867N.01/5–2148
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
| Participants: | Mr. Lovett |
| Sir John Balfour, British Chargé d’Affaires | |
| Mr. Henderson, NEA | |
| Mr. Rusk, UNA |
Sir John Balfour called upon me today in order to convey orally certain views which he had just received from Mr. Bevin by telegram regarding developments in Palestine.
Sir John explained that Mr. Bevin thought it desirable for Mr. Marshall to have these views in mind so as to avoid the British getting to unnecessary cross-purposes with the Americans, and so that Mr. Marshall should be aware that there were certain courses of action to which the British Government could not agree. The following is a summary of the views of Mr. Bevin as set forth by Sir John:
Mr. Bevin is particularly anxious that, over Palestine as over other matters, the British and the Americans should not drift apart, and it would obviously be dangerous if the situation were to develop in such a way that the Americans were giving increased support to one party and the British to the other.
Nonetheless, there are certain points of policy concerning Palestine from which Mr. Bevin cannot deviate. He does not intend in the near future to recognise the Jewish state, nor to support any proposal that it should become a member of the United Nations. In this connection, Mr. Bevin hopes that, even though the United States Government may have recognised the Jewish state de facto, they will not commit themselves to any precise recognition of boundaries. It might well be that, if the two sides ever accept a compromise, it would be on the basis of boundaries differing from those recommended in the partition plan of the General Assembly.
Mr. Bevin also hopes that the United States Government will feel able to maintain its arms embargo. If this is raised, HMG will almost certainly be obliged to raise their own embargo on the export of arms to certain Arab states, and the unfortunate position will then be reached of one side being largely armed by the Americans and the other by the British.
Mr. Bevin cannot agree to any action under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter at least at this stage, since the situation in Palestine is so confused that an impartial assessment of the true position is needed before any such drastic action is taken, the effect of which would be to place the blame upon one party only.
[Page 1020]Further, it must be remembered that, under the terms of the British treaty with Trans-Jordan, HMG would be obliged to go to Trans-Jordan’s assistance in the event of an incursion by forces from outside into Trans-Jordan territory, and that this situation may come about should the Jews obtain military successes and pursue retreating Arab forces over the frontier into Trans-Jordan.
Mr. Bevin points out that the development of United States policy over Palestine has unfortunately placed a heavy strain on Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East. It has had the effect of arousing bitter Arab resentment against the United States in an area which the British and American Governments regard as of high strategic and political importance to both of them. Unless the Arab countries can be induced to retain some confidence in the friendly understanding and fairness of both the United States Government and HMG on the Palestine issue, they may turn away from Western countries altogether.
With these thoughts among many others in mind, Mr. Bevin earnestly hopes that the United States Government will acquaint HMG with any further initiatives on their part which might compel the latter to take a different line or oppose their actions. His Majesty’s Government are anxious that the actions of the United States and themselves should conform to the real interests in the Middle East which they share in common.