Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/7–1048: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup) to the Secretary of State

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New York, July 10, 1948—1:19 p. m.

870. Following are our analyses of present situation re Palestine and recommendations for action based on hypothesis that latest ten-day truce extension proposed by mediator will be rejected by Arabs. Just informed Israel has accepted ten-day truce. If Arabs accept ten-day truce, following suggestions on tactics would require substantial change but basic policy considerations would still be pertinent:

1. The documented evidence is incontrovertible that states of Arab League have created a threat to the peace by refusing to extend truce.

2. The circumstantial evidence is equally clear that military action by Egypt at least, probably also by Iraq and Syria, constitutes a breach of the peace and an act of aggression.

3. It is unfortunate that for the moment it will probably be difficult to verify any breach of the peace or act of aggression in view of the fact that Mediator has, mistakenly, in our opinion, withdrawn the UN observers and other UN personnel from Palestine. (Compare conflicting reports in No. 3086 from London¹ and unnumbered from Navy July 8, 2:12 p. m. [7:12 a. m.?].²) However, while avoiding basing action on controversial facts, it would be sheer quibbling and grossly inexpedient politically to delay action on this account.

4. In view of fact that Israel has accepted extension of truce unconditionally on terms proposed by Mediator, military action by Israel cannot possibly be considered to be a breach of the peace or act of aggression. Such action on the contrary must be considered as defensive action as contemplated by Art. 51 of the charter pending appropriate action by SC. Fact that Israel is not a member of UN does not alter principle involved.

5. It is possible that UK and certainly Arab line will be that Arab failure to extend truce and resumption of hostilities by Arabs result from Jewish breaches of truce while it was operative; hence there should be no finding or action under chapter VII of charter pending further investigation. This is wholly specious constituting no excuse for Arabs and no reason for delay. Questions of breaches of truce should be dealt with while it is in effect by peaceful means through machinery available and created by UN for purpose, namely, Mediator and SC. We must obviously also oppose Arab argument that they are still acting to defend Palestine against “Zionist invaders”.

6. The fact that Mediator has decided to come to Lake Success to report (it is now anticipated that he will not arrive until late Monday) and that he has made a new appeal to parties for ten-day truce extension should not be occasion for any further delay in SC consideration and action. Every hour that passes is likely to intensify fighting and renders more and more difficulty restoration of peace and maintenance of conditions necessary to working out of peaceful adjustment of future situation. Prolongation of truce should still be our first objective, but meanwhile events are outstripping our policy.

7. Delay will reflect very adversely on prestige and effectiveness of SC.

8. Delay will increase risk of new dissension between US and UK.

9. Delay will increase risk of serious breach in our bipartisan foreign policy and of hindering thereby a settlement, in view of fact that both our parties are wholly committed to support of Israel and that in present political circumstances one or other party may feel impelled to take some precipitate action.

10. Arabs are living in a dream world where the political fact of existence of Israel (supported by USSR and US—in the US strongly by both political parties) is denied and where it is imagined that even the ghost of this fact may be laid by resort to arms. It is wholly contrary to our political and strategic interests and our oft repeated professions of friendship for Arabs to allow them to continue to delude themselves in this manner.

11. While we must so far as possible try to maintain maximum possible friendly relations Arab states, we cannot ignore our relations with Israel. Failure to support Israel in SC would almost certainly induce pressures which might be irresistible and because not planned by us, far less satisfactory than a well-considered policy of strong public support.

12. Delay, weakness or equivocation in our policy will unquestionably give Russians strong propaganda advantage not only in SC and in Israel but also among world Jewry.

In light of foregoing we propose following specific actions:

1. That we formally request an SC meeting to be called at earliest possible, preferably no later than Monday.

2. That preferably over weekend but in any case no later than Monday the President issue a statement from White House as follows:

a. We have hoped that parties would agree to prolongation of truce and we have exerted every effort at our command to this end. Prolongation of truce is still our primary objective.

b. To our great regret, however, states of Arab League have rejected three appeals for prolongation of truce and certain of them have resorted to armed force in Palestine in a manner wholly inconsistent with purposes and principles of UN charter.

c. Present situation in Palestine clearly constitutes at very least a “threat to the peace” within meaning of Art. 39 of charter requiring immediate action by SC.

