Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/6–3048: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup) to the Secretary of State

top secret
urgent

New York, June 30, 1948—8:30 p. m.

831. Department may find following comments, which are framed largely in light of accumulation of data acquired by USUN in conversations here over several months, helpful in formulating our policy with regard to the “peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine.”

A. Probable Effectiveness of Bernadotte

1. Latest information from Bernadotte, in particular his personal telegram to Lie of June 20 (reported to Department orally June 21; text sent to Department as USUN 809¹) indicates that Bernadotte’s tactics will be to try to gain time and to make rather vague proposals instead of precise and firm proposals during remainder of first four-week truce period.

2. Paragraph 3 of London’s 2701² indicates that Bevin is inclined to think that Arabs and Jews may not reach agreement under Bernadotte’s auspices without much delay, and then probably not without USG and HMG getting involved to some degree as sources of advice.

3. Opinion here, based on recent conversations with Beeley, McNaughton, Parodi, Asil, Eban, Lie and others, would go somewhat further than Bevin’s somewhat modest comment. General view here is that sooner or later Bernadotte will be confronted with basically extreme and apparent irreconcilable Jewish and Arab positions and that at this point influence of US and UK will be essential to persuade parties to come to terms.

4. We are glad to note Department’s agreement (2348 from Washington to London³) with Bevin’s suggestion concerning the development of a common policy with UK in regard to Palestine as reported in paragraph 4 of London’s 2701. It is our view that this is essential not only to facilitate Bernadotte’s task but also for the broader reasons dealt with in earlier discussions with the British in London, Washington, and New York. Friendly delegations here have freely expressed to us view that US–UK cooperation re Palestine essential to prevent growth of Soviet influence in area.

5. We feel that Bernadotte should be given as free a hand as possible. Also, with a single reservation, we consider it axiomatic that any solution upon which Bernadotte can get the two parties to agree should be acceptable to US and UK (reference paragraph 2, London’s 2701 and paragraph 6, London’s 2785⁴). Reservation is that although perhaps very unlikely it is conceivable that such solution in some particular aspect might be contrary to our interests. We feel we should avoid giving to Bernadotte any impression that so far as we are concerned he has a completely blank check. To avoid such impression we suggest we inform Bernadotte discreetly that we are definitely interested in any proposed solution. This might best be done by letting Bernadotte know very informally through UN Secretariat here that USG would be very glad to give him its comments on any suggests or proposals he may make from time to time to the parties. This procedure would also serve dual purpose of keeping us fully informed concerning Secretariat views. We consider this very important since Secretariat influence is probably predominant in light of Lie-Bernadotte friendship, fact that strong Secretariat personnel is attached to Lie, and fact that US–UK have very little direct contact with Bernadotte.

B. Extension of Truce

1. Representative of PGI here has reiterated that truce is definitely to advantage of Israel. Obvious advantages are PGI is provided by truce with opportunity to consolidate its position; this includes putting down such revolts as recent Irgun affair at Tel-Aviv. Also opinion in Arab states as well as world public opinion would more readily get accustomed to idea of State of Israel under peaceful conditions. An opportunity would be provided for more diplomatic recognitions and exchange of representatives.

2. Parenthetically, it is obviously important from the viewpoint of our relations with Israel and other governments and in dealing with this question in UN to know whether or not PGI will continue to be able in fact to deal effectively not only with the Irgun but also with the Sternists and other dissident elements, particularly those susceptible to Communist influence. This is a particularly difficult problem with respect to Jerusalem (Jerusalem’s 963⁵). As we see it, problem here to which we suggest Department give urgent attention is whether Mediator should be expected to deal with this aspect of problem in Jerusalem, bearing in mind possible complications with respect to use of proposed armed guards or whether PGI should be expected to deal with problem and if so how they might be assisted in doing so, bearing in mind Israel does not have nor does it claim any legal or de facto control in Jerusalem.

3. Arabs, of course, might object initially to extension of truce because of advantages derived therefrom by Israel. On other hand, evidence indicates that Arabs for most part are tired of fighting and have been shown up as poorly organized and equipped from military viewpoint. It seems clear that only Transjordan has a respectable fighting force but stands more to gain by a negotiated settlement.

