840.00/7–1448: Telegram
The United States Special Representative in Europe Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
Unnumbered. Eyes only for Marshall and Forrestal. From various contacts since my arrival in Europe I have formed initial judgment upon certain aspects of situation in Western Europe. Perhaps most important is the development of the will to resist internal and external aggression which has developed since the Harvard speech. This relatively new-born determination, however, can well be weakened by events. On the continent war is not talked about publicly as it is in America but it is constantly in peopled minds. There is general acceptance that the US will fight if Western Europe is attacked, but the almost universal comment is that “Western Europe will be overrun by the Russians, eventually the US will defeat Russia and liberate Western Europe, but in the meantime most of the better people, and therefore, their civilization will have been destroyed”. Appeasement psychology, like isolationism in the US, is not deeply buried.
It appears to me that maintaining and strengthening the will to resist in Europe should be fundamental in our policy through the coming months. This requires not only effective implementation of ERP but active encouragement of the idea that we intend to help rebuild military defense against outside aggression. By this I do not mean immediate commitments on a comprehensive and integrated armament program, but adoption of an attitude towards the Brussels Pact countries which will give them a greater feeling of assurance that we really mean business when we say their security is our security. I feel strongly there is need for tangible evidence of this in the form [Page 184] of token shipments of equipment in the near future. These might be, for instance, only a limited number of P–49’s or P–51’s to equip a selected unit of the French Air Force or some ground equipment for army units. The military value of these token shipments is not important, but the effect on public opinion would be inspiring. You will recall the psychological effect of our shipment of one million rifles to Britain in 1940 which, though of negligible military importance, had incalculable morale effect. Economic support aids in meeting the threat of internal aggression, but it is military support which strengthens the will to resist external aggression. I recognize the limitations in our capabilities, both practical and legal, but I am frankly concerned over the possibility of a reversal of the upward trend of determination in Europe unless we give some concrete evidence of support, not in top secret circles but openly to the people. After all in free countries political policies are largely influenced by public opinion. Public knowledge of military discussions would in itself be of value if we are unable to make shipments. I am fearful that if we wait for action by Congress next year there may well be a weakening of determination which it would be difficult to offset.
Confidence arising from the growing strength of Western Union would spread to perimeter countries and as our present capabilities are so limited I would be inclined to concentrate primarily on assistance to Western Union.