Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

“1. Most convenient way to present our ideas on kind of settlement which we should wish to see is in the form in which they would appear if Mediator agreed to sponsor them. In that event he might present report to UN on following lines.

2. Report might begin with short historical passage recounting Mediator’s efforts maintain truce and various difficulties which he had experienced owing to attempts by both sides to gain advantages for themselves by military action and owing to absence of any force with which Mediator could prevent such action. Mediator could then give his opinion of relative culpability of each side in these matters.

3. Mediator would no doubt wish to add that in his attempt to reach a peaceful solution, as he was instructed to do by UNGA resolution of fourteenth May, he has been thwarted by the entirely incompatible claims of both sides, by difficulty of bringing them together on any common ground and by the entirely unrealistic picture of situation which public opinion on both sides has been allowed to obtain, thus making it more difficult for leaders to accept any reasonable compromise.

4. Mediator might then say that further progress towards a settlement cannot be expected by negotiation between the two parties. Jews will only negotiate on basis of prior acceptance of the existence of a Jewish state; Arabs refuse to recognize existence of this state and maintain that to negotiate with its representatives would give away whole basis of their position before negotiations had begun. On other hand, some success has been achieved, except in a few particularly contentious localities such as Jerusalem and its western approaches, in practical steps to delimit the areas held and administered by either side. The agreement of local commanders on each side has been obtained to an exact definition of a line of this character extending over X kilometres. This process has resulted in a growth of respect for the status quo in such areas and has made it easier for UN” observers to carry out their functions.

5. In spite of this, continued breaches of truce and cease-fire make it clear that international peace and security will continue to be endangered by situation in Palestine unless a settlement on following lines is immediately adopted.

6. No further attempt should be made to negotiate with the two parties about the general principles on which a peaceful solution should be reached, but a permanent frontier line should be laid down on the ground as quickly as possible. Failure to respect this line would be regarded as a breach of the truce. Frontier line should be laid down on the ground by a UN representative; Mediator might express his willingness to assume responsibility for this task. In discharging it, he would put into effect the general principles set out below, and would consult appropriate representatives of both parties in the areas concerned. He would also take account of administrative conveniences and communications. His decision on location of the boundary would be final.

7. Subject to arrangements mentioned below re Jerusalem and Haifa, the Arab and Jewish authorities shall have complete independence on their respective sides of boundary line. Provisions of SC [Page 1356] truce resolutions of twenty-ninth May and fifteenth. July would be maintained until SC acting in light of advice from Mediator, decided to terminate them. For a period of six months after the boundary had been laid down, observers would be maintained on frontier to ensure that SC received early and impartial reports on any attempt or alleged attempt by either side to infringe boundary.

8. Developing his earlier suggestions, Mediator might then lay down following general principles on which the boundary should be drawn. Division between Arab and Jewish areas should follow very generally the lines now held by the forces of either side. As compared with the boundary proposed by UNGA on twenty-ninth November 1947 Jews would gain western Galilee and Jaffa. Arabs would gain the Negeb, i.e., the whole area in southern Palestine south of the latitude of El Majdel, which UNGA allotted to the Jews, This area is larger in extent than Jewish gain in western Galilee, but is at present very considerably less productive.

9. Municipal area of Jerusalem should be a fully autonomous unit under neither Arab nor Jewish sovereignty. It would be governed by a governor responsible to UN but appointed in such a way as to avoid a deadlock of kind which has prevented establishment of a governor in Trieste, Governor would be assisted by force of international police responsible to him. A line should be demarcated on the ground in Jerusalem between the existing Arab and Jewish areas, each of which would have its district municipal administration. Both municipal bodies would be subject to the overriding authority of UN governor, who would have powers both of veto and of initiative. It would be hoped that after a certain time the two bodies would fuse into one municipal authority. Meanwhile, necessary common services would be operated by special arrangements to be made by governor. Governor would have special responsibility rights of Christian communities and preservation of holy places, together with access thereto.

10. There would not be a corridor of Jewish territory joining Jerusalem to the coast but UN governor would make necessary arrangements with Arab and Jewish authorities to ensure transit facilities for requirements of the authorities and all inhabitants of Jerusalem. Failure by either party to enter into reasonable arrangements or to respect them when they had been made would be reported to SC.

11. At Haifa a free port should be established covering a sufficient part of the port area including the oil dock and the oil refineries and pipeline terminals. Goods would be imported and exported through this area on behalf of the Jewish authorities and the authorities of the Arab countries without interference and without payment of customs duties. Agreed facilities would be given for movement of sealed trains and road transport on determined routes between free port and neighbouring Arab territories. Arab authorities would place no obstacle in delivery of oil by pipeline to free port. Any infraction of these arrangements would be dealt with by SC. Pending agreement between Arab and Jewish authorities about operation of port and transit facilities, free port would be governed by a UN port commissioner responsible to UN and having at his disposal an international police force. In absence of agreement between Arab and Jewish authorities, [Page 1357] commissioner would demarcate boundary of free port area. Administration of free port during this period would be carried out by a port authority set up by the commissioner and responsible to him. Port commissioner would make every effort to bring about as quickly as possible agreed arrangements for operation of free port and transit facilities. He would report to SC failure of either side to agree to reasonable arrangements in this regard.

12. Both parties should have access to Lydda airport.

13. In relation to Arab areas Mediator might point out that it is unlikely that agreement would be easily reached by Arab Governments and representatives of Arabs of Palestine on the disposal of these areas. It is necessary, therefore, that general principles on which they should be disposed of must be laid down by UN”. In November 1947 UNGA recommended that Arab areas should form a separate Palestinian Arab state. But this recommendation was bound up with the proposal, since shown to be impracticable, for an economic union of the whole of Palestine. Without such a union, the Arab areas do not form a viable administrative or economic unit by themselves. It would not be a permanent solution to set up an independent Arab state covering this territory. The territory should therefore be incorporated in Transjordan, subject to any frontier rectification which may be desired by the Egyptian Government. Mediator might declare his readiness to make necessary arrangements, after consultation with Governments of Egypt and Transjordan. If it were decided to modify the southern frontier, its new demarcation should be supervised by Mediator.

14. Mediator might then ask Security Council to endorse above recommendations as only means of ensuring international peace and security. They should inform all parties concerned:

(1): That they should give Mediator (or others in authority charged with demarcating boundaries) all possible assistance in carrying out this task;
(2): That they should respect the United Nations areas in Jerusalem and Haifa and make all necessary arrangements with UN authorities responsible for them; and
(3): That any attempt made during truce to infringe the new boundaries, once they were laid down, would be treated by SC as a breach of the truce and would be dealt with under Chapter VII of UN Charter.

15. Mediator would presumably include in his recommendations some action as to the Arab refugees. Nature of this recommendation will depend largely on the investigations which he is making into the numbers of refugees and the proportion of them who wish to move back to Jewish areas. Subject to this, recommendation might be to effect that as part of the boundary settlement, the Jewish authorities should be made to allow refugees to come back or to give them compensation for the property which they have left behind. The Mediator would report to SC if the Jews refused to enter into arrangements which he considered reasonable.”

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State