4. Extension of truce would provide opportunity to de-emphasize, to some extent at least, political aspects of the future settlement and in turn to begin emphasizing those aspects, particularly economic, with regard to which it might be considerably easier to find a common ground for agreement, thus facilitating the political settlement.

5. Having indicated in a general way to UK and to Bernadotte (Department’s 658 to Jerusalem⁶) that we favor extension of truce, we suggest that Department now give urgent consideration to question whether truce should be extended only for additional four-weeks period or for a longer period, say a minimum of eight weeks or a maximum of six months. Advantages of six months extension, if feasible, would be (a) more time for passions to cool off; (b) more time and better atmosphere for Bernadotte to work out extremely complex and difficult negotiations; (c) more time to work out details of concerted policy with British; (d) more time for developing our relations with Israel and Arab states towards the desired ends; (e) minimizing risk of breakdown of mediation efforts because question extension of truce not coming up every few weeks; (f) minimizing of exploitation of issues in public discussion periodically in SC; (g) minimizing of opportunity for exploitation and possible reopening of whole question in Paris GA; (h) while we would not, of course, wish in any sense to delay peaceful settlement, Department might consider it preferable if recurrent issues and crisis of final stage of negotiations could be avoided before end of year or first of next year.

C. Minimum Requirements for Peaceful Adjustment

1. Full sovereignty for Israel. We feel (a) that PGI will never accept any compromise with full sovereignty for Israel; (b) that opinion this country will not permit any deviation from this objective so far as USG is concerned; and (c) that Soviets, satellite and probably other governments will support Israeli view. Eban, PGI representative here, has recently made view his government on this point very clear to us. While current British thinking seems leaning direction basing future settlement on recognition Israel, it seems essential to us to clarify earliest with British and at appropriate time to make clear to Arabs, Bernadotte and others concerned exactly what “recognition of Israel” means. Even very moderate Arab opinion reflected in Asil–Ross conversation indicates Arabs would hold out for “compromising” Israeli sovereignty re (a) conduct foreign relations, (b) defense, (c) finance, and (d) immigration. Regarding (d), in our opinion PGI must be given full freedom to control immigration but we would not exclude possibility PGI might adopt and announce in advance of settlement its own immigration limitation based upon capacity to support and absorb immigrants. Regarding (a), (b) and (c) we see no insuperable obstacle to agreement between PGI and Abdullah on some treaty formulation of common action perhaps by analogy to frequently mentioned Austro-Hungarian precedent. Viewpoint other Arabs, particularly Syria, as reflected recent conversations here with Khouri and cables from Damascus, indicates more extreme view. If Bevin, reported by Beeley two weeks ago still to be leaning in direction federated state, should feel impelled to support even moderate Arab viewpoint, result might well be another serious split on this fundamental point in US–UK understanding.

2. Support of Israel’s application for membership in UN. While not necessarily a condition of the future settlement it is clear that Israel attaches considerable importance to support for its application for membership. It seems axiomatic that such assurances would be forthcoming from the US and the UK; at the proper time we might appropriately express to the Arab Governments the hope that if they could not fully support Israel’s application they would at least refrain from opposing it.

