860F.00/2–2648: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
top secret niact
us urgent
us urgent
London, February
26, 1948—4 p. m.
755. For Lovett’s eyes only from Douglas.
- 1.
- In a long conversation yesterday with Bevin, he, as you know,
expressed approval to the issuance of the joint US-UK-French
statement1 on Czechoslovakia. He thinks, however, that
this is not enough, and is greatly concerned about what he calls the
extension of dictatorship which he now substitutes for the word
communism, for he believes that the word dictatorship graphically
defines the distinction between liberty and tyranny.
He is particularly apprehensive about France and Italy, the latter at the moment being a more critical point. About the former, however, he is still fearful that the CGT demand for an increase in wages may produce at least an interference with the industrial activities of France and at most internal strife. Also, he is not without his worries over possible insinuation of councils for action in, and subsequent disturbances in, Germany. - 2.
- He hopes the following steps will be taken:
- (a)
- The meeting of the trade unions group participating countries exclusive of CGT in France, during the early part of March. At this meeting he hopes that solidarity among the trade union groups of Western Europe will emerge. This, he thinks, is of some significance, in view of the Soviet and Communist techniques which have proved to be so successful; that is to say, the councils for action in workshops which form armed cadres for subsequent coups d’état.
- (b)
- He is meeting with the chairman of the Committee on International Affairs of the Parliamentary Labor Party in an effort to persuade him and his committee to ostracize Nenni and his party in Italy from the group of acknowledged Social Democrats in Western [Page 33] Europe, and to endorse Saragat and his right-wing Socialist Party, which has lined itself up with De Gasperi as the authentic choice of Social Democracy in Italy.
- 3.
- But these steps, Bevin feels, however useful they may be, are, on
the whole, rather feeble measures when compared with the positive
action and aggressive intrigues of the Soviet and their ability to
apply coercive pressure. He, therefore, puts forward personally the
thought which he has not cleared with his Cabinet, that there should
be held, very privately, either in Washington or at some point in
Europe, consultations between the UK, France, Italy, and the Benelux countries for the purpose
of exploring what steps all may take collectively, or in groups, to
prevent the extension of the area of dictatorship. He tentatively
thinks that there should be:
- (a)
- Representatives of the civil establishment of each government, and perhaps one or two representing the armed forces. He believes Washington, on the whole, might be preferable, because the consultations which he has in mind could be held there with less risk of publicity than in any capital of the continent.
- (b)
- Bevin is not, however, prepared to put forward this idea until he has had our response.
- (c)
- He thought, tentatively, that the Scandinavian countries should not be included, for he felt that they were too vulnerable to at least Soviet economic retaliation.
- 4.
- I could not determine whether Bevin made this suggestion as a slanting effort to entangle us at the moment in European quasi-military alliances or agreements, but I rather doubt that this was his motive, for he indicated that the measures to prevent the success of the subtle sort of aggression which has taken place all over Europe would vary as between each country.
- 5.
- In discussing the whole situation, he told me that HMG would not reduce their armed forces any further than they had previously planned. Whereas several months ago from all sides the government was being criticized for failure to shrink its defense establishments, today the government would be severely criticized from all sides were they further to contract their military, naval, and air forces.
Douglas