CIA Files
Report by the Central Intelligence Agency1
secret
[Washington,] July 27, 1948.
ORE 38–48
Possible Developments From the Palestine
Truce2
- 1.
- In response to a request from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense regarding the probable duration of the 18 July truce in
Palestine and developments that may arise as a result of it, CIA presents the following estimates:
-
a.
- The current continuation of the truce is for the most part
nominal, and sporadic fighting continues. Israel benefited
greatly from the previous truce period in improving its
military potential. A continuation of the truce on the
conditions of the previous one would be to Israel’s
advantage, and the Arabs probably would not long respect it.
On the other hand, a really effective and adequately
enforced truce would have a reasonable chance of being
prolonged. Therefore, the Mediator’s success in prolonging
the truce is in direct proportion to the support he is given
in establishing effective means of enforcement.
-
b.
- It is unlikely that the Mediator himself will be able to
effect a settlement of the basic controversy. Provided,
however, that effective means of observation and enforcement
are made available and utilized, it is probable than an
unstable truce can be maintained until the problem can be
referred back to the United Nations General Assembly in
September or to the International Court of Justice.
-
c.
- The present intentions of the USSR are to promote
instability and insecurity throughout the Middle East and to
undermine the positions of the US and the UK therein. To do
so the USSR has given, and presumably will continue to give,
support in varying degrees to both Israel and the Arab
countries. The collapse of the truce and the intensification
of hostilities would afford the USSR increased opportunities
to pursue its aims. Conversely, any measures which might
prolong the truce would be detrimental to Soviet
aims.
-
d.
- A critical factor in the continuance of the truce will be
the ability of the Israeli government to control the
activities of its extremist elements (Irgun Zvai Leumi and
the Stern Gang) and of the Arab governments to control
popular outbreaks directed against the maintenance of the
truce. It is not believed that complete control by their
governments of either Jewish or Arab extremists will be
possible, but the conditions for such control will be much
more favorable under a fair truce, rigorously enforced, than
under an inadequate truce, halfheartedly supported.
- 2.
- Further discussion concerning the possible outcome of the truce is
in Enclosure A; of the current military situation in Palestine in
Enclosure B; of Soviet intentions in the area in Enclosure C.
Enclosure A
Possible Developments From the Palestine
Truce
1. general
The UN mediator has two objectives: an effective truce of indefinite
duration; and a final compromise solution, between Jews and Arabs,
of the Palestine problem. The present truce was agreed to on 18 July
and has been violated repeatedly by both Arabs and Jews. The
violations have resulted from the absence in Palestine of UN
observers and machinery for preventing infractions, and from the
determination of various Arab and Jewish groups to gain last-minute
advantages which they feel to be of vital importance. The Mediator’s
success in establishing an effective truce will depend on the
effectiveness of the machinery which is given him, the ability of
Israel to control its extremist groups (the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the
Stern Gang), and the reaction of the Arab peoples against the
acceptance of the truce by their leaders.
2. possibility of an effective truce
a. Observer Teams.
Current efforts to organize UN observer teams include plans for 300
observers—three times as many as were sent to Palestine during the
previous truce. The effectiveness of the current truce will depend
largely on the incisiveness with which these observers carry out
their
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duties and the
forcefulness with which the Mediator deals with violations. If
violations are ignored to the same extent as during the previous
truce, the success of the current truce will be doubtful. The Jews
will, as before, bring in men, aircraft, and heavy military
equipment; present Arab opposition to the truce will then become
intensified, and the Arabs will probably reopen hostilities.
b. Israeli Extremists.
It is probable that any concessions that the PGI might make to obtain Arab agreement to permanent
peace would be met by open and violent action by the Jerusalem
extremists. If, however, the Mediator attempts to establish a
special UN regime over Jerusalem before a final settlement is
achieved or to revise the territorial boundaries to what they
consider detrimental to Israel, the extremist groups will almost
certainly resume fighting. At the present time it is believed that
the PGI can control extremist
elements within the partition boundaries, but it may not be able to
control them in other parts of Palestine, especially in
Jerusalem.
c. Reaction of Arab Peoples.