3. Status of Abdullah. The process of peaceful adjustment is greatly complicated by relations among the Arab states and the AHC. Our evidence here, which is confirmed by cables from the area, indicates that the Arab [Higher] Committee and the Mufti are no longer a factor of any importance. The influence of Azzam, SYG of the Arab League, and the solidarity of the League with regard to Palestine also seem to be considerably lessened. This impression is strengthened by current reports of Abdullah’s visits to Farouk and Ibn Saud. Although from political viewpoint the influence of certain Arab League governments may still be great, it seems clear that Abdullah is the only one who has any very substantial material bargaining power. Abdullah’s influence is based principally on his army and UK backing. The evidence seems clear that none of the other Arab states have armed forces available which can even begin to compare in organization, efficiency, and numbers with the Haganah. On the basis of earlier conversations with Shertok when he was here and more recently with Eban it seems wholly clear that Abdullah is probably the only Arab with whom the Jews might successfully, from their viewpoint, undertake definitive negotiations. Same source (Eban) discounts importance and influence other Arab states, particularly Syria. It also seems clear as indicated above that Abdullah has far more to gain from a negotiated settlement than from continuing to fight. Moreover, it seems clear that in this affair Abdullah is more susceptible to UK influence and control than any of the other Arab states. These thoughts lead us to the conclusion that we should reach an early understanding with the British on the point that Abdullah is the principal bargaining factor on the Arab side. This does not, of course, imply that we would in any way neglect the interests of the other Arab states or the importance of maintaining the friendliest of relations with them.

4. Recognition of Transjordan by the US. We are not familiar with reasons why US has not hitherto recognized Transjordan although we have supported her application for membership in UN. In any event, we feel that recognition of Transjordan, exchange of diplomatic representatives, and continued support of its application for membership in UN” would be important ingredients in the overall solution.

5. Boundary adjustments. In return for unequivocal recognition of the full sovereignty of Israel it seems reasonable to us to envisage a readjustment of the boundaries of Israel. From the Israeli viewpoint the territorial case for Israel is based on the November 29 resolution and on de facto military control. We have expressed the personal view to Eban here that Israel’s legal case under the November 29 resolution with respect to boundaries is relatively weak. Also personally, Eban has in effect admitted this and indicated they consider their de facto position resulting from military operations much stronger. On the latter point Eban claims that Israel is in de facto control not only of the November 29 territory but also of western Galilee. In recent conversations with Eban he has expressed in a general way the hope that the US would support the “territorial integrity” of Israel. On the other hand, he has specifically said that if there were any Arab (implying Abdullah) with whom Israel could negotiate on the basis of full recognition of Israel’s sovereignty, they would be prepared to consider boundary adjustments. This comment was, of course, wholly personal and may have been meant to imply only minor boundary rectifications rather than any more substantial territorial changes. A more extreme Jewish viewpoint is represented by Rabbi Silver’s recent statement attacking the British for desiring to impair the territorial integrity of Israel. Department has probably also noted Eichelberger’s June 16 memorandum to AAUN chapters and affiliated organizations attacking the concept of territorial change, and Sumner Welles’ column, June 29. It is our estimate that the PGI attaches far more importance to the question of sovereignty than to the question of the November 29 or present de facto boundaries and might be willing, therefore, to consider reasonable and balanced territorial adjustments.

6. Arab areas of Palestine. On the Arab side we should make up our mind whether we favor establishment of a Palestinian Arab state or extension of the boundaries of Transjordan to take in the Arab areas of Palestine as those areas may be determined. We favor the latter course for the following reasons:

a. The British, as indicated recently by Beeley, would favor this course.

b. The Jews, as indicated by Eban, would favor this.

c. With the decline of the Mufti and the AHC there is no apparent leadership among the Palestinian Arabs around whom could be built the nucleus of a Palestinian state.

d. Presumably Abdullah would prefer this arrangement.

7. Specific territorial proposals. Assuming that Israel, having established the principle of full sovereignty as a basis of negotiation and settlement, would be willing to negotiate for territorial changes, such changes along the lines in part suggested very privately and personally by Beeley in conversation here and Washington, namely as follows, might seem reasonable

a. Transfer of the Negeb to Transjordan.

b. Transfer of western Galilee to Israel.

c. Transfer of Jaffa to Israel.

d. Transfer to Israel of subdistricts marked Jenin and Tulkarm on November 29 GA map.

e. Rectification of eastern boundary of Israel to provide that coastal railway (Haifa, Tulkarm, Lydda, Gazza, etc.) lies within said boundaries rather than criss-crossing the boundary.

f. Internationalization of Jerusalem.

