840.20/8–948

Memorandum of the Ninth Meeting of the Working Group Participating in the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, August 9, 1948

top secret

The paper on “The Territorial Scope of the Western European and North Atlantic Security Arrangement” (Item 3a of the agenda) was approved as revised for submission to higher authorities representing the countries participating in the Talks. The language suggested by [Page 210] the British was substituted for the last sentence of paragraph 1, and in paragraph 4 the phrase following “Western Germany” was changed to read “if Germany remains divided”. This paper is subject to change in the light of reports of the Consultative Council now meeting in London and the participant countries’ recommendations thereon.1

In opening the discussion of “The Nature of North American Association with North Atlantic Security Arrangements” (Item 4 of the agenda), Mr. Bohlen suggested that short-term assistance be considered separately from proposals for a long-term arrangement. The short-term aspects relate to plans for immediate measures which this country might take to reinforce and strengthen the military security of Brussels Union countries. These questions are more military than political, and are the subject of current discussions in London. They are beyond the scope of the Washington working group since they are based upon actual military requirements and no treaties are expected to be signed. A treaty respecting short-term military assistance from the U.S. would not be required since immediate military support could probably be furnished through a Presidential Directive. The maintenance of U.S. forces in Western Germany should be sufficient assurance of our concern with the immediate aspects of military security of Western European countries. It is expected that the consultative group will provide an estimate of the overall military requirements of Brussels Union countries, upon which we can base our plans for the extent and type of immediate military assistance which the U.S. might furnish. In considering the question of short-term assistance, the possible role of Norway, Iceland, Ireland, and Portugal should be explored since the strategic position of their territories makes their participation essential to any military program of Western European countries.

Mr. Bohlen stated that U.S. participation in any long-term arrangement would be based on our established policy of supporting the maintenance of freedom and economic well being in Western European countries through both individual and unified efforts on the part of those countries. The U.S. role in the Recovery Program might be cited as an example of our support of one aspect of this policy. In the field of military security, we would prefer an arrangement embracing as many countries as possible. Such an arrangement would be more likely to meet with approval in Congress, since the same Congressional leaders who supported the Vandenberg Resolution are likewise in favor of unified effort among European countries. It is doubtful that arrangements with small groups of countries or bilateral arrangements would be ratified by Congress. It would be inadvisable and inappropriate [Page 211] for the U.S. to adhere to the Brussels Pact since the Pact covers cooperation in other than military fields, and many of the countries essential to maintaining the security of Western Europe are not signatories thereto. Countries, in addition to members of the Brussels Union, which should participate in any arrangement may be classified in two categories: (1) those which would serve as a link between Western Europe and North America, such as Norway, Iceland, Ireland, and Portugal, and (2) those essential to military security from the European standpoint, for example, Italy or Sweden. Thus, the objective of any arrangement would be to provide for (1) a unified association for military security of Western Europe, and (2) the participation of countries which would serve as a link between North America and Europe.

With regard to the type of association contemplated, Mr. Bohlen stated that any arrangement concluded by the U.S. must be (1) within the terms of the UN Charter, and (2) must recognize the separation of powers of the U.S. Government. Plans for the arrangement should be based on the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Pact). The strategy contemplated in the Rio Pact differs from that in the Brussels Pact but the obligation to afford assistance to a country under aggression is similar. A commitment such as that contained in Article IV of the Brussels Pact, which binds each country to provide all military and other aid and assistance in their power, is unacceptable under the U.S. Constitution in view of the fact that Congressional action is required prior to entering into a state of war. Furthermore, the U.S. could not be a party to any Pact which would provide that the United States would automatically be at war as a result of an event occurring outside its border, or by vote of other countries without its concurrence. However, the Rio Pact provides that in case of an attack on one of the signatory countries a military staff committee shall meet immediately to plan the overall strategy which might be taken. In the Brussels Pact, on the other hand, the existence of a permanent military staff committee with detailed information on the actual forces in each of the participating countries serves to obligate all countries that are a party to the Pact to wage war with all forces at their disposal.

Mr. Bohlen stated that although the Brussels countries have taken the first step toward achieving military security by signing the Brussels Pact, the United States has also taken similar measures independently through the Vandenberg Resolution, rearmament, and the draft law. The task remaining is to develop a security arrangement for all Western Europe and to determine the role of the United States and Canada in this arrangement. He suggested that at the next meeting, [Page 212] scheduled for 3:00 PM, Thursday, August 12, a paper be prepared on the type of arrangement which might be concluded with emphasis on the role of those countries which would provide the connecting link in any military program undertaken jointly by the countries of Western Europe and North America.

  1. This paper not printed. For final revision, see part II of the September 9 “Washington Paper,” p. 240.