867N.01/12–2848: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Wells Stabler, at Amman

top secret

2. Dept has given careful consideration Jerusalem tel No. 1550 Dec 23 rptd Amman 15 and to ur 173 Dec 28, 172 Dec 281 and 176 Dec. 29.2 Dept’s comment on points raised as follows:

Dept anxious see peace restored to Palestine and believes should be accomplished by negotiations, either directly between parties or through Conciliation Commission. Dept would naturally welcome any concrete steps by Israelis or Arabs to bring about such negotiations. In this connection Dept has found reasonable attitude shown by TJ re negotiations with Jews extremely hopeful sign.

US, however, naturally desires avoid becoming involved in inter-Arab jealousies and intrigues and Dept regards question TJ relations with Arab League as essentially one for determination by TJ. As you point out ur 176 Dec 29, determining factor seems to be mil one. Dept believes final attitude TJ re Israelis will be decided by mil situation, particularly position of Arab Legion, and by stand taken by UK. Not essential, therefore, and certainly undesirable that US become involved in question TJ attitude re Arab League and other Arab States.

Dept believes that most satisfactory solution disposition greater part Arab Palestine would be incorporation in Transjordan. Therefore Dept approves principle underlying Jericho resolutions.

To sum up, US would like to see TJ negotiate armistice and final peace with Israelis, and believes most Arab Palestine could be incorporated in Transjordan as outcome such negotiations. However, US can not become involved in inter-Arab politics. If King and TJ officials [Page 1707] seek views US on question Palestine settlement, you are authorized state US approval reasonable attitude so far shown by TJ and to express US hope that TJ, as well as other Arab States, will find way of entering armistice and peace negotiations with Israelis. You are also authorized, if queried re US views on disposition Arab Palestine, to state that US believes logical outcome negotiations between TJ and Israelis would be incorporation greater part Arab Palestine in TJ. You will know best how to do this without giving impression US supporting TJ against Arab League and without involving US in Arab politics.3

Lovett
  1. No. 172 not printed; but see footnotes 1 and 3, p. 1700.
  2. Not printed; it advised that British Minister Kirkbride had cabled the Foreign Office for instructions concerning an approach to King Abdullah. The Minister commented that the policy of the Foreign Office to “hold back until Conciliation Commission arrives” no longer corresponded with the facts and that the King was fearful that the Israelis would “continue war against him or Iraqis or both unless he agrees in immediate future to peace negotiations.” The King was said to be aware that the Arab Legion and the Iraqi Army would be defeated easily, the former because of its lack of ammunition (867N.01/12–2948).
  3. This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem and London.