501.BB Palestine/5–848: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
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610. From Ross. Hare, Wilkins and I spent about three hours last night discussing with Beeley and Trafford Smith for the UK and Hopkins and Lewis for Canada the question of trusteeship for Palestine.1 We told them we saw practical value of suggestions made by Creech Jones for carrying on minimum of central administrative services.
The great weakness of Creech Jones’ plan, however, was lack of sound legal foundation in UN charter. In order to provide such sound legal foundation we had originally suggested trusteeship.
Difficulty with attempting to provide interim administrative regime based on SC powers under chapter 7 of charter was involvement in veto.
Canadians suggested possible legal basis for Creech Jones’ proposals might be article 14 of charter, providing that GA “may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation.” We pointed out such recommendation had no more validity than recommended solution by partition in November 29 resolution. Russians would be free to ignore and follow any course suited to their political objectives.
In support of necessity basing political regime on trusteeship provisions of charter we made following points:
- 1.
- When UK lays down mandate May 15 there will be no successor authority unless created by UN. Doctrine of principal allied and associated powers (US, UK, France) not accepted by British and involves [Page 937] US on too narrow a basis. US objective is broad sharing of responsibility in UN.
- 2.
- In absence of UN constituted authority with sound legal basis in charter Jews would undoubtedly argue legal foundation in November 29 resolution for proclamation their state. This legal argument could be forestalled only by involvement in very embarrassing debate in special session for suspension of November 29 resolution.
- 3.
- On Arab side, in absence of sound legal basis of trusteeship we would encounter legal difficulties with regard to Arab invasion, if Abdullah, for example, on invitation of Palestinian Arabs goes into Arab portion of Palestine.
- 4.
- If UN action taken on flimsy legal basis, problem of recognition with particular reference recognition of Jewish state by Russia and satellites would be very difficult to deal with. Thus Russian penetration of area and incidentally embarrassment to Jews themselves would be greatly facilitated.
We gave Beeley on informal and noncommital basis text of simplified draft for provisional regime based on chapter XII of charter.2 Text follows in next telegram.3 We pointed out that this draft was effort to combine our concept of necessity basing provisional regime on trusteeship provisions of charter with “British empirical” approach. Beeley said that statements made by Creech Jones in opposition to trusteeship were based on concept of trusteeship, either requiring force to implement or agreement of both parties. Beeley said Creech Jones was not opposed necessarily to concept of trusteeship as legal basis for action. In appearing to brush trusteeship aside he merely wanted to emphasize necessity of focusing attention on simple practical measures that might be taken.
We pointed out that our present concept did not require force to implement but would provide opportunity to seek forces if necessary.
We also pointed out that at present we do not have in mind imposing trusteeship in absence agreement of parties. On other hand if we have sound legal framework we feel getting agreement of parties on specific administrative steps to be taken would be facilitated.
Canadians raised question how we would deal with problem of warfare in Palestine in absence of forces to implement trusteeship. We replied that if circumstances indicated threat to peace in Palestine this would be matter for SC. This comment led us into discussion of sanctions. British outlined probable developments as they envisage them. Haganah in alliance with Irgun were on the march and could not be restricted to Jewish area. They would be in effect the aggressors against Arab communities and Arab parts of Palestine. Arab action would probably be restricted to “invasion” only of Arab areas and defensive operations against Jews. There would probably be weak [Page 938] legal basis for sanctions against Arabs. In any event if by sanctions we meant force this impossible because forces required would be very large and are not forthcoming. British position not to supply forces for this purpose reiterated flatly.
On question of economic sanctions against Arabs, British said they could not envisage any economic sanctions we might apply that would not hurt us more than it would the Arabs. They said flatly that in the British view any attempt to apply economic sanctions against the Arab states would wreck the Marshall Plan and everything we are trying to do in Western Europe. They mentioned the essentiality of oil supplies in this connection. Beeley said that relations with the Arab world were basic to Commonwealth policy.
On question of sanctions against Jews, Beeley expressed frank doubts whether US Government would in show-down apply against Jews only effective sanction which would be to stop flow of dollars which enabled Jews to support their military potential. We replied question was obviously hypothetical and we could not undertake to say what US Government might do. We did say, however, that our present mood is considerably firmer in this regard than it has been.
Beeley said there was one sanction which he felt might be most equitable and feasible against both Jews and Arabs, namely, arms embargo not only for Palestine but for entire Middle East if necessary. He was quite categorical in his statements to effect that flow of arms to Arab states could be controlled.
The main question in his mind, however, was whether US would maintain effective embargo on shipment of arms from US to Jews.
We indicated that US control of shipments from this country was rigid. We raised question of necessity of blockade to control importation of arms, whether by Jews or Arabs. Beeley agreed blockade necessary and we asked him if British would be prepared to participate in contribution naval forces for this purpose. He said he could not speak for his government but his personal guess was that they would agree to participate.
In response to Canadian question, Beeley said UK Government would certainly not contribute as much as 80 percent.
It was clear in context of Beeley’s remarks that he envisaged some kind of joint UN action, although probably by or on behalf of powers administering trusteeship.
On this later point British are very skeptical of our concept of UN itself as administering authority. They appear to have in mind possibility of group of powers in which connection Beeley said that UK would not necessarily be willing to be one of administering powers.
We all agreed that prospects for large majority in favor of specific proposal based on compromise of US and UK views would be very [Page 939] good and that we could probably get one or two other members of UN to introduce such proposal, if desirable.
Canadians said very emphatically they would support anything on which US and UK agreed.
In conclusion we agreed to cooperate in development of draft compromise proposal. Beeley is cabling London to find out if UK Government will support legal concept of trusteeship, and will do his best to get reply by Monday.
He asked us if his government replied in negative whether US would support proposal along lines Creech Jones’ suggestions. We replied we did not like to say no but we very strongly preferred our trusteeship approach. We agreed to ask Department for answer to Beeley’s question.
Entire foregoing conversation was on most informal basis and without any commitments given or implied by participants.
We cannot emphasize too strongly very tight time schedule against which we are now operating. Assuming maximum of good will on part of most members of Assembly and minimum of obstructionism from Soviets, their satellites and few others, we have to get through subcommittee, committee one itself, and plenary session and meanwhile carry on intensive negotiations outside of committee structure. We consider, therefore, that decision on line we are to follow is essential by Monday at latest.
We are continuing work with British in effort to develop compromise draft which we hope to send you tonight or tomorrow morning.
Our general impression following this conversation is rather more heartening than impression we had following conversation with Shertok yesterday afternoon.4 British seemed to be making effort to cooperate with us. On other hand, we cannot but recall that these matters have been discussed very fully for several months with British here, in Washington and in London without being productive of British willingness to support, and it is a little difficult to understand this apparent sudden change in attitude at this eleventh hour, and to determine whether present conversations will result in real and continuing support for a compromise plan.
New impression we get out of this discussion with reference to Abdullah invasion and effective partition with Jewish state concept, is that instead of pursuing clear-cut objective British seem to take it for granted that this is inevitable solution which will result after laying down mandate, together with defeatist attitude toward possibility of guiding this or any other solution through peaceful channels rather than leaving it to parties to shoot it out.
British appeared to be working on hypothesis that intervention by neighboring Arab states, aside from Transjordan, would be of negligible [Page 940] importance but that Transjordan would be factor with which to reckon. We noted that such being the case British, through their special relations with Abdullah, would be in position to exercise decisive influence in stabilizing situation. Beeley made evasive reply to effect that British control of Abdullah not as great as might be imagined.