Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/7–1748: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

secret

Cairo, July 17, 1948—4 p. m.

1005. Mytel 957, July 9. In connection with Bernadotte’s advice that SC should adopt resolution threatening use all provisions of Charter including armed intervention in order to bring Arabs to their senses. Department may find comments of this Embassy of pertinence in view of July 15 action SC in ordering cease-fire.

In regard to Bernadotte’s statement under reference Embassy convinced that necessity exists to provide Arabs with face-saving formula but Department may wish to consider whether application of sanctions as proposed will produce effect envisaged by Bernadotte either by (a) Bringing Arabs to their senses or (b) Constituting a face-saving formula enabling Arab leaders to reverse present policy. It may be suggested that effect may possibly be to contrary. Aerial and naval demonstrations as suggested by Bunche might well prove contra productive.

Arabs have been already cognizant possibility application of sanctions so Bernadotte’s proposals were apparently rejected in realization of consequences. Application and effect therefore already discounted. Further threat of their actual application by UN (UN[in?] which US will be regarded as taking leading part) may thereby fail to bring them to their senses as predicted. Consequently in present fatalistic mood of Arabs contrary effect may be produced. Such view also held by British Ministers Clayton and Troutbeck here the latter having changed his views as reported by London telegram to Department No. 2965 July 4, 1948.¹

This Embassy unaware of Arab officials to whom Bernadotte refers as seeking UN application of sanctions in order to provide way out. Such, no doubt, exist among those who seek resolution of conflict but as Department aware most Arab leaders have committed themselves so strongly and raised hopes of masses so high through press and other media as to incur considerable personal risk by withdrawal from current Palestine policy at least without period of preparation of public opinion. Current and continuing statements along these lines as by Iraqi Prime Minister and Nokrashy (Embtel 993 July 15¹) and critical press comments suggest that such dangers are present. It is felt by observers here that even should Arab leaders accept truce on ground that application of sanctions implies that world is against Arabs, the masses which now more intensely interested in Palestine than are leaders, might not concur in such action. Indignant reaction among masses can be reasonably foreshadowed with conceivable overthrow administrations with consequent disorders and increased resentment against west highly detrimental to personal safety of American citizens and their commercial interests including oil concessions and aviation throughout Arab world.

Collapse of Arab League and disappearance of Azzam Pasha who in all issues except Palestine have exerted moderating influence on Arab world would also seem to be a sequel.

Department has no doubt considered possibility action would be followed by withdrawal Arab States from UN.

For possible consideration in ameliorating situation Embassy suggests regarding truce extension that prospect for possible face saving formula lies in Azzam Pasha’s letter to UN Secretary General Lie pointing out that Arabs in rejecting Bernadotte’s request for truce extension were not adverse to truce as such but only to truce of previous four weeks which Arabs are firmly convinced gave Jews opportunity to expand strategic and political positions with no approach to meeting of minds of two parties and which held out no prospect of final solution at its termination.² However, in this connection Department should be aware that antagonism to America and loss of Confidence in it has reached such point here that future representations will have little effect unless concrete evidence is available that similar pressures are being exerted on Zionist leaders and on PGI.

As for possible formula for future settlement Azzam’s public pronouncement through AP interview for Jewish “Vatican State” might be studied. Represents first public break in Arab front.

Patterson

1. Not printed.
1. Not printed.
2. Secretary-General Azzam, in a telegram of July 18 to Secretary-General Lie, announced the Arab States’ acceptance of that part of the Security Council’s resolution of July 15 dealing with a cessation of hostilities in Palestine. The communication set forth the View that the new truce would not achieve its purpose unless various deficiencies in the four-weeks’ truce were remedied. Thus he requested that all Jewish immigration into Palestine be stopped during the truce and that the 300,000 Arab refugees be returned home with guarantees of their lives and property. He requested also that the new truce not be indefinite, but with a fixed duration to permit a last effort to reach a peaceful solution; for text, see SC, 3rd yr., Supplement for July 1948, p. 82. Egypt, Transjordan, Israel, Syria, arid Lebanon also accepted the cease-fire arrangements in Palestine, and Iraq and Saudi Arabia made interim reply; for the texts of their communications to Count Bernadotte, see ibid., pp. 80, 81.