501.BB Palestine/7–1448: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
3188. Bevin sent me word this afternoon re remarks which Cadogan was instructed by Foreign Office telegram noon today to make in SC before he cast British vote for our resolution. Bevin thought it would be clear to Department that Cadogan’s remarks in no way receded from official British position of yesterday and that they constitute amplifications of some of points made by Cadogan which, in Bevin’s view, have been dangerously misinterpreted in today’s press (see my 31731 for strong Arab office statement).
2. As Bevin sees situation, there is grave danger that hands of Azzam Pasha and other Arab extremists will be strengthened against more moderate group led by King Abdullah if idea is spread that HMG has lost all sympathy for Arabs and that UN is a British-Zionist body from which Arabs can expect nothing resembling justice. (Foreign Office understands Azzam now at Amman doing his best to persuade Arab states to continue hopeless war of desperation.)
3. To rectify the somewhat unbalanced picture of British position as presented by press today, which has caused number of MP’s to express alarm lest HMG “let the Arabs down”, and to persuade the Arabs, insofar as this is possible, that SC dice are not loaded against them, Bevin instructed Cadogan to amplify his remarks.
4. The danger of Arabs losing faith in HMG, Bevin advised me, [was] consensus opinion of British ME missions was [and?] that White [while?] resolution such as ours might be successful in causing Arabs to end hostilities, and consequently should be objective of UKUN it would cause most unfortunate anti-British local impression in Arab states if UKUN voted for it. British missions suggested UKUN should abstain. Bevin debated a long time between voting and abstaining and decided in favor of voting for resolution partly because of his desire to keep in step with us, but most of all because “I think it is right”.
5. In my view it would be calamity for American, British, European and PGI interests in the Middle East were Britain to lose such vestiges of influence as she still possesses with the Arab Governments. The game being played by HMG is one requiring courage and it may be lost if remaining British influence among Arabs vanished from the [Page 1221] Middle East. There is little doubt that Soviet is ready take Britain’s place. (Embassy’s 3175, July 142)
- Dated July 14, not printed.↩
- Not printed; it gave the text of a letter sent to the British Foreign Office by the British Representative on the Trusteeship Council, The letter recounted that Semyon K. Tsarapkin, Soviet Representative on the Council, had complained to the Iraqi Representative on the same body concerning the latter’s support of the administering powers. After the Iraqi Representative had stated to Mr. Tsarapkin that he was not on either side but voted as he thought best on each occasion, Mr. Tsarapkin replied that he was making a mistake; that Britain was deserting the Arabs; that the time was coming when the Arab world would need a friend; and that the Soviet Union was that friend. He then proceeded to warn that the Soviet Union would not help the Iraqis in time of need if they continued to support the British position in the Trusteeship Council (501.BB Palestine/7–1448).↩