501.BB Palestine/9–1048: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
4057. 1. Because at this stage it seems to me that more progress can be made by dealing with Foreign Office officials acting for him than by direct conversations on Palestine between me and Bevin whose mind is so absorbed by our mutual problems in Berlin, Department’s 3544, September 8 has been discussed with Sir Orme Sargent, Michael Wright and Burrows. Following memo embodying their thoughts was handed Embassy this morning (see also my immediately following telegram).
2. (Memo begins):
Foreign Office has carefully considered Department’s views in September 8 telegram1 and is glad to note that there is now a large measure of agreement. Only important outstanding point of difference seems to be that Department only envisages reference to UN on basis, of some measure of acquiescence by two parties, whereas Foreign Office, while very much hoping that such acquiescence will be reached at early stage, fears that it is far more probable that weight of UN would have to be put behind recommendations before any signs of acquiescence will be made. Foreign Office bases this view largely on experience of second truce, since on that occasion intense diplomatic pressure failed to secure agreement of Arabs, but immediately SC had endorsed truce recommendation Arab opposition was overcome. Foreign Office feels it is unfortunately most likely that same process will happen possibly with both sides in case of recommendations now to be made by Mediator.
3. Reference in paragraph 3 Depreftel to UN action in order to convert public opinion suggests, however, to Foreign Office that Department may in fact be willing to contemplate UN action even if signs of acquiescence are limited to private statements from responsible people on either side to effect that acquiescence will be assured provided UN action is taken.
4. Foreign Office also points out that if as is presumed, Mediator makes his report to SC or Secretary General, it may be difficult to prevent matter being raised by some member state in either SC or UNGA. They also feel that if after Mediator has made his recommendation and US–UK diplomatic pressure has been applied, them is no progress, it will then certainly be necessary for Mediator to report his failure to SC or UNGA.
5. In general, Foreign Office feels that need for definite progress is becoming so urgent that earlier and agreed stages of programme should be immediately put into effect without spending any more time on US–UK discussion of later stages. Foreign Office view on later stages remains as stated above and Foreign Office hopes Department will in due course come to accept same view, but it does not press for any commitment on this at present. Foreign Office therefore proposes [Page 1389] that contact should be immediately made with Mediator by British and US representatives who would convey to him US–UK views. Mediator would be urged to make recommendations on these lines and to send copies to Secretary General of UN, Arab Governments and Jewish authorities, who would be asked not to give publicity to proposals for time being. British and US representatives would thereupon use strongest possible diplomatic pressure on Arab and Jewish authorities to persuade them to acquiesce in a settlement on lines recommended by Mediator. Both parties would be warned that truce resolution is still in force and would remain in force during implementation of Mediator’s recommendations and that USG and HMG would make every effort to ensure that breach of truce was effectively dealt with under powers of SC. At subsequent date to be agreed, proposals would be published and public statements made by US and UK endorsing them.
6. Foreign Office suggests that approaches to Arab and Jewish authorities should be parallel rather than joint.
7. If Department agrees to proceed as above, Foreign Office proposes that British Consul [at] Rhodes should be instructed to make detailed arrangements with Mediator for meeting with UK and US representatives at mutually convenient place which Foreign Office suggests might be Cairo in order to avoid undesirable publicity of visit by special British and American representatives to Rhodes. (Memo ends).
8. Re paragraph 3 above, please advise on this point.
9. Paragraph 6 above is intended to clear up possible confusion (Department’s 3544, September 8, paragraph 4). Foreign Office assumes Department does not envisage US and UK representatives calling on Mediator and officials of states together. Please confirm.
10. Re British Consul arranging meeting with Mediator (paragraph 7 above) see my 4058.2
11. Action which resulted in British memo quoted above was taken prior receipt Department’s 3573, September 93 which constitutes Department’s reply to number of points raised in memo. To keep things in sequence reply to Department’s 3573 is embodied in my 4058.