840.00/3–2348
Minutes of the Second Meeting of the United States–United Kingdom–Canada Security Conversations, Held at Washington, March 23, 1948
Present were all first meeting conferees, excepting Ambassadors Douglas and Inverchapel. Gen. Gruenther appeared only briefly. Hickerson opened the meeting at 1015, recessed it for lunch served in the conference room, and adjourned it at 1545.
Exploration of possible defense agreements: The pros and cons of various possible defense arrangements were discussed informally, it having been agreed that no notes would be kept until notes or views could be agreed upon by all the parties.
A world-wide Article 51 (UN Charter) pact of the free nations was explored first and abandoned as a possibility in meeting the urgencies of the present situation. It would be too cumbersome and too long in implementation. It was agreed that any approach adopted should not prejudice an ultimate development in this direction.
Extension of the Brussels Pact should not involve adherence by the US (or Canada), in Hickerson’s view, since the US hopes to see the eventual development of a United States of Western Europe (possibly later of all Europe) and the Brussels pact offers the hard core for such a development. It would lose its utility for this purpose were the US to join. It would require substantial revision if members were drawn from outside Europe.
An Atlantic pact would leave Italy out, and would equally exclude Swiss and (possibly later) German or western German participation. It was agreed that the word “Atlantic” might be changed to “Western”, which would permit inclusion of those states sharing western civilization. This would presumably exclude Greece, Turkey and Iran: there was doubt as to whether Greece and Turkey should be included [Page 65] even in an expanded Brussels agreement. Jebb suggested that there might be a Western Mutual Defense Pact plus, later, a Middle East Pact. If so, however, what could be done with Afghanistan? With India and Pakistan? Would not even China want assurances?
Hickerson pointed out that the difficulty with establishing a “hold line” is that it must be kept secret, since publication of a “hold line” is likely to convince an aggressor that everything outside the line is vulnerable to easy aggression.
Presidential declaration or defense pact are the two choices open to the US in giving assurances of military support to free nations menaced by Soviet Communism. The point was raised that while the US might in an emergency situation extend assurances of armed support against aggression on the basis of a declaration of intent, sooner or later the US would have to require reciprocal guarantees from others. Were reciprocal guarantees offered, the result would, in effect, be a mutual defense agreement. The objective, therefore, should from the outset include a pact of mutual defense against aggression to which the US (and Canada) would finally adhere.
The possibilities of a military ERP were discussed, particularly in view of the likelihood that materiel and equipment will be asked of the US (and Canada), and that requirements should be coordinated. Discussion was inconclusive. No estimates were suggested as to the extent to which the US might be asked to contribute military supplies. The consensus seemed to be that political arrangements, including US assurances, should be worked out before any related questions could be explored.
Action taken: It was agreed that each delegation would prepare a paper for a meeting at 1050 24 March suggestion [suggesting] a pattern and procedure by which:
- 1.
- A Western Mutual Defense Pact might be developed.
- 2.
- Assurances might be given, during the interim, by the US to threatened free nations of Europe.
- 3.
- Joint assurances might at the same time be given Greece, Turkey and Iran by the US and UK.
- 4.
- Efforts might be simultaneously developed to widen participation in the Brussels agreement, first by invitations to Scandinavia and Iceland, then to Portugal, Eire, Switzerland, and to Italy if De Gasperi considered the domestic Italian situation warranted an immediate invitation to membership.
The general idea of this approach would be to begin approaching agreement on the working level, of the substance of a course of action. Specific actions and timing would be examined later. It was understood that no commitments were being made by any party and that the [Page 66] problem remained one of determining objectively upon a possible best course of action.