501.BB Palestine/6–548: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
urgent
753. The Secretariat, in the late afternoon of June 4, upon receiving the queries of Count Bernadotte regarding need for clarification of the SC May 29 resolution in respect to immigration, initially called a meeting of the SC for June 5. Secretariat officials agreed with El-Khouri’s1 view that neither he nor the SYG were competent to interpret the resolution. However, after some delay, and with the assistance of USUN, telephonic communication was established between Lake Success and Cairo, in which Cordier2 expressed to Bunche the SYG’s view that an SC meeting to interpret its resolution would lead to confusion rather than clarification.
Bunche reported that Arabs and Jews were not far apart in their position and apparently did not absolutely insist that the SC must define the terms of the resolution in minute detail. However, Bernadotte wished to be sure that he would not later be accused of preempting SC functions if he were to interpret the SC resolution as best he could. He also sought assurance that if he took a strong initiative he would not be accused of exceeding his role.
After consultation with El-Khouri, Cordier, on instructions from [Page 1099] Lie, informed Bunche for Bernadotte that it was the view of the President of the SC and the SYG that the SC resolution basically meant that neither side should improve its military position during the cease fire and, as El-Khouri insisted on adding, the resolution did not prejudice the rights or position of either party. Bernadotte was also assured that it was the intention of the SC that he should have a free hand to bring about an end to the hostilities.
In presenting this opinion, the SYG was reinforced by the strong protest which Parodi had entered against an SC meeting to interpret the resolution.
Cordier informed USUN that Bunche was quite optimistic about the prospects of achieving a cease fire by Monday, June 7.
The Secretariat was informed by Bernadotte during the course of the telephone conversation that the 5 Swedish officers flying to Cairo on June 5 would be considered by him as members of his personal staff to be used in supervising the cease fire order. He expected the French, Belgian and American observers to have a somewhat different status as officers of members of the SCTC. Neither Bunche nor Bernadotte has mentioned the alleged request to the USSR to provide military observers.
Bunche informed Cordier that Bernadotte would probably ask for 3 or 4 naval patrol vessels, preferably neither British nor American, to patrol the Palestine and adjacent coasts.
- Faris el-Khouri, Syrian
Representative at the United Nations and, at this time, President of
the Security Council. During the proceedings of the Council on June
3, he announced that “The matter is already in the hands of the
Mediator, who has the full confidence of the Security Council to
understand and interpret the text of the resolution which he now
has, in a way which he may deem to be correct.
“If that interpretation is challenged, the matter will then he submitted to the Security Council for further consideration. Then and only then would such a point as interpretation be discussed.”
He concluded that the Mediator “should be given a free hand to act in accordance with the resolutions which he now has before him” (SC, 3rd yr., No. 79, p. 29).
↩ - Andrew W. Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.↩