The Arab people were confident of victory and were assured by their
leaders that the truce would not be extended. Their bitterness may
well erupt into violence against their governments or the Western
powers or both. If their wrath is turned against their leaders, some
of the Arab governments in an attempt to survive may well resume the
Palestine war. Arab leaders, however, will first make every effort
to turn the anger of their people against the UN, the US, and the
UK, or even against one another.
The timing of such developments cannot be predicted because they
depend partly on spontaneous eruptions of popular feelings, which
are subject to violent change, and partly on organized agitation.
Rioting, however, has already developed in Cairo. Serious Jewish
violations of the truce (particularly the bombing of Arab cities)
would further inflame Arab public opinion and would make it more
difficult for the Arab governments to continue the truce. Communist
agents in the Arab countries will probably exert themselves to stir
up the people against their governments in order to bring about the
downfall of the present regime as well as to destroy the truce. The
rapidity with which the observer teams are mobilized and their
effectiveness will obviously have great bearing on this problem.
3. possibility of a compromise solution between
arabs and jews
It is extremely unlikely that the Mediator himself will be able to
persuade Arabs and Jews to agree to a compromise solution for
Palestine. The Jews, with a de facto
government and because of their military
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strength and the political support of the US
and the USSR, are in an extremely strong position. The provisions of
the UN partition scheme constitute for the moment their minimum
demands. The Arabs, in spite of their weakness, have given no
official indication that they are prepared to recognize Israel as
defined in the UN partition plan. At the present time no Arab
government feels it could survive if it consented to negotiate with
Israeli representatives. Israel and the Arab governments might
accept some sort of international status for Jerusalem or its
de-militarization, but such a development might well be resisted by
the Israeli extremist groups.
If, after repeated attempts, the Mediator is unable to make any
progress toward a solution, he may recommend some further course of
action to the Security Council. Should the truce prove reasonably
effective, he might as an alternate move recommend the advisability
of securing an advisory opinion from the International Court of
Justice. If, on the other hand, the truce collapses, he undoubtedly
will recommend sanctions against Arabs, or Jews, or both. One
difficulty in the way of getting negotiations started is the firm
statement of the Arabs, frequently repeated, that under no
circumstances will they recognize an Israeli state, which they would
appear to do if they sat at a council table with Israeli delegates.
Encouragement must therefore be given to the present Arab
governments as well as an excuse furnished to them to give to their
own people. This might well be secured through an advisory opinion
of the International Court of Justice; e.g. as to whether a
government of Israel exists: with which the Arabs can negotiate.
4. conclusions
Unless strongly backed by the Security Council and efficiently
enforced, it is unlikely that the truce will be effective. Even with
an effective truce it is unlikely that a compromise agreement will
be reached between Arabs and Jews for a considerable period of time.
Judging from present events in Palestine and should the
effectiveness of the observer machinery be no better than during the
first truce, it is probable that sporadic fighting will continue and
that the Jews will greatly increase their military potential under
the cloak of the truce. Thus the state of Israel would be further
consolidated, and the Arabs would be further weakened and isolated.
If, however, the truce is effectively enforced and the present
comparatively moderate Arab governments can stay in power, the truce
may be prolonged by the Arabs in the hope that a revision of the UN
partition resolution may be secured at the September meeting of the
General Assembly or that the issue will be submitted to the
International Court of Justice. If, on the other hand, these
governments are overthrown, the Arabs will resume the fight, be
seriously defeated, break all contact with the US and the UK,
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and almost certainly (in
one way or another) eventually find themselves open to Soviet
exploitation.*
Enclosure B
The Military Situation in Palestine at the
Beginning of the Second Truce—18 July 1948
The military situation on 18 July, the beginning of the second truce
in Palestine, shows that the Jews have made substantial gains during
the nine-day period of fighting between 9 July and 18 July. (See
map.) During that period the Jews captured Lydda, Ramie, and Ras el
Zin, thereby removing the danger of an Arab thrust on Tel-Aviv. In
the north they took the strategic Arab-Christian town of Nazareth
and consolidated their positions along the Lebanese border into
which units had been moved during the truce. In the south the Jews
thrust southeast into the Egyptian-occupied area near Isdud and
widened and strengthened the strip of Jewish-controlled territory
along the roads between Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv. The only successful
Arab action during that period, the Iraqi advance north from Jenin
toward Afule, was halted by the truce before any significant gain
was made.