8. Comments on specific territorial proposals.

(a) The transfer of the Negeb to Transjordan would provide an outlet to the sea for Transjordan and according to Beeley, in lieu of Jaffa a port could more or less readily be constructed along the Arab coastline. As Beeley has pointed out, principal communication routes between the Arab hinterland, on the one hand and the Arab coastal area and Egypt, on the other, run through the northern part of the Negeb. From the Jewish point of view there is some evidence that their interest in the Negeb may have been primarily for its bargaining value. There is also some hint, however, that there is a possibility of oil deposits in the area. On the latter point consideration might be given as a makeweight in the concession by Israel of the Negeb to arrangements for the joint and equitable economic development of the area, thus protecting the economic interests of Israel in the event that at some future time substantial oil deposits should be discovered. Such economic arrangements might also provide for Jewish participation in irrigation and colonization prospects.

(b) The transfer of western Galilee to Israel would be part of the makeweight in return for concession of the Negeb by Israel. It is our understanding that this area is a richer one although very considerably smaller than the Negeb. Moreover, from the point of view of Israel, its transfer would create a more compact and defensible state. Although the population of this area is understood to be predominantly Arab, there is no reason to believe that this Arab population, in the event of a peaceful settlement, would suffer any disabilities. On the contrary there is every reason to believe that their inclusion within the boundaries of Israel might well lead to a substantial improvement in their material welfare and guarantees of their minority rights would be provided for.
In general, particularly in light recent reports re Jewish restriction on return of Arabs to Jewish territory, minority regime, perhaps under UN guarantee on basis comparable to League of Nations Upper Silesian plan should be explored. It would, of course, be understood that Arabs could control or prohibit future immigration of Jews into Arab territory.

(c) Although Jaffa was set aside in the November 29 partition plan as part of the Arab state, we do not believe that it would be sound to perpetuate this enclave within Israel and next door to Tel-Aviv. Quite aside from the fact that the Jews are in de facto control of Jaffa, perpetuation of its status as an Arab conclave could only lead as we see it to perpetuation of the risk of conflict between Arabs and Jews.

(d) With reference to the Jenin–Tulkarm areas, in discussing the territorial aspects of the peaceful adjustment with Beeley, we raised with him the possibility of transferring the entire northern half above Jerusalem of the central Arab area under the November 29 plan to Israel, together with western Galilee. Our thought was that the transfer of this area to Israel would more nearly balance the transfer of the Negeb. Beeley felt that the transfer of the northern half of the central Arab area would be unwise since it was almost exclusively populated by Arabs, while an insignificant number of Jews would be involved in the transfer of the Negeb. We are not convinced, however, that this transfer would be unwise. As a minimum we feel that consideration should be given to the transfer of the above-mentioned Jenin–Tulkarm areas to Israel.

(e) The proposal that the eastern frontier of Israel be rectified to include the coastal railway was made by McNaughton in private conversation and not dissented from by Beeley. It seems to us obvious that if the frontier is not rectified as indicated, there might be innumerable petty administrative difficulties. On the other hand we have no evidence that such boundary rectification would be a substantial concession to the Jews.

(f) It is our belief that the Jews would be very strongly opposed to transferring Jerusalem to Transjordan. Also, for the reasons set forth in USUN’s 808⁷ on armed guards for Jerusalem, the Jewish point of view is very likely to be strongly supported by public opinion generally in this country and elsewhere. Although Beeley personally opposed the internationalization of Jerusalem and favored its inclusion in a greater TransJordania as Abdullah’s capital, Douglas’ 2785 indicated the British might be willing to agree to internationalization. If Jerusalem were to be internationalized we feel that the international area should be reduced from the November 29 plan to include the city alone. If the mediator is successful in his current effort to obtain Arab-Jewish agreement for the demilitarization of Jerusalem and for the establishment of a UN armed guard, the first and most important steps will have been taken towards the internationalization of the city. This de facto arrangement might continue until such time as definitive arrangements can be worked out by the TC, should this be necessary or by relying on Lie’s power to appoint a successor to Evans which we understand Lie has under British municipal ordinance establishing this post.

