Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/3–2448

Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs¹

secret

[Washington, undated.]

Certain observations regarding the present status of the Palestine problem:

(1) Our present policy with regard to Palestine, that is, support of a temporary trusteeship, is leading us in the direction of taking certain heavy responsibilities which maybe of almost indefinite duration. These responsibilities not only may be of a financial character but may eventually require the presence of American troops in Palestine and even the shedding of American blood in Palestine.

This policy is being inaugurated in the belief that (1) American public sentiment would insist on American armed intervention if necessary in order to prevent the slaughter of the Jews in Palestine; (2) such slaughter would take place following British withdrawal unless either American or Soviet troops intervene; and (3) if American troops are introduced into Palestine it would be preferable for them to go under the terms of a neutral trusteeship rather than in order to maintain law and order while partition is being carried out. It is likely that an attempt to carry out partition accompanied by the use of foreign force would eventually require the conquest by force and a continued military occupation of much of the Arab world.

(2) There are certain dangers and pitfalls inherent in our present policy. They would be inherent in any kind of a policy with regard to Palestine. A development which would render our policy a failure would be the lack of full cooperation on the part of Great Britain. Unless there is full British-American cooperation in the future with regard to Palestine, no Palestine policy can be successful; fighting will continue in that country and chaos will probably develop in the whole Middle East to an extent which will be injurious to our national interests and will adversely affect our national security.

(3) It will probably not be easy to obtain full British cooperation for our present policy because the British are extremely bitter at what they consider to be our lack of consideration for their difficulties with regard to Palestine in the past and because of their belief that internal political pressures and shifts in the United States will render the American Government an unreliable partner in the carrying out of any Palestine policy.

(4) If we are, therefore, to obtain British cooperation we must be able to give assurances that there will not be deviations in our policy with regard to Palestine as a result of internal political pressures in the United States. It would be difficult for us to give any assurances of this kind: (a) unless the United States Government decides once for all that it will not permit itself to be influenced by Zionist pressures; (b) unless the Palestine problem is fully explained to the leaders of both great political Parties, including members of Congress and Presidential candidates, and informal undertakings are obtained from them that Zionism and Palestine will not be made an issue in the coming presidential campaign.

(5) If we are to obtain British cooperation, we must also let the British know that the Executive Branch will take all possible steps in order to see that the United States will bear its fair share of the financial and military responsibilities involved.

(6) Our present policy with regard to Palestine can not possibly be successful if we take a defensive rather than a bold clear-cut attitude with regard to it both in the international and in the domestic arena. In the international field in cooperation with Great Britain, France, China, and such other powers as are willing to participate, we should insist sternly upon the laying down of arms, the cessation of the illegal entry of either Arabs or Jews and of the cessation of all smuggling of arms into Palestine. Perpetrators of acts of violence in Palestine, once trusteeship is established, must be considered as ordinary criminals and terrorists and punished as such. Any weakness on our part in this respect would be disastrous.

Internally we should take the lead in calling upon all American citizens regardless of race, creed or political party, to refrain from taking any action which might encourage the continuance of violence in Palestine. It should be made clear that the encouragement of such violence might well lead to the shedding of American blood and would be opposed to the basic interest of the United States. It is possible that a carefully planned campaign might result in freeing many American Jews from the domination of Zionist extremists.

(7) It is important that energetic steps be taken to bring the moderate Jews and Arabs in Palestine together. Both Jews and Arabs in Palestine should be given to understand that their failure to reach an agreement can only mean loss of life and property in Palestine. In particular the Jews in Palestine should be made to understand that they will receive no United States backing in case they persist in following a course of violence.

1. Transmitted to the Secretary of State by Mr. Henderson with his memorandum of March 24.