501.BB Palestine/10–248: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
priority
Delga 190. Eyes alone for Lovett from Rusk. Since Secretary is away from Paris today and tomorrow, I am sending brief summary of conversation with Dulles on Palestine. Dulles had absented himself from delegation meetings on Palestine question because of lack of bipartisan approach. In view of presence both Democratic and Republican candidates New York this coming week, I believe you should have following memorandum despite fact contents have not yet been discussed with Secretary.
My memorandum to Secretary starts:
“I had further talk with Dulles about bipartisan implications of Palestine question.
I told him I recognized that leaders of two parties had not succeeded in getting together on Palestine question on bipartisan basis. Nevertheless, it would be mistake for other delegations or our own US public opinion to conclude there were major differences between two parties on subject. On all of fundamentals, two parties were in agreement. Examples of such agreement are: Existence of Israel as independent state, early and full recognition of new government of Israel, admission of Israel to UN, economic assistance, and peaceful settlement Jewish-Arab difficulties through UN.
The apparent differences between two parties have arisen (1) because administration has been specifically responsible for conduct of negotiations and for elaboration of details of policy, and (2) Jews have succeeded in playing one party leadership off against the other in contest for votes—votes which obviously cannot be delivered to both parties.
[Page 1449]Speaking as a non-political civil servant, I told Dulles I thought the leadership of two parties had unnecessarily exposed themselves to Jewish pressure by failure to arrive at bipartisan agreement.
Dulles then indicated that early this year Dewey had expressed willingness arrive at bipartisan policy but efforts bring Democratic Party along had been unavailing. He specifically mentioned Forrestal’s efforts in this connection. I then told Dulles that if position we have now taken in this Assembly on Palestine is undermined by bitter political rivalry and controversy in US, effect will be to subject US once more to contempt, acrimony and ridicule. I told him I was speaking only individually but that I knew every possible effort was being made to hold our present policy to lines of Bernadotte report. Obviously no one could give any assurances about what might happen on Democratic side during campaign, but I hoped very much that if Democratic policy made it possible to do so, Republicans would use greatest restraint and do everything they could not to upset situation.
Dulles said he understood complexities of situation and that, although he, too, was in no position to offer any commitment, he would do everything he could to influence Republican side toward moderation. He further expressed hope that matter might be settled before election. During conversation, he dropped useful idea that since Republicans felt quite confident, it might be possible for them to take broader view on this specific issue than they might be able to do if contest for votes were very close and bitter.
I do not believe there is much chance to get formal bipartisan agreement on Palestine before election. I do think, however, that if Department is able to hold the line on Bernadotte report and to persuade Democratic leaders not to start fresh round of new bids for Jewish support, there is good chance that Republicans will take moderate view and assist in keeping matter from flaring up once again.”
- [Rusk]
- Marshall