740.00119 Council/4–1048: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Reber), at London

top secret   us urgent
niact

1372. Ausdel 18. For Reber. We have noted the apparent evidence of Soviet desire to conclude Austrian treaty but are not fully convinced Soviets prepared to negotiate treaty which will insure adequate guarantees of Austrian political and economic independence (Delsec 16701). Under circumstances you should play your hand [Page 1498] straight, attempting to obtain treaty of maximum advantage to Austria on basis of our previous instructions, particularly as set forth in Ausdels 9 and 13.2 This position is based on:

1.
Recognition that if treaty were completed in near future withdrawal of Allied troops would probably not occur before end of one year according to anticipated schedule of end of current negotiations in London, possible reference of certain technical points re Art 35 to AC, Vienna, report of Deputies to Governments or Foreign Ministers, consideration of treaty by Governments, signing and ratification. Possible delay in ratification would always remain as last resort if critical deterioration European situation makes undesirable coming into force of treaty.
2.
Recognition of calculated risk in either course of agreement on treaty or breaking off of negotiations. It is realized absence of treaty could lead to partition, increased pressure to drive us from Vienna, economic dislocation, and likely decline of our influence in Austria with growing tendency to yield to Sov pressure.

Envisage question will be referred to National Security Council at early date but believe matter should not be brought to its attention until after results of BevinBidault conversations and Italian election3 outcome are known.

In view of developing situation we now feel if you have not already committed yourself that our lump-sum offer should remain at $115 millions for the present, including Austria’s assets in ex-enemy States. We raise question whether proposal should not be made when military and air clauses are considered to include provision that Allied troops will not be withdrawn until Austria’s gendarmerie and armed forces proper are adequately equipped and in effective operation. Your recommendation and any proposed formula to cover the point would be appreciated.

For your own info you will, of course, keep in mind that any settlement would be out of question if and as long as Sovs interfere with our communications to Vienna. Treaty discussions may not be proper forum at present time (Ausdel 154) but Dept wishes to give you discretion to interject issue on suitable occasion as circumstances warrant.

Lovett
  1. Ante, p. 1495.
  2. March 31 and April 10, pp. 1483, 1492.
  3. The Italian elections took place April 18; the Bevin-Bidault conversations presumably refer to talks at the April 17 meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Brussels Pact.
  4. Not printed.