Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

840.20/7–748

Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 7, 1948, 10 a. m.

Washington, July 7, 1948, 10 a.m.

top secret

Item 2. Security Measures Taken or To Be Taken in Europe by the Five.

At Mr. Lovett’s request Sir Oliver Franks described the framework within which the work of military integration was being carried on pursuant to the Five-Power Treaty. The immediate result of the Treaty had been establishment of the Permanent Consultative Council with its various subordinate bodies, including the permanent Military Committee established by the five Defense Ministers on April 30. The Military Committee’s work so far had been divided into two parts. The first had been to answer certain questions asked by Mr. Lovett. In this connection Sir Oliver read Mr. Gladwyn Jebb’s letter of May 12 to Ambassador Douglas and the accompanying report. He stated that this report was naturally provisional pending completion of the Committee’s second task, namely preparation of the inventories of presently available and potential forces and resources and the formulation and implementation of further plans.

The Committee had formed advisory subcommittees and a Standardization Subcommittee. The inventory it was preparing of forces and resources mobilizable in the near future had been nearly completed. Its inventory of potential forces and resources would take longer to complete. This involved working out a balance between manpower, industrial capacity and economic resources available for defense and for the normal economy. On the Continent, war production facilities had been destroyed or reconverted to civilian purposes and were of little immediate use for current military production. Military potential depended on a healthy economy.

Sir Oliver observed that the foregoing related to the long term. With regard to the point raised by M. Bonnet at a previous meeting concerning the need for short-term measures, the British Commander in Chief in Germany, and he believed the U.S. and French Commanders in Chief, had already been instructed to make concerted plans for emergencies. He suggested that the short-term phase could well be dealt with in this manner in Berlin and that the five-power organization should concentrate on the longer term.

Mr. Lovett said that Mr. Jebb’s report had been of assistance in obtaining bi-partisan approval in the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate Resolution. It was clear that the military men still had much to do on both necessities and possibilities. He pointed out that the presence of U.S. forces in Europe and the newly developed air potential did provide greater emergency strength than would otherwise have been the case.

Mr. Lovett said that in view of the ERP pattern and the emphasis placed by the Senate on “continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid” the U.S. administration must at some point present to Congress something corresponding to the CEEC report.¹ U.S. “association” could not succeed on a basis solely of military lend-lease. The objective should be some sort of regional collective security pact similar to the Rio treaty would be desirable. Mr. Lovett cited three additional requirements: (1) staff planning and understanding on logistics and procedures; (2) working out methods for making the load economically supportable in Europe and the U.S.; and (3) countering Soviet use of fear as a weapon. This last could not be accomplished by military force alone. Penetration could not be prevented by the provision of tanks and planes. The problem was broader than the purely military field. The association of the U.S. and Canada with the other nations of the North Atlantic community as evidence of mutuality of interest would be a deterrent although not a final answer since the U.S. and presumably Canada, could not undertake to go to war automatically over some event abroad. The Constitutional prerogative of Congress to declare war must be preserved. The Senate Resolution was a great step but it obviously could not alter the American Constitutional process. Congress alone could declare war and its approval was essential to implementation of an arms program.

These conversations, leaving military topics to military men, must examine realistically possible counter-measures to prevent the Russians from fertilizing the sense of insecurity.

At Mr. Lovett’s request Mr. Kennan discussed Soviet intentions. He expressed disbelief that the Soviet leaders contemplated launching world conflict by armed force. They had not yet repaired the devastated-areas of Russia. The people were war weary. In view of the lessons of the two World Wars the Kremlin could not be sure of overcoming Europe without first knocking out North American industrial potential. It believed it could win ideologically more easily than militarily. It was not operating on any fixed timetable, and parallels between Stalinism and Hitlerism were dangerous.

The lack of a Soviet plan did not mean that the Russians might not be brought to take military action. The greatest danger would be in an abrupt weakening of their power in Eastern Europe, which in their view might leave no choice other than military action. Barring these possibilities of almost involuntary hostilities, the war, in the Soviet conception, was now in progress. The West could win this cold war. Alliances and military force cast shadows and influenced policy. Hitherto the Soviets have cast the longer shadow. The basic problem was how to give, individually and collectively, the greatest encouragement to the Western European countries and discouragement to Moscow, while being prepared at the same time to act if necessary. Two points must be kept in mind: the long-term trend, and what should be done if it became necessary to use force.

Mr. Bohlen added that the Politburo did not separate their military, political and economic policies but had rather a single integrated policy and used the threat of armed force to enhance fear. The West must guard against the trap of undue apprehension over the prospect of Russian invasion, with corresponding excessive military expenditures to the detriment of recovery. The Kremlin remembered that the only serious defections during the war had occurred among Russian troops and would hesitate before again exposing Russian troops to Western life. The Soviet Government was more preoccupied with the maintenance of the regime in Russia than with any other problem and was aware of potential dangers at home.