During the period of the truce the Jews gained considerably from a
military point of view. They strengthened and improved their
existing fortifications and built new ones in the areas recently
taken over from the Arabs. They improved the by-pass road to
Jerusalem, which skirts Arab-held Latrun and Bab el Wad on the main
road from Jerusalem to Tel-Aviv. They recruited and trained troops
both abroad and in Palestine, and reinforcements were flown in from
abroad. They increased their supply of tanks, aeroplanes, and
artillery. The Jews brought heavy artillery into the Jerusalem area
and are reported to have acquired at least 13 German ME–109 fighter planes—which can be
converted into light bombers—and 3 B–17’s. (They are now reported to
possess a total of 60 ME–109’s, of
which 24 are operational.) The food situation in Jerusalem was
greatly improved during the truce.
The Arabs made certain gains during the truce, but these were
insignificant compared to the Jewish gains. The Arabs received some
Italian and Belgian arms and brought more arms and ammunition to the
front.
The truce resulted in so great an improvement in the Jewish
capabilities that the Jews may now be strong enough to launch a
full-scale offensive and drive the Arab forces out of Palestine.
Events during the
[Page 1245]
truce,
and the enormous increase in Jewish strength resulting from them,
considerably change the previously held estimate of the probable
course of the war in Palestine. The Arabs’ logistical position
generally is very bad and their ammunition supply is exceedingly
low. It is estimated that they could not continue to fight, even on
the previous moderate scale, for more than two to three months.
The Military Forces involved are estimated as:
Arab Forces in or near Palestine
Army |
In Palestine |
Near
Palestine |
Total |
Transjordan |
6,000 |
4,000 |
10,000 |
Iraq |
9,000 |
1,000 |
10,000 |
Egypt |
5,000 |
8,000 |
13,000 |
Syria |
1,000 |
1,500 |
2,500 |
Lebanon |
|
1,800 |
1,800 |
Saudi Arabia |
3,000 (?) |
|
3,000 |
Irregulars |
3,000 (?) |
3,500 |
6,500 |
Totals |
27,000 |
19,800 |
46,800 |
Israeli Forces
Haganah
Mobile Striking Force |
17,000 |
Semi-Mobile (Local operation) |
18,000 |
Garrison or Defense (settlers-urban
militia) |
50,000 |
Irgun Zvai Leumi
The Irgun has gradually increased from 7,000 to 12,000 during the
past 4 to 6 months.
Stem Gang
A similar rise in Stern Gang numbers from 400–800 has been recently
confirmed.
Enclosure C
Soviet Policy in the Middle East
1. soviet objectives
-
a.
- The ultimate objective of Soviet policy vis-à-vis the Middle
East is the assumption of the dominant role in the area.
-
b.
- To implement this main objective, Soviet policy is directed
toward the accomplishment of four secondary objectives:
- (1)
- Instability in the Arab world.
- (2)
- A complete break between the US and the Arab
states.
- (3)
- Strained relations between the US and the UK
concerning Middle East policy.
- (4)
- A complete break between the UK and the Arab
states.
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2. application and results of soviet policy (29
november 1947–18 july 1948)
With the above objectives in mind, the USSR voted for the UN
partition of Palestine. From November to May it consistently
supported partition but took no initiative in urging effective
action to implement partition. Officially the Soviet position was
unimpeachable; unofficially, the Kremlin was content to sit back and
watch matters go from bad to worse in Palestine. The Soviet
delegation loudly denounced and obstructed the US proposals for a
temporary trusteeship over Palestine, the one
possibility which might have prevented an Arab-Jewish war after 15
May. Since 15 May the delegation has been lukewarm on truce attempts
and has obstructed mediation efforts. On 7 July it abstained in the
Security Council from voting on the resolution to extend the four
weeks’ truce. Although it voted for the resolution on 15 July
ordering the beligerents to cease hostilities, it abstained from
voting on the proposal to give the UN Mediator authority to
negotiate a settlement between Jews and Arabs.