d. Accordingly he is instructing the acting US representative to introduce a resolution in SC at earliest possible moment (along lines of draft resolution sent Department in USUN 863.³)

e. During four weeks period of truce under SC resolution of May 29, US has followed a course of strict neutrality and impartiality between the parties, and has lived up faithfully to all of its obligations under that resolution. Furthermore, as a member of Truce Commission, US has assisted UN Mediator in many different ways at his request in carrying out his responsibilities.

f. So long as there is prospect of immediate resumption of truce, US will continue to act on basis SC resolution of May 29.

g. However, May 29 resolution would no longer be applicable if Arab states have finally repudiated truce and full-scale fighting is resumed. Under such circumstances, US would consider itself under obligation to maintain measures designed to prevent military aid reaching Arab states which, were illegally waging war in violation of charter.

h. At same time US would remove restrictions on aid to Israel on ground that having been attacked after agreeing to truce, it was acting in self-defense. US policy will continue to be based on Charter and our responsibilities as member of UN” to assist in restoring and maintaining peace in Palestine.

i. Meanwhile, he is having instructions issued to all US personnel loaned to UN” as observers and in other capacities to stand by for further assistance to Mediator as may be required.

3. That without delaying action here, our line as outlined above be communicatetd immediately to UK through US Embassy London and simultaneously through UK Del here. We believe we must not yield too much to UK desire to stall action and Presidential statement could be used as leverage in our representations in London and New York.

4. That in connection with above we, jointly with UK, make clear in strongest terms and without equivocation to all Arab capitals (as UK has already done in Amman—see London’s 2964 and 2989⁴), our judgement that sovereign state of Israel is here to stay, that no amount of fighting or other action by Arabs can possibly alter this situation in either short or long run, and that this simple fact of political life must be taken as basis for continued truce and efforts to work out peaceful adjustment of future situation. Our representatives should point out that apparent Arab reliance on theory that US support for Israel is inspired by local political considerations is specious; both major political parties emphatically taking same position; no change in this bipartisan position is conceivable. We fully recognize that this action requires a great deal of courage in light of probable shock to Arabs and resultant risks of Arab action re oil concessions, air base facilities, etc. On other hand, this action in view of strong bipartisan support of Israel in this country will have to be faced up to sooner or later and we are not at all convinced that risk of Arab retaliation is nearly as great as they would have us believe, particularly from long run viewpoint. We believe that Bernadotte is right in theory Arabs would be relieved to have to yield to strong UN pressure. (See Niact 957 from Cairo, July 9.)

5. That we proceed immediately without further delay to determine at least main outlines of tentative plan we could support for peaceful adjustment of future situation in Palestine (see our tels 831 and 837⁵) and that we discuss this plan immediately and simultaneously with UK and Israel. In case of UK we suggest discussion through three channels, London, Washington and New York. In case of Israel we suggest discussion initially in New York where because our personal relations with Eban plan can be discussed entirely unofficial, personal, trial-balloon basis.

6. That following discussion with UK and Israel we then take the plan up, as it may be revised in light of said discussions, with Mediator for his guidance in further negotiations, and at same time jointly with UK communicate our views to Arab states as well as to Israel.⁶

Jessup

1. Dated July 9; it reported an Egyptian denial that Egyptian troops had made attacks in southern Palestine (501.BB Palestine/7–948).
2. Not printed; it reported information from Israeli sources that Egyptian forces were attacking Isdud (867N.01/7–848).
3. Dated July 9, not printed; the draft resolution provided that the Security Council order those governments which had resumed hostilities to cease and desist from further hostile military action (paragraph 3), that the Council order all other governments which had refused to accept prolongation of the truce to refrain from any threat or use of force (paragraph 4), and that the Council order all governments to which paragraphs 3 and 4 applied to accept immediately the prolongation of the truce. Failure to do so would be evidence of a breach of the peace and an act of aggression within the meaning of Article 39 and would require further immediate action under Chapter 7 (501.BB Palestine/7–948).
4. Dated July 3 and July 6, respectively, pp. 1189 and 1192.
5. Dated June 30 and July 1, respectively, pp. 1161 and 1180.
6. A marginal notation indicates that no action was taken on this telegram.