501.BB Palestine/7–1148: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
top secret
London, July 11,
1948—noon.
3111. Embtel 3096, July 9.
- 1.
- Bevin asked me to meet again with him and his top advisers on Palestine late yesterday. Lewis Jones accompanied me.
- 2.
- Bevin, speaking from brief based on telegrams summarized my 3110, July 101 (full texts are obtainable from British Embassy Washington), established the facts as HMG understands them, most crucial of which is that both King Abdullah and intermediary King of Egypt have expressed desire that SC should threaten Arabs with sanctions. He sketched following as HMG’s suggestions with regard to the road ahead re Palestine along which he hoped devoutly US and UK could proceed together.
- 3.
- Present aims British policy re Palestine as sketched to me by
Bevin and telegraphed last night to Cadogan for his private guidance
are:
- (a)
- To avoid resumption hostilities;
- (b)
- There being no good purpose in declining accept Jewish state, HMG hopes to arrive by peaceful means at settlement approximating that indicated by Mediator but thinks it fatal to acceptance of this by Arabs if Mediator and UN” insist upon political union between Arab and Jewish states.
- 4.
- To accomplish three (b) above Foreign Office thinks it would be better for UN to settle frontiers Jewish state and demilitarization Jerusalem, leaving future remainder Palestine to be determined by Arabs, probably by incorporating it in Transjordan. Thus UN would fix Jewish state frontiers and violation of these by either party would be aggression. This would give Arabs feeling of security and help bring about their acquiescence.
- 5.
- British view is that final political settlement must be arrived at either by agreement between parties under auspices Mediator or by action UNGA (paragraph five my 3080, July 92). SC would have no right to interfere with authority UNGA by itself attempting to modify in some radical manner basis plan of November 29 resolution. It should, however, be British aim to ensure SC acts in way consistent with ultimate objective defined paragraph three (b) above.
- 6.
- Immediate British aim is to end fighting on conditions ensuring so far as possible that it will not be resumed. Because of facts paragraph two above, Foreign Office sees advantage in adoption by SC of resolution containing threat of sanctions against Arabs but considers it essential this should be presented in such way as to diminish as little as possible British influence over Arab governments. It should therefore contain reference to accusations made re truce breaches and to machinery for dealing with future breaches. Cadogan should vote for such a resolution if it fulfills British requirements. Otherwise, he should seek further instructions.
- 7.
- Above covers general British future policy as now conceived. Bevin emphasized British view that as first step before considering any resolution SC should hear Mediator’s report on his activities under original truce resolution. This is important because if political committee of Arab League meets Beirut as press indicates there is chance situation may be entirely changed by Arab decision to comply after all with proposals for extending truce.
- 8.
- If, however, truce has not been renewed, Cadogan has been instructed to urge in SC a hearing of complaints of both sides re application of truce. Foreign Office believes SC should examine carefully whether Arabs alone are at fault.
- 9.
- British thinking re text of resolution which may be required is
well advanced and has been based on US draft. Most important
amendments which Foreign Office has instructed UKUN to discuss with USUN are that resolution:
- (a)
- Should specify that hostilities are not to be resumed pending definitive political settlement;
- (b)
- Should instruct Mediator to establish machinery (see paragraph eleven below) for examining alleged breaches of the truce in order that he may take appropriate action without delay;
- (c)
- Should make no reference at this stage to an act of aggression within meaning of Article 39 of Charter.
- 10.
- Foreign Office draft resolution incorporating ideas paragraph nine above was sent Cadogan last night with instruction to discuss it today with USUN.
- 11.
- Re machinery for examination past and future breaches of peace (paragraph nine (b) above) Bevin referred repeatedly to investigation “tribunals” made up of observers of three different nationalities.
- 12.
- Bevin expressed belief that Arabs will accept truce extension on basis SC resolution drafted along lines suggested by Foreign Office (paragraph ten above).
- 13.
- In advising me of foregoing views which have been worked out here with utmost thought and care since long term British relations with Arab world are at stake, Bevin said he was laying all of his cards on the table and he hoped that the logic underlying the steps he proposed would commend itself to the Department and so result in a parallel course of action on our part.
- 14.
- Having in mind the step-by-step evolution during past weeks of British policy, ever closer to our own policy as I understand it, and the nature of the ideas set forth above, it seems to me that the latter stand on their own merits and that comment by me is superfluous.
Douglas