Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/4–2348: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret
us urgent

London, April 23, 1948—4 p. m.

1705. For Lovett from Douglas.

1. As you know, discussions with Bevin on Palestine are, because of British sensitiveness to the subject, extremely delicate. This morning’s British newspapers carry headlines to the effect that the British are considering joining with other countries in a trusteeship and imply that I am putting pressure on HMG to this end. These stories seem to emanate from Washington, because nothing has been said to the press here either by anyone in the Embassy or, in so far as I can tell, anyone in the Foreign Office. One story from Lake Success gives as its authority “source close to US Cabinet.” You will understand, I know, why these press accounts make my task, difficult at best, even harder. I know your difficulties. (Embtel 1697, April 22.)

2. Am confident that the British will not agree to participation in a trusteeship, unless preceded by a truce, and unless it does not involve the use of force to impose on the two parties a regime which is unacceptable to them.¹

3. It is, however, in my judgment remotely possible that if a truce can be arranged and the Jews and the Arabs can be persuaded in good faith to sit down around the table for the purpose of amicably settling their differences, the British might be persuaded to assume a major, if not exclusive, role within the limits of their reduced forces and administrative personnel in Palestine. If you agree, I should like to put the question to the British as to whether they would lend such assistance on these conditions.

4. I have not found Bevin stubborn or unfriendly. He is, however, in view of his assessment of the situation, at a loss to suggest a proposal in which he has confidence and which meets the specifications arising out of an extraordinarily delicate political situation here. In this connection, I confirmed yesterday my previously reported opinion that the Conservative Party and practically all of the Labor Party would oppose bitterly the retention of troops in Palestine.

5. As I view the situation, it divides itself into two parts: The first is the naked question of Palestine; the second is the way in which British position, as represented publicly in the US, is casting a cloud on our relations, and probably will cause, unless the situation changes, greater tension to the disadvantage of both countries everywhere. Both questions I have, of course, discussed with Bevin; the latter in an endeavor to persuade him to take some position in regard to the former. I think, however, that the matter is of sufficient importance for me to suggest tactfully to him that I discuss the issue with him and the Prime Minister, particularly stressing the second part of the question.

Douglas

1. Marginal notation on an information copy of this message in the handwriting of Mr. McClintock: “Analogous to U.S. position as stated by Austin April 20.”