9. Status of Haifa. We have noted recent telegrams concerning the status of Haifa and particularly the British view expressed in Douglas’ 2785 that this city might also be internationalized. We would be inclined to oppose this, at least as part of a permanent settlement, for the following reasons: Haifa was included within the November 29 boundaries of the Jewish state; the Jews are in de facto control of the city; there would be far less support publicly for the internationalization of Haifa than in the case of Jerusalem; the responsibilities of international administration under circumstances we cannot now foresee would be greater in terms of the economic and strategic importance of the pipeline than we might be willing in advance to turn over to the UN Secretariat or a group of powers. Such considerations do not apply to Jerusalem which is now in the process of demilitarization and de facto international control. On the other hand, it would seem to us that an economic arrangement for Haifa would avoid many of the political problems and would be therefore more workable in view of the interest which both Israel and Iraq have in the oil supply. Such arrangement might provide for a free port at Haifa including the port and refinery area.

10. Territorial guarantees. Assuming that it may be possible to work out territorial adjustments that both Jews and Arabs can agree to, it seems clear that both parties would wish to have territorial guarantees. It has obviously been one of the greatest Arab fears that Jews, once obtaining a foothold in Palestine, would use this as a basis for territorial expansion not only throughout Palestine but into the neighboring Arab states. On the other hand, from our conversations with the Jews here, we have some indications that they are fearful Abdullah might be bent on conquest and therefore not long content with territorial adjustments worked out in dealing with the current phase of the problem. For reasons indicated to Beeley in recent conversations with him, UK treaty relations with Abdullah do not seem to us to meet fully what is required. A joint US–UK guarantee to both parties would not seem to be practical politics. It is difficult to anticipate any special territorial guarantee by the UN; in any event, it may be anticipated that neither party would feel entirely confident in the ability of the UN at this stage of its development to guarantee its frontiers. A combination of measures may be necessary in this situation.

11. Specific proposal for territorial guarantees. The most direct and simple approach would be arrangements including nonaggression and mutual defense pacts between Israel and greater Trans Jordania. Non-aggression and mutual defense pacts might also be concluded between Israel and Syria and Lebanon. This might seem paradoxical in the case of Israel because of the present extreme anti-Israel views of the Syrian Government. It might be argued, however, that the real reason for present Syrian extremism is not so much fear of Israel as fear of the expansion of Transjordan and increase in Abdullah’s prestige in the light of his former Greater Syrian ideas.⁸ In other words, a fear that a settlement based on arrangements between Israel and Abdullah would be only a stepping stone for the latter, his next step being attempted expansion into Syria. In view of the fact that from all accounts the Syrian Army is nothing to boast about it might be thought reasonable to assume that the Syrian Government would more than welcome non-aggression and mutual defense pacts with Israel. Such arrangements between Israel, on the one hand, and her immediate neighbors on the other might lead in turn to the transformation of the present Arab League, which is based on racial, religious and nationalist lines, into a politically mature organization along the lines of the Western European Union and our own arrangements in the Western Hemisphere. Such an organization might be expanded to include Turkey, Iran and possibly Afghanistan and in this sense provide a bulwark against Soviet aggression. It would be a regional organization within the purview of the UN Charter providing for guarantees of territorial integrity and procedures for consultation and action in the settlement of disputes.

12. Economic arrangements. It is our view that a settlement based on political and territorial factors alone would not be so easily attainable nor would it be viable unless substantial arrangements of an economic and related character were provided for. The prospect of finding common areas of agreement between Israel, on the one hand, and Arab states, on the other, might be greater in the economic field than in the political. Moreover, with the exception of Transjordan the Arab states initially at least are likely to assess at considerably less than their real value the advantages of restoring peace and stability in Palestine through a settlement based upon recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Israel as that territory may be determined by agreement. Economic advantages offered in connection with, if not actually as a part of the future settlement would be a powerful inducement, as we see it, to acceptance by the other Arab states of a reasonable solution of the Palestine problem. Such assistance would also have the advantage of contributing to the stability of the governments concerned, thus permitting a more orderly and progressive economic and political development and minimizing the risk of an increase in Communist influence. Of the Arab representatives here, those of Iraq and Egypt in particular have frequently discussed the question of economic assistance with US. The PGI representative here has indicated his belief in the importance of economic cooperation in Palestine. The PGI has also, we understand, formally requested from this government financial assistance in the form of a loan. The pressure to grant such a loan will presumably be very great and if granted we can hardly expect that our relations with the Arab states would be improved unless we grant comparable economic assistance to them. In any event, in the absence of an overall program of economic assistance and development for the area and taking into account the superior organizing ability, efficiency and resources, both human and financial, of Israel as compared with the Arab states, the economic development of Israel is likely to outstrip that of the surrounding Arabs, leading to expansionist pressures in Israel and jealousy and resentment among the Arabs.

