Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

840.20/7–648

Minutes of the First Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 6, 1948, 11:30 a. m.

Washington, July 6, 1948, 11:30 a.m.

top secret

Present: The Under Secretary of State, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Hickerson, Mr. George Butler, Mr. Achilles;
The British Ambassador,¹ Mr. Hoyer Millar, Mr. Maclean, Mr. Henderson;²
The French Ambassador, Mr. Bérard, Mr. Wapler;³ The Netherlands Ambassador, Mr. Jonkheer Reuchlin, Mr. Vreede;⁴
The Belgian Ambassador, Mr. Taymans, Mr. Vaes;⁵
The Canadian Ambassador, The Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs,⁶ Mr. Stone.⁷

After his opening words of welcome, Mr. Lovett referred to the Vandenberg Resolution as being the basis of the United States approach to the problems of mutual security and defense in Western Europe. In this connection he referred to the long-standing arrangements between the U.S. and Canada for their common defense.

He then recalled Mr. Bevin’s approach to the United States Government early this year in which he expressed that belief that the political, military, economic and spiritual forces of Western Europe must be integrated into “some form of union, formal or informal, backed by the United States.” For its part, the United States Government welcomed this approach. It had, however, to make sure, particularly in an election year, that any conversations in which the U.S. would participate would have the backing of the vast majority of the American people. The Administration, therefore, had to determine the scope within which discussions could profitably take place and to establish basic criteria under which, within the framework of the United Nations, the United States could make a useful contribution to security in Europe.

Mr. Lovett then went on to explain that in their approach to Congress the Administration had two alternatives:

(i) either to go to the Senate to seek immediate ratification of some kind of agreement, or

(ii) to approach the whole Congress under constitutional provisions for consultation and advice on policy.

The second course was decided upon and the result was the Vandenberg Resolution, which he described as an extraordinary paper in American history, as a statement of policy in advance. The House of Representatives failed, owing to legislative complications, to approve a similar resolution. Mr. Lovett said that while it would have been good to have this additional authority, the administration did not regard it as essential, particularly since they well knew the intent of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, which had unanimously reported such a resolution.

The Under Secretary then went over the Resolution, clause by clause, and made the following points:

(a) The important point in this paragraph 2 is the emphasis placed on regional and other collective arrangements and the fact that the Senate has put itself in a position not only of approving but also of recommending such arrangements.

(b) Paragraph 3 sets out the basic conditions of association by the United States in any security arrangements established under paragraph 2. United States association is limited to arrangements which are based on continuous self-help and mutual aid and in circumstances involving the national security of the United States. Self-help and mutual aid, Mr. Lovett said, are the two basic criteria to which he made reference earlier. The United States Government read “national security” in the light of Western Hemisphere security.

The discussions which were about to take place in Washington, therefore, were based, insofar as the United States was concerned, on the preamble and paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Senate Resolution. Mr. Lovett emphasized that any results achieved would have to be referred to Congress for concurrence and ratification and that any positive action, such as military aid, would require legislation and appropriations. At this point Mr. Lovett said that the United States did not contemplate any kind of a guarantee—the United States could not, under any circumstances, guarantee the peace of the world. The approach of the United States Government, with the concurrence of the United States Congress, to these problems of regional security, however, did represent a substantial departure from the former foreign policy of this country.

Mr. Lovett wished the meetings to be completely informal, with frank exchanges of view. The general idea of the State Department was that there should be a preliminary canter over the questions which had been tentatively put forward as an agenda, following which there would be a breakdown into a working party or working parties to discuss details. The talks in Washington, in his view, should cover the political field; military problems should be dealt with by discussions in London.

Insofar as military talks in London were concerned, he said that if it was agreeable to the Brussels Pact countries, the United States, and he assumed Canada, would send representatives to London to meet with the military committee there. The United States had already received an informal invitation to send qualified officers, and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had already considered the terms of reference for these officers, which he would hope to make available in the near future. Mr. Wrong said that he would be very glad if he could be kept informed of what the United States was doing in this regard, and added that presumably Canada would be receiving an invitation of some kind from the Brussels countries to send military observers to London. It was assumed that such invitations would be forthcoming.

He emphasized the need for absolute security. A leak, particularly during the political campaign in the United States, might throw the whole enterprise into jeopardy. Political heat in this country will increase up to election day, and scars will be left afterwards. Any leak as to the subjects of discussion in these meetings, therefore, might cast a cloud over the whole plan. The State Department for its part was, therefore, limiting the number of people involved in these discussions to an absolute minimum.

Insofar as the press was concerned at the moment, Mr. Lovett proposed a brief statement today. The text of this statement was agreed and is attached.⁸

Sir Oliver Franks observed that the Brussels countries were taking strict security measures to prevent leaks concerning discussions between them, and it was suggested that similar measures might be adopted in Washington.

Mr. Lovett then mentioned some difficulties which might be anticipated, and some thoughts which the State Department had had on the general problem, as follows:

(1) The question of how to bring into these talks and out of them the idea that the security of other European countries was not being ignored.

(2) The expression “military lend lease” was unpopular in the United States. As the Senate debate clearly showed, this was one of the reasons for emphasizing the self-help and mutual aid aspects of any arrangements which might be reached.

(3) In some quarters in the United States, there were objections to the ideas now being discussed. The State Department and the Administration, however, sincerely believed that there was a general disposition in the U.S. to find a satisfactory solution to the security problems of Western Europe and related security problems of the Western Hemisphere.

(4) The United States would endeavor in these talks to develop thoughts of closer military, political, economic and spiritual union between the countries of Western Europe. Opinion in the United States formed the establishment of a permanent system of security in Western Europe by modern and lasting methods. The countries party to the Brussels Pact might provide the hard core. A phrase had been used in the Senate that the United States could not afford “to re-build a fire trap.” In other words, that European security must be rebuilt on a much sounder basis than in the past.

1. Sir Oliver S. Franks.
2. J. N. Henderson, Second Secretary, British Embassy.
3. Armand Bérard, Minister-Counselor, and Arnauld Wapler, Counselor, French Embassy.
4. J. Reuchlin, Minister, and C. Vreede, First Secretary, Netherlands Embassy.
5. Roger Taymans, Counselor, and Robert Vaes, Attaché, Belgian Embassy.
6. Lester B. Pearson.
7. Thomas A. Stone, Minister, Canadian Embassy.
8. Press release issued July 6, 1948, by the Department of State, printed in the Department of State Bulletin, July 18, 1948, p. 80.