By pursuing the tactics outlined in the preceding paragraph, the USSR
has increased its prestige among Zionist groups throughout the
world. Moreover, its support of partition has done little to impair
Soviet-Arab relations, which could hardly have been made worse in
any case. (The retaliatory outlawing of the Communist parties in
Syria and Lebanon merely sent tie Communists underground and, in
view of the ineffectiveness of Anab police and security measures,
did not greatly impair the capabilities of the Communists in these
countries.) Soviet tactics in the UN have also contributed directly
to instability in the Middle East, the first secondary objective of
Soviet policy.
The inability of the UN to formulate a compromise solution of the
Palestine problem has contributed directly to the other three Soviet
secondary objectives. US support of partition immediately drove a
wedge into US-Arab relations. This breach in relations could never
be mended unless a compromise was reached between Arabs and Jews. By
opposing a compromise solution, the USSR contributed directly to
increasingly strained relations between Arabs and the US, its second
objective. As the UK was compelled for strategic and economic
reasons to support the Arabs, strained relations between the US and
the UK, the third Soviet objective, inevitably followed. The Kremlin
doubtless reasoned that UK dependence on ERP would compel the UK to bow to US pressure. This
would in turn lead to the fourth Soviet objective, the rupture of
UK-Arab relations. While the USSR was doubtless prepared to take
positive steps toward the attainment of its objectives, it has been
unnecessary for it to do anything beyond obstructing the possibility
of a compromise solution between Arabs and Jews. US support of
partition, UK support of the Arabs, and UK economic dependence on
the US have combined to produce a situation
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favorable to the USSR and one which they can
be expected to exploit in the future.
3. future policy (after 18 july 1948)
The future policy of the USSR vis-à-vis Palestine will aim at
consolidating the objectives already partially attained. It will
continue to be the Soviet plan to follow a line of opportunism and
readiness to exploit what the USSR considers US and UK mistakes.
While continuing to support the partition scheme, the USSR may be
expected to abstain on or to block any UN action which is likely to
bring Jewish-Arab hostilities to a permanent end. This trend is
forecast by the USSR abstention on the 7 July Security Council
resolution calling on both parties to agree to an extension of the
four weeks’ truce, and subsequently on the question of granting
Bernadotte powers to mediate.
It may come about that the UK, as a result of US and UN pressure,
would find it difficult to maintain all its ties with the Arab
states, which would contribute to the fourth major objective of the
USSR. In such an event it may be expected that the USSR will shift
the emphasis of its propaganda from “Jewish independence” to “US
imperialism in Israel” and under the latter slogan will woo the Arab
governments with promises of military advisers and supplies. It can
be expected to “encourage” its own candidates in the political
turmoil which will follow Arab military defeats. By such methods it
will continue its drive toward the attainment of its basic
objective, the assumption of the dominant role in the Middle
East.
4. soviet arms policy on palestine issue
There is a large body of evidence which indicates that arms shipments
from the Communist-dominated countries have been made both to the
Arab states and to Israel. The Israeli have received the bulk of
these arms, which have included ammunition, small arms, automatic
weapons, artillery and military planes.†
The major source of arms supply for Israel has been Czechoslovakia.
Other countries which have supplied arms are Yugoslavia and Poland,
and possibly the USSR. The governments of Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia have actively cooperated in these shipments by furnishing
protection, maintaining secrecy, or supplying government facilities,
including airfields in the case of Czechoslovakia. Ports in Albania
and Italy have been utilized for transshipment purposes to provide
additional secrecy as to the countries of origin of these military
supplies.
Some of the Arab League countries have purchased arms from
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Czechoslovakia; the
largest shipments to the Arabs from that country have gone to Syria
and Lebanon. Small shipments from the USSR or Balkan ports are also
reported to have been landed on the Syrian and Lebanese coasts;
also, petroleum products are now being shipped to Lebanon by
Rumania.