Mr. Bonnet observed that military strength depended basically upon economic strength and paid tribute to the ECA. But he added that the CEEC Report had shown, in spite of the self-help and mutual aid, a gap which Europe could not fill. The same would be true in the security field. He agreed that there was no evidence that the Soviets intended an overt attack but believed that action must be taken to dispel fear. Much had been already done by the Western Powers themselves: the Brussels Treaty, the creation of the Consultative Council, the London military talks, close economic cooperation between the sixteen Nations, etc. He also emphasized the importance of the American contribution, through for example, the declaration by the President on March 17 and the Vandenberg resolution.

As for the Constitutional aspect underlined by Mr. Lovett, it was clear that no Democratic country could go to war without a declaration by its Parliament. That did not prevent the steady development of plans for long range solidarity which would be made clear everywhere. It should not be forgotten that if the Soviet Union went to war it would be against the U.S. rather than any European country. In consequence plans must be made to meet immediate as well as the long range problems.

In response to Mr. Hickerson’s question as to the extent of progress on pooling of resources and particularly the conclusion of any financial arrangements to that end, Sir Oliver Franks expressed the opinion that no yardstick for such arrangements had yet been formulated.

Mr. Van Kleffens inquired whether the U.S. agreed that the five powers were taking the right line and whether in U.S. opinion there were any matters which might usefully be taken up, in relation to these conversations, at the next meeting of the Consultative Council.

Mr. Lovett said the U.S. was handicapped by limited knowledge of the arrangements so far made. Knowledge was also lacking as to the intended relationship of other European countries to such arrangements. For example, three other countries had asked the U.S. for arms, which could be supplied only at the expense of the United States own military effort.

Reviewing the production situation in the U.S., Mr. Lovett said that in 1940 the U.S. had been in a low stage of production with substantial unemployment. American industry was now running at full speed with shortages of both manpower and raw materials. It had reconverted its war economy to civilian production not only for American but for world needs. The largest American shell loading plant was now making fertilizer for Europe as well as for the U.S. and a number of the principal air craft factories were making agricultural machinery for both continents. If they were reconverted to war production, European recovery would suffer. Piecemeal requests could not be met without retarding the U.S. rearmament effort, which was essential to offset the shadow of Soviet power, or by cutting down civilian supplies, which would both hurt Europe and adversely affect American public opinion.

The U.S. would like to see a carefully screened statement of European requirements, showing the most earnest efforts of the European countries to meet them. Other claimants should be included in the pattern. There would be serious gaps in any North Atlantic security arrangements which did not include Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Greenland.

Further clarification on these points by the Consultative Council would be most helpful.

Mr. Van Kleffens suggested that the summary of this meeting should, make these points clear in order that the Consultative Council and the Military Committee could go into them very carefully. Mr. Lovett reiterated that the present peak of American production left no room for production of arms for Europe except at the expense of ERP or American military or civilian production.

Sir Oliver Franks said that a picture was forming in his mind as a result of the discussion so far. He saw three chapters, not necessarily in the order stated. The first was the development of the case for concerted action in the North Atlantic Area together with an assessment of the contribution made by the countries on the Atlantic Eastern Seaboard. The second comprised consideration of the possible form which a collective association or pact for the security of the Atlantic collectivity might take. The third would be consideration of what flowed from the arrangement including a possible scheme for an integrated and equitable flow of arms and way of fitting in other countries.

Mr. Lovett indicated substantial agreement. He had not yet tried to crystallize his approach since it was important that we all agree on the background. Sir Oliver’s first chapter was of great importance to the U.S., his second had not yet been adequately considered.

Mr. Pearson saw difficulties if North Atlantic defense arrangements were tied too closely to Soviet intentions. This might mean that if the danger were removed, or appeared to be removed, this justification for a collective system would disappear. Such a system was justifiable on broader grounds and should have a positive, not merely a negative, purpose. Mr. Lovett observed that the United Nations framework provided a long range point of view without stressing Soviet intentions. M. Bonnet said that regional arrangements would strengthen the United Nations. Mr. Kennan emphasized that the community of interest of the participating governments was wider than military, it was traditional and historical and would continue. Association was necessary entirely aside from the troubles of the moment and might well go far beyond the military sphere. Mr. Lovett observed that the essential element was not the Soviet threat but the common Western approach and that the Western attachment to the worth of the individual would be the best cement. Mr. Van Kleffens saw advantages in presenting the matter in that light. If the arrangements appeared to be directed against Russia, public perspective would be unnecessarily unpleasant. It would have better perspective and a more serene tone if based on the wider considerations.

Baron Silvercruys cited the preambles of the Rio and Brussels Treaties as exemplifying the long-range approach which would naturally guide the present conversations. This approach in which the sister nations were engaged aimed at the consolidation of peace. It was not directed against any specific threat. It was inspired by the resolve to seek in the spirit of the Charter some sort of arrangement that would substantially contribute to the maintenance of peace. Any effort of this sort would fall short of its purpose and lose its dynamic value if it were to assume a negative aspect instead of a positive one, namely the promotion of security and peace.

1. Reference here is presumably to the July–September 1947, report of the Committee of European Economic Co-operation, publications 2930 and 2952 of the Department of State.