501.BB Palestine/9–1548: Telegram
The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Secretary of State
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1316. For Lovett and Rusk from McClintock. Sir John Troutbeck, representing UK, and I arrived Rhodes 13th, he from Cairo, I from Athens. We found Bernadotte had already prepared first draft of his report on Palestine dealing with mediation, truce and refugees. (Cairo’s 1315, September 15, provides text of Mediator’s recommendations for a political settlement.)
1. Substance.
Department will note general similarity of Bernadotte’s conclusions with US and UK views. Our conversations were devoted more to perfection of Bernadotte’s first draft of the conclusions than to matters of substance in which all three were in agreement. Neither Troutbeck nor I went over body of Bernadotte’s report, attention being concentrated solely on conclusion to Part I. Troutbeck had detailed brief from Foreign Office while I was guided by terms of Department’s 72, September 1, to Tel Aviv and Secretary’s instructions of September 10.
Principal matter of substance upon which views of Bernadotte and UK were at variance with our own was whether Israel should be given even a token salient into Negev, such as our suggestion for a projection of Israeli territory south to Beersheba-Gaza Road. British proposed southern frontier terminate at latitude of Majdal and found firm support from Mediator. Bernadotte said the responsibility was to propose terms founded on strict justice. If Jews were to receive all of rich Galilee in return for giving up Negev to Arabs to whom it would ever remain a worthless desert, Jews should not in his opinion have any salient to that area. Bernadotte was also swayed by information that there are mixed councils in Tel Aviv, Shertok and the more moderate leaders tending to feel that Negev for Galilee is a good bargain, while Weizmann and Ben-Gurion looked with mystical tenacity toward holding Negev and Galilee too.
I told Bernadotte that I would recommend that Department support his proposals in their entirety, including his suggestion of Majdal-Faluja line as southern boundary of Israel. I made it clear, however, that this recommendation was in no way binding on US Government, that Negev was a question of much political importance to Jews, and that it might eventually be a political good judgment to give Israel a token holding in that area. (I think, however, that from point of impartial equity that Bernadotte is right.)
[Page 1399]On internationalization of Jerusalem, UK instructions were to advocate a UN governor and provision for an international police force. I suggested that language be less specific, leaving choice open between complete UN control and responsibility or merely supervisory functions, at same time making clear that US at this stage did not contemplate contributing to an international police force. Bernadotte had been favoring a request to French Government for loan of several battalions of foreign legion for Jerusalem police duty but it was pointed out that Arabs, and particularly Azzam Pasha, would be affronted by presence of legionnaires who had fought their brethren in Morocco. Bunche and Begley favored using proposed UN guard for Jerusalem police, Begley putting minimum number at 6,000.
As for additional comment on Bernadotte’s conclusions, which seem self-explanatory, it might be said that I questioned phrase in 4(b) whereby in absence of agreement between Arabs and Jews frontiers “should be established by UN,” but it was pointed out this language came from November 29th resolution which we supported.
On Haifa refinery UK advocated in addition to free port a UN port commissioner with an international police force and special guarantee for transit of sealed trains and flow of oil to and from Iraq. It was, however, possible to agree on present language in 4(e).
Troutbeck’s instructions indicated that Foreign Office still clings to belief SC can lay down a frontier in Palestine under threat that any violation of that frontier would constitute a breach of peace calling for use of Chapter VII sanctions. It was agreed with Mediator’s approval that what was essential was that resort to force should not be attempted by either Arabs or Jews, and that SC responsibility was confined to keeping peace, not to establishing a frontier by compulsion. Further talks with British on this point of charter interpretation would be useful. As will be seen issue does not arise in Mediator’s conclusions.
2. Procedure.
Two days were devoted to discussion of substance of what may eventually be called “the Bernadotte plan.” Third meeting with Mediator this morning dealt with tactics and timing.
Bernadotte from outset of conversations insisted that it was imperative to bring Palestine situation before GA at earliest possible moment. His conversations with Arab and Jewish leaders on returning from Stockholm had convinced him that failure of GA to deal with his recommendations promptly would cause situation in Palestine greatly to deteriorate, possibly irretrievably. He based this judgment on following considerations: [Page 1400]
- (a)
- Arab Governments following last Arab League Council meeting, were sending Foreign Ministers and Prime Ministers to Paris. These leaders were in need of rapid UN action in order to channel public opinion at home to accept a solution (which they now admit to be essential even though maintaining their bluster about “never” recognizing a Jewish state and “never” dealing with the Jews.
- (b)
- Israel may not be long restrained from taking matters into its own hands if GA seems to regard Palestine situation as not urgent. Severe economic strain of maintaining men under arms during truce makes Jews restive to get some return on this investment in manpower. Mediator felt PGI would use GA inaction as pretext for action by Israel.
I told Bernadotte we had hoped his influence, abetted by UK and US diplomatic pressure, would have sufficed for parties to reach a measure of acquiescence without incurring risk of further bitter and perhaps inconclusive debate in GA. If his judgment was correct and matter should immediately be placed on agenda, I urged in strongest terms that political recommendations of Mediator be dealt with in committee I with all possible expedition. No sub-committee to drag out proceeding should be formed, and “the Bernadotte plan” should be rushed through if possible almost by acclamation. Mediator’s recommendation on refugee problem should be dealt within committee III. Bernadotte concurred with these views.
When asked how Palestine issue should be placed on agenda, I said US had already had its share of the limelight. Bernadotte and his advisors favored having some friendly delegation such as France, Canada or New Zealand place a specific item on agenda phrased, “further consideration of situation of Palestine. Consideration of the Mediator’s report.” An alternative would be to ask SYG to place matter on agenda.
As for sponsorship of an eventual resolution embodying the “Bernadotte plan” it was obvious that Mediator felt support of UK and US would be a determining factor. Troutbeck explained he had no instructions covering this point. I said I was in similar position, but offered personal comment that it would seem odd for US and UK, who were prepared to give fullest diplomatic support to “Bernadotte plan” not to give equal support once it was before GA.
It was agreed that Bunche would draft a resolution setting forth essence of Mediator’s recommendations which he will make available. My overall impression of conversations is that Bernadotte, who has taken an immense amount of first-hand testimony, has come from last minute talks with leaders on both sides, and who is sternly determined to advocate only a solution based on equal justice to both sides, feels that now is the optimum moment: that if not “now” it is “never,” and that the General Assembly must seize the opportunity.
[Page 1401]Sent Department as 1316; repeated Paris for USUN as 84, London as 97. [McClintock.]