501.BB Palestine/5–648: Telegram
Mr. John C. Ross to the Secretary of State
585. From Boss. [Here follows Mr. Ross’ account of his conversation with Judge Proskauer.]
Shertok–Silver. I called on Shertok by appointment this afternoon;1 when I arrived his office he said Silver had indicated desire sit in our discussion. We discussed truce about an hour, Shertok leading by saying principal objection to ten-day proposal was extension of man-date. [Page 918] This, they thought, would greatly impair their position re establishment Jewish state.
Silver said, however, they were prepared to accept immediate unconditional cease-fire for indefinite period if other side would accept. They had authority from JA Executive in Palestine for such action.
I asked what they meant by unconditional cease-fire. Silver replied it means what it says, explaining that Jews were not trying to shoot Arabs out of Arab state but Arabs were trying to do this to Jews. If Arabs will stop shooting, stop their aggression (in other words, stop interfering with establishment towards Jewish state), Jews will stop shooting. They would not attempt take new positions nor attack Arab communities, etc.
I inquired how recent affairs in Jaffa and Jerusalem squared with idea that only Arabs were aggressors. They replied with well-known line re protecting their people and positions, somewhat embarrassed, however, re Jaffa.
I brought up articles of truce, asked what were main difficulties. Silver took burden of reply to effect two principal difficulties: (1) postponement establishment Jewish state; (2) impairment their relative military position. I asked if these two points were considered more crucial than immigration.
Silver replied immigration secondary factor assuming, of course, reasonable compromise could be worked out along lines four, five, six thousand, with four thousand as rock bottom figure, and other two points he had mentioned definitely not difficult for JA. His remarks re immigration figures largely talking for effect but it was perfectly clear that present position is immigration distinctly secondary.
On question postponement establishment of state, Silver asked if this included also postponement of establishment provisional government in Jewish area.
I told him principal objective was to avoid political action establishment Jewish state May 15. Our idea was if truce could be arranged, local communities would carry on so far as possible own self-government. Here was big distinction in my mind between Jews governing themselves in their own areas and proclamation of sovereign state.
Silver then went on to say if they could establish provisional government they could forego establishment sovereign state provided there was guarantee that at end of truce period they could go ahead and establish their state.
I tried unsuccessfully to argue them out of this position, indicating that if I understood meaning word truce it meant standstill, while they were asking for a flat guarantee. We were dealing with three possible alternatives; first, on the one extreme would be renunciation for good and all of any claim to statehood. We were not asking them to accept this. Second, that the other extreme was guaranteed statehood whether [Page 919] May 15 or later. We were trying to establish a condition which was midway between these two extremes which would not prejudice their position.
I went on to point out that in my view if truce were not established they ran a very serious risk of not being able to establish their state and moreover of losing a great deal of the gains they have made over the past years, and particularly since November 29, in developing their political institutions.
Silver and Shertok argued vigorously against this point of view, Silver holding forth at some length on attitude of US Government which he described as “hostile” government in which, in effect, they had no confidence at all. How could we ask them to accept a truce and pretend to be friendly in doing so if we were not prepared to support creation of Jewish state and defend it against external aggression.
[Here follows one paragraph regarding a document given to Mr. Ross by Rabbi Silver.]
After further discussion I told Silver I wanted to be as clear as possible as to position he had stated and developed re truce. As I understood it JA might be prepared postpone establishment of state as part of truce terms provided (1) they could establish their provisional government, and (2) that objective of truce would be establishment of Jewish state or alternatively (3) that US would guarantee to prevent aggression into Palestine from neighboring Arab states. Silver confirmed this but Shertok hedged and said that two and three were essential.
During course of conversation I asked whether their worry about postponement of proclamation of sovereign state derived from fear their legal position would be impaired if they did not do so upon termination of mandate. They replied in affirmative. In this connection Silver emphasized heavy reliance JA is placing on November 29 resolution as legal basis for its action.
At another point Shertok asked why we were worried about Jews going ahead with proclamation their state May 15. Were we worried, he inquired, lest Jews might seek recognition from left to right but more left than right? If this were the case, they could assure us that they had no intention of looking in that quarter and intended to move very slowly on question of recognition.
I replied that our motive in political standstill was to prevent Jews taking the one step which would call forth counter-steps from Arab side and plunge Palestine into war. We had no motive beyond this.
Silver inquired with some suspicion about Creech Jones’ proposal for some neutral administrative regime.2 Was this a device to keep the British in or was it simply trusteeship under another name?
[Page 920]I replied I could not speak for British but as I understood proposal it was simply taking recognition of fact that a number of central administrative services are essential to welfare of community as a whole and that it might facilitate agreement between Jews and Arabs to continue these minimum services. Silver indicated by implication that Jews could be cooperative in this regard with assistance of UN.
In discussion some of legal points, Shertok turned back clock considerably to effect that establishment of Jewish state in area contemplated by November 29 resolution was very much less than Jewish position called for, their original position being Jewish state for whole of Palestine. If on May 15 Arabs proclaim Arab state for whole of Palestine rather than for Arab position, Jews would then feel free to revert to original position and proclaim Jewish state for whole of Palestine.
Although results of this conversation rather gloomy and I feel Jewish position has hardened very considerably, on other hand I feel we have two elements we may be able to develop, namely, their willingness expressed for first time to my knowledge to forego proclamation of Jewish state May 15, and their statement re accepting an immediate unconditional cease-fire for indefinite period, despite in both cases impractical conditions attached.