867N.113/7–1448
Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite 1) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
Subject: Possible or Probable Results if US Arms Export Policy is modified unilaterally to permit Arms Shipments to the State of Israel
Summary
In the considered judgment of this office, American strategic interests and international security would be seriously prejudiced if the arms embargo were raised unilaterally in favor of the State of Israel. The military setbacks which the Arabs could be expected to suffer would probably result in the overthrow of some of their governments. The attendant chaos would provide a breeding ground for communism, or a series of dictatorships might arise on a wave of anti-American and anti-British sentiment. Governments hostile to the Western powers would mean the loss of vital strategic facilities in the Near East coveted by the Soviet Union. The intensification of the disturbances might undermine our strategic position in Greece, Turkey, and Iran as well.
The unilateral raising of the arms embargo might well result in the imposition of oil sanctions by the Arab states, or even in the cancellation of American concessions. Such action would result in further depletion of our domestic oil reserves and would in all likelihood prevent the use of Near Eastern petroleum in support of the European Recovery Program. Our action might also result in a Saudi Arab request that we evacuate Dhahran air base, the loss of which would disrupt our strategic air communications network.
If the United States were to lift the embargo unilaterally in favor of the State of Israel, Great Britain might take similar action in behalf of the Arabs, which would certainly result in a dangerous Anglo-American rift and might well jeopardize the entire basis of US policy in Europe.
The raising of the embargo would immediately place the lives of [Page 1218] most American citizens and official representatives in the Arab states in serious jeopardy, necessitating their repatriation under difficult and dangerous circumstances. It is probable that American property, investments, and philanthropic enterprises would be singled out for molestation, destruction, or seizure as a result of popular reaction.
The governments of the Arab states would probably be incapable of controlling mob action arising from the unilateral repeal of the embargo, and mob attacks against some of the 700,000 Jews residing in Arab countries could be expected. Such attacks might turn into anti-foreign or anti-Christian demonstrations as well.
The Arab governments and peoples would regard our action as a virtual American declaration of war against them, and popular feeling against us would be intense and lasting. It is not unlikely that the Arab League states would take concerted action in breaking diplomatic relations with the United States. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen might even withdraw from the United Nations.
Conclusion: Unilateral action to repeal the arms embargo outside the framework of the United Nations would in effect constitute independent punitive action by the United States against the Arab states.
In the event that the Security Council continues the arms embargo, provided for in the Security Council resolution of May 29, 1947, unilateral action by the United States lifting the embargo as it affects either side would not only be inconsistent with the United Nations action, but would violate our obligations under the Charter to support United Nations action.3
- Joseph C. Satterthwaite became Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs on July 16, succeeding Lay W. Henderson, who, two days before, had been designated Ambassador to India.↩
- A copy of this memorandum was received in the Office of United Nations Affairs on July 14.↩
- Attached to this document is an undated memorandum of virtually identical title, going into greater detail concerning the matters discussed in the summary.↩