867N.01/1–2848

The Secretary of State to Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, at Hyde Park

Dear Mrs. Roosevelt: I have your two letters1 giving me a frank expression of your views on Palestine.

We are trying hard to formulate and follow policies with regard to Palestine which would seem most likely to promote peace and maintain the prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations. At the same time we must not ignore the humanitarian aspects of the problem.

It is very unfortunate that the delicate situation in Palestine should be made so explosive by the acts of terror and violence committed by both Jewish and Arab elements. Their lack of restraint is not only increasing human misery and suffering but also makes the implementation of the General Assembly’s recommendations all the more difficult. The political situation in this country does not help matters.

Since the appropriate organs of the United Nations are now dealing with the Palestine question, we feel that so far as possible we should, approach the problem through the United Nations rather than unilaterally.

A decision by the United States, for instance, to permit American arms to go to Palestine and neighboring states would facilitate acts of violence and the further shedding of blood and thus render still more difficult the task of maintaining law and order. We are continuing, therefore, to refuse to license the shipment of arms to that area.

I am told that the United Nations Commission provided for in the November 29 resolution of the General Assembly will shortly make [Page 630] a supplementary report on the question of security iii Palestine. It is to be hoped that the report will be of genuine aid to the members of the United Nations in deciding upon a practical course of action which gives some hope for a tranquil solution.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall
[Extracts]

First Special Report of the United Nations Palestine Commission to the Security Council: The Problem of Security in Palestine1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

[II] 9. The main facts controlling the security situation in Palestine today are the following:

(a)
Organized efforts are being made by strong Arab elements inside and outside Palestine to prevent the implementation of the Assembly’s plan of partition and to thwart its objectives by threats and acts of violence, including armed incursions into Palestinian territory.
(b)
Certain elements of the Jewish community in Palestine continue to commit irresponsible acts of violence which worsen the security situation, although that community is generally in support of the recommendations of the Assembly.
(c)
An added complication is created by the fact that the Mandatory Power, which remains responsible for law and order in Palestine until the termination of the Mandate, is engaged in the liquidation of its administration and is preparing for the evacuation of its troops.

VIII. Conclusion

1.
The pertinent facts in support of the Commission’s unavoidable decision to call upon the Security Council for assistance in the discharge of its duty to the General Assembly are evident. The United Nations has taken a firm decision regarding the future government of Palestine. Following that decision the General Assembly created this Commission as its agent in the matter and charged it with responsibility, under the guidance of the Security Council, for implementing the Assembly’s recommendations. This Commission now finds itself confronted with an attempt to defeat its purposes, and to nullify the resolution of the General Assembly.
2.
For the above reasons the Commission has decided to refer to the Security Council the problem of providing that armed assistance which alone would enable the Commission to discharge its responsibilities on the termination of the Mandate, because it is convinced that there is no step which it can take under the resolution of the Assembly to improve the security situation in Palestine between now and the termination of the Mandate.
3.
The Commission realizes that time is a factor of utmost importance in its endeavor to fulfil the mandate given to it by the General Assembly. The Commission, therefore must emphasize the compelling need for prompt action, in order to avert great bloodshed and human suffering in Palestine, and to assist the implementation of the resolution which the Commission, notwithstanding all difficulties, is exerting every effort to carry out.
4.
In the view of the Commission, a basic issue of international order is involved. A dangerous and tragic precedent will have been established if force, or the threat of the use of force, is to prove an effective deterrent to the will of the United Nations.
5.
It is the considered view of the Commission that the security forces of the Mandatory Power, which at the present time prevent the situation from deteriorating completely into open warfare on an organized basis, must be replaced by an adequate non-Palestinian force which will assist law-abiding elements in both the Arab and Jewish communities, organized under the general direction of the Commission, in maintaining order and security in Palestine, thereby enabling the Commission to carry out the recommendations of the General Assembly. Otherwise, the period immediately following the termination of the Mandate will be a period of uncontrolled, widespread strife and bloodshed in Palestine, including the City of Jerusalem. This would be a catastrophic conclusion to an era of international concern for that territory.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

  1. Dated January 28, neither printed. One cited Mrs. Roosevelt’s concern about an article by James Reston in the New York Times of the day before, calling attention to the development in the State Department and the Cabinet of sentiment to extend bipartisan or non-partisan foreign policy to all questions relating to Palestine. She gave her opinion that the United States decision to support the majority report on Palestine and United States leadership in the United Nations placed a responsibility on the U.S. to see the UN through in implementing its policies. She suggested that “the quicker we remove the embargo and see that the Jews and any UN police force are equipped with modern armaments … the better it will be for the whole situation.” (867N.01/1–2848)
  2. Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., Special Suppl. No. 2, pp. 10, 14, 18. The report dated February 16, was transmitted to Secretary-General Lie the same day.