840.00/6–2948: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

top secret
us urgent

3436. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. In strictest confidence Bidault showed to me a draft telegram which is being sent to Bonnet (now being cleared with Prime Minister Schuman and National Defense Minister Teitgen) setting forth the French views on the security problem of the Western democracies. Following is résumé of Bidault’s draft telegram:

(Begin résumé) As the French Government sees it, the Western democracies are faced with (1) an eventual threat, which is Germany; (2) an actual threat, which is the Soviet Union: (3) an immediate threat which is Soviet action in Germany. As the French understand it, the last two threats enumerated above are the ones which particularly concern the United States Government.

The essential elements of this problem are Soviet Russia’s real intentions, which are difficult clearly to define at this time. While it is reasonable to doubt that the USSR is disposed to tolerate indefinitely the existence of a capitalistic system, there is on the other hand, no clear indication that the USSR is now prepared to make war, particularly because of the economic difficulties which the USSR is experiencing and the lack of sufficient military preparedness. But it seems equally certain that the USSR will (a) defend itself against any attack or (b) will be prepared to engage in hostilities if it believes that it is seriously threatened. The latter is particularly true if the USSR believes that its adversaries are unprepared. Therefore in connection with this last point, Soviet intentions would seem to depend to a very considerable extent on the intentions and degree of preparedness of the United States.

In the view of the French Government the present danger is the weakness of the Western European powers, and the sole method to overcome it would appear to be the reconstitution of the effective military strength of Europe and the cooperation of this Europe with the United States. What the French Government desires is not a spectacular system of guarantees, but an effective and concrete system of assistance.

Cooperation between Western Europe and the US should be effected on three planes: conception, preparation, and execution. (1) Insofar as “conception” is concerned, it is obviously centered in the US which explains the French desire to be admitted into the US–UK military commission (CCS) which sits at Washington, to enable France to participate (in the event of hostilities) in considerations involving the conduct of a war.

(2) [Insofar as] “preparation”, particularly measures common to the Brussels Pact signatories, is concerned, it is centered in London, and it is imperative at the earliest possible moment to establish an effective liaison between the London military committee and Washington. It was with this in mind, that the French suggested that a US observer be assigned to the London military committee, in order to [Page 143] keep the US fully informed and to obtain the reaction of the US to various questions as they arise.

(3) “Execution” for the moment is centered in Germany and requires the closest possible cooperation not primarily between the Brussels Pact signatories or between the Brussels Pact signatories and the US, but between the three occupying authorities (US, UK and France). Such cooperation exists inherently, but should be made an effective reality by the creation of a single command for the Allied troops of occupation, in order best to utilize the military means of the three occupying powers.

The foregoing observations apply for the moment primarily to the problems with which the Brussels Pact signatories are dealing, and the French Government does not feel that the scope of the Brussels Pact can well be extended until the ground which has thus far been covered has been consolidated.

In this connection, the French Government believes that Italy, for example, should belong to another defensive system covering both shores of the Mediterranean and extending to Persian Gulf and Northern Iran frontier. The problems in this theater should subsequently be examined but not in the framework of the Brussels Pact.

The French Government believes that discussions should take place in Washington between the US, Britain and France on the foregoing, and in view of the role played by Canada in the late war that it is justifiable and desirable that Canada also be included. (End résumé)

Caffery