758.00/10–2648
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
| Participants: | Mr. Erik C. Boheman, Swedish Ambassador |
| Mr. Robert A. Lovett, Acting Secretary of State | |
| Mr. Benjamin M. Hulley, Chief, Division of Northern European Affairs |
The Ambassador said he had asked to see me in order to continue our last talk1 in which we started to discuss the relations of Sweden with the Western Powers. I told him we had had a report of the recent conversation between his Foreign Minister and Secretary Marshall which covered a good deal of ground. Mr. Boheman said that he had received a brief cable listing the main points of that talk. [In the first part of our talk the Ambassador seemed nervous and on the defensive, but in the latter part he regained his customary buoyant confidence.]2
He said that Sweden has cooperated loyally with the Western nations in European recovery plans and in the United Nations on atomic energy and other questions. However, Sweden felt great reluctance to enter any sort of military alliance, because to do so would lead the Soviets to take counter-measures in the belief that airfields in Sweden were being made available to the Western Powers for attack on Russia. These counter-measures would include prompt Russian occupation of Finland. This would be very repugnant to Swedish public opinion since half a million persons of Swedish race live in Finland which historically was a Swedish province. As a result Russia would be right on the Swedish border, necessitating continuous mobilization such as exists in Turkey, and this would turn Sweden into a liability rather than a potential asset as it now is. Swedes believe that a major reason [Page 269] for the mild Soviet policy towards Finland is based on the theory that a harsh policy would frighten Scandinavia into close military cooperation with the West, and Sweden does not want to make any move which would lead to a harsh policy in Finland.
He deplored the use of the word “neutrality” which was most inaccurate and misleading, since this neutrality points only one way and has never taken into consideration the possibility of conflict with the Western Powers. I remarked that we had run through a number of terms like “non-intervention” and “non-belligerence”, and he said that perhaps one of these would be better adapted to the situation. He wanted to make it clear that there was no failure on the part of Sweden to discriminate between the two sides; Swedes were practically unanimous in siding with the West. Sweden continued to use the word “neutrality” as a convenience because of its long tradition, though it was perhaps something of a blind which did not correctly designate the Swedish attitude.
I told the Ambassador I appreciated his talking frankly with me. I said that speaking as an individual, not as an official, I was puzzled at the conception of any sort of military alliance of the three Scandinavian countries since their strength was so unequal, Denmark being wide open to attack and Norway having no defense potential, whereas Sweden was militarily strong in training, equipment, and industrial production. Scandinavia is not a geographic entity from the viewpoint of modern warfare. He agreed that the three nations were quite unequal in the characteristics I mentioned, and he was very doubtful that any sort of military agreement would emerge from the current Scandinavian talks; particularly, he did not think there would be a neutrality agreement. However, he thought it was useful to explore in these talks whether there is any basis on which the countries can offer military assistance to one another in case of attack. The only hope in the case of Denmark is to defend a small area so as to keep the Straits open, forgetting about Jutland. He thought a good defense line could be established across northern Norway and Sweden, from Narvik to the head of the Bothnian Gulf. With Swedish ground troops there this line could hold out for a very long time.
I asked if Bofors is still producing military equipment. He said it is going strong and is the mainstay of Swedish military production. I asked if Sweden had sufficient to offer military supplies to its two neighbors and if so, how they could pay. He said Sweden could offer some supplies, and as trade is so evenly balanced, Sweden would probably have to help the recipients with a credit.
After some interesting anecdotes (summarized separately) he said he just wanted to let me know the problem Sweden is facing so that [Page 270] I could understand the Swedish, position. I expressed my appreciation of his talking with me in this way.