Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

840.811/12–648

Memorandum by Mr. John W. Tuthill, Adviser in the Office of Transport and Communications, to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)

[Washington,] November 17, 1948.

Attached is a copy of the proposed note to the Soviets on the Danube Conference. …

Last week Lord Jellicoe of the British Embassy came in to give the latest British comments. These comments seemed to be aimed more at joint or parallel notes than to the desirability of the United States sending a note regardless of whether the French and British do likewise. The British objections to sending notes were: (1) A note would indicate Western ability to protest only in words and thus would emphasize Western impotence to take direct action in the Danube area; (2) a note sent to the Russians and publicized would probably result in a propaganda battle with the Russians on this issue, with the likelihood that the West would lose the propaganda battle in view of timidity, delay, etc; (3) the British public has no particular interest in this subject at this time.

Lord Jellicoe repeated the earlier British view that the Western rejection of the Danube Convention was made clear and explicit at Belgrade and that no further action seems necessary at this time.

I mentioned to Jellicoe that the British comments seemed to be aimed at parallel notes more than at the problem of an American note without reference to British and French action. I told him that if we decided to send a note anyway I would attempt to give him an advance copy for comment. With reference to the latest British comments, I pointed out that if the Russians were provoked into a reply by our note, the controversy would emphasize the fact that the issue has not yet been resolved.

I also mentioned that the U.S. has a current operating interest in the Danube in view of occupation in Germany and Austria, which operating problems are much less direct to the British and French.

Aside from the British comments, I should like to have a reappraisal of our next move on the Danube, primarily in terms of timeliness. The original decision to send a note of protest was taken six or seven weeks ago, at a time when there was a sharp exchange going on at the UN between Russia and the West. If it is believed that we are now moving into a stage when discussions might be re-opened on such problems as Austria and Germany, then I think the question of sending a provocative note, such as the attached, at this time should be carefully weighed. Accordingly, before taking any further action within the Department I should like to have your views on: (1) the desirability of sending a note at this time (it might be more appropriate, for example, to send one at a later date at the time that the Russians set up a Commission at Galatz under their Danube Convention); (2) if a note is to be sent, whether the attached is appropriate or whether a less provocative note should be drafted.

[Attachment]

Revised Draft of Proposed Note to the Soviet Union on the Danube Conference

secret

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the recent Conference held in Belgrade for the purpose of drawing up an international convention for a regime of navigation on the Danube.

The Government of the United States of America desires to advise the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the Government of the United States does not recognize the Convention signed at Belgrade August 18, 1948 by the U.S.S.R., the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Czechoslavakia, the Hungarian Republic, the People’s Republic of Rumania, the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia as having any valid international effect.

The Convention signed by seven delegations over the objections of the Governments of France, the United States of America, Austria, and the United Kingdom and, in contravention of the well established rights of Belgium, Greece and Italy, would violate the concept of international waterways which has been recognized in Europe for more than 130 years. It fails to provide an adequate basis for freedom of trade and navigation on the Danube. In this failure it negates the provisions of the peace treaties with the ex-enemy states, and also fails to carry out the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers of December 12, 1946. Moreover, the Convention omits any provision for nonriparian representation in a Danube Commission. It seeks to deprive the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Belgium, and Greece, without their consent, of treaty rights established by international agreement in 1921 and disregards the legitimate interests of non-riparian states. The rejection by the Conference of any relationship with the United Nations indicates an intention to seal off the Danubian area from normal intercourse with the rest of the world to the area’s own direct disadvantage, notwithstanding the world-wide efforts to coordinate new international undertakings with the purposes and objectives of the United Nations.

Although the Conference professed to devise a regime of navigation in the interests of all riparian states, Austria is at present denied representations on the Danube Commission proposed in the Convention and no provision whatsoever is made with respect to German participation.

The subservience of six delegations to the representative of the Soviet Union at the Conference, and the signature of the Soviet Union’s draft convention without change by those representatives on their part clearly demonstrates that the governments of these states are more concerned with complying with the wishes of the Soviet Union than in promoting the interests of their own peoples. This proposed convention, when coupled with the device of Soviet-controlled joint companies which have acquired long term exclusive control of facilities essential to the conduct of Danube commerce is clearly designed to enable the Soviet Union to maintain a monopoly of Danubian commerce. In light of numerous actions taken by these governments with respect to Western interests, this Convention can be expected to impede the economic rehabilitation of the Danubian peoples by obstructing the reestablishment of normal trade between the Danube countries and other parts of Europe.

For these reasons, the Government of the United States of America considers the Convention signed at Belgrade August 18, 1948 an instrument of Soviet Imperialism which confirms the present colonial status of the Danube States and purports to give legal sanction to their continued exploitation. In the event that a Commission is established under the terms of that Convention the Government of the United States of America can not recognize the jurisdiction of such a Commission over any part of the Danube River. The Government of the United States looks forward to the time when the states interested in the Danube as an international waterway, acting as free agents and true representatives of their people, agree upon a new Convention which effectively promotes non-discriminatory constructive utilization of the Danube. Until then the Government of the United States of America considers the Definitive Statute of the Danube, signed in Paris July 23, 1921, to be in force for the entire Danube River.

In view of the importance of the Danube River to European economic and social development, and the United Nations’ expressed interest in its international regulation, a copy of this note is being forwarded to the Secretary General of the United Nations.