13. Economic self-help. Section D of the November 29 partition plan concerning economic union provides a basis for the beginnings of an economic program, although perhaps not applicable in all particulars to the newly envisaged relationships between Israel and Transjordan. We envisage that an essential part of the settlement would have to be a minimum of economic arrangements between Israel and Transjordan. These might include as contemplated in the November 29 plan (a) a customs union; (b) a joint currencies system; (c) operation of railways, highways, ports, etc.; (d) joint economic development, and (e) access to water and power facilities. Specific projects might include a Jordan Valley authority and agreement, as indicated above, for the joint development of irrigation and colonization projects in the Negeb. Paralleling the development of political cooperation (paragraphs 10 and 11 above) economic arrangement between Transjordan and Israel might be extended to Lebanon and Syria and in turn the area as a whole. In this connection it should be envisaged that at an early date Israel would become a full-fledged member of the newly proposed Middle Eastern Economic Commission. It is unthinkable that Israel would be excluded from full partnership in this commission. As we see it, the advantages to the Arabs of full membership for Israel are obvious. We assume that the Department has these factors in mind in preparing for the forthcoming ECOSOC meeting at Geneva at which we understand the question of the ECME will be considered, although we do not anticipate time is yet ripe for forcing issue.

14. International assistance. We refer in this connection to the sections in Ambassador Austin’s statement in Committee One of the recent special session concerning the economic development of Palestine and the role of UN agencies therein. Specialized agencies such as the FAQ, the Bank, the Fund, the WHO and UNESCO might undertake at the request of the mediator with the concurrence of Israel and Abdullah comprehensive studies of the needs of Palestine. Such studies might at a later stage be broadened to include other countries in the area, possibly in connection with the program of the ECME. The International Bank might be in a position to grant development loans to assist in the carrying out of joint Israeli-Trans Jordan projects and the Stabilization Fund might be of assistance in any currency arrangements. Because of special position of holy places in Palestine outside Jerusalem, Magnes plan for UNESCO Commission for this protection is worth consideration.

15. Assistance by US. It is our view that a program of economic assistance and development should be worked out to the fullest extent possible on an international (UN) basis. We should satisfy ourselves in considering any specific proposals that the project in question cannot be effectively dealt with by international means. Furthermore, we should assure ourselves that to the fullest extent possible any projects for which we grant loans or other assistance should be of a self-liquidating character. Instead of attempting to deal with the problem of US assistance on a piecemeal basis, we would suggest that Department formulate a comprehensive program of US aid to the Middle Eastern countries, including Israel, for presentation to the new Congress in January if possible. We suggest that such a program be developed on the basis of ERP principles and in consistency with the work of the UN specialized agencies, of the ECME, and in close collaboration with the UK. In developing such a program we should bear in mind the desirability of shifting the major portion of the load to private investment as soon as peaceful conditions permit.⁹

Jessup

1. Dated June 23, not printed; tout see footnote 1, p. 1138.
2. Dated June 18, p. 1121.
3. Dated June 22, p. 1133.
4. Dated June 24, p. 1143.
5. Dated June 24, p. 1141.
6. Dated June 25, p. 1150.
7. Dated June 23, not printed.
8. For previous documentation on the efforts by Transjordan for a Greater Syria, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. v, pp. 738 ff.
9. For continuation of this communication, see telegram 837, July. 1, p. 1180.