear to British that we could not accept course of action merely involving a delay in ratification as pretext for retention of troops. Marjoribanks stated the British Government’s view was now that we should proceed to reach a treaty at this time, arguing that the Soviets desire to reach agreement could be utilized to get the best bargain for Austria and that Austrian independence must be guaranteed in some other way, possibly through its incorporation into the western security block or by some form of separate specific guarantee by western powers.
The French deputy, on the other hand, stated his government had decided the continued presence of troops in Austria is important in the general European interest and therefore did not now wish to conclude a treaty. It was agreed that it should be recommended that Bevin and Bidault take the opportunity of Mr. Bevin’s visit to Paris further to discuss this issue.
In our opinion we are faced with a dilemma requiring consideration of this matter by the National Security Council. In USDel opinion we must face this issue without delay since the field of difference is progessively being narrowed and a reason for not concluding a treaty will become increasingly difficult to find which will not run the risk of misunderstanding in Austria.
In our opinion, the National Security Council, as suggested in Deptel 1269, April 103 should give consideration (a) to potentialities of Soviet pressure arising out of Austria’s exposed position as well as rights acquired under the assets settlement, an evaluation of which can already be given in narrow limits which now separate western and Soviet positions, (b) to the kind of guarantee which might be given to Austria to minimize the dangers of concluding a treaty and (c) to the problem, if decision is reached to retain troops in Austria, of how to conclude negotiations sat earliest possible moment rather than rely on tactics of discussion and consequent delays taking into account progressively unfavorable position such decision is likely to create for US in Austria. It was agreed at our meeting today that each deputy should seek further early clarification of the views of his government on this important matter and that for the moment we should make no further indications of concession to the Soviets position, even to the extent of stalling over the question of inviting Yugoslavia at least until next week.