501.BC/3–1548: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
295. For the Secretary from Austin. Following is account of fifth meeting of consultative group of permanent members of SC (Security Council) on Palestine in Chinese delegation offices, 10:30 to 12:30 this morning.
At outset of meeting I raised the question whether it would not be possible for the four of us to agree at least on a set of facts which could be reported to SC in response to first part of SC resolution of March 5 which called for a report on situation in Palestine.
Gromyko said that we have asked certain questions and received answers and perhaps the SYG (Secretary-General) should convey at once to all members of SC information we have received.
Tsiang said, “could we not agree on this as an established fact, that peaceful implementation of the plan of partition is out of the question?”
I said I thought we should consider this and decide what our viewpoint is and make a report on the question.
Lie asked if another question would be “is there a threat to international peace?” and I replied that we should also consider and report on this question.
Tsiang said that up to present moment, while we have had intrusion of bands into Palestine, we have no information that any state has taken part in the fighting. He said that if partition plan should be pushed forward the condition of fighting would become more serious.
[Page 726]I then raised question whether there is some method available to SC to quiet fighting down. Could we not proceed with a provisional order for a truce? Parodi said that as long as we have not taken the position that there is a threat to the peace we are in a good position to get both of the parties to accept a truce. A decision that there is a threat to the peace would have to be in effect against one of the parties. He thought that it would be a good first step to try to get a truce. He thought it would not be too difficult to get both parties to accept a truce. This would not only stop the fighting but increase the strength of the SC which has thus far lost strength on this matter.
I said that I had in mind the possibility of finding a threat to the peace under Article 39 and then getting a truce as a provisional measure under Article 40. As I understood it, Parodi had in mind trying to get a truce by agreement between the parties. Parodi agreed that this was the case.
He went on to say that the Arabs must have the impression that the SC is not very strong for partition. They are therefore less prepared to accept any agreement. The moral position of SC will be impossible if inaction leads to further massacre in Palestine. The SC is not strong for partition but it has no other plan. The only other plan that it seems might be suggested would be a federal state but even this assumes at least a minimum of Arab agreement and this, therefore, does not get us very far. He concluded that “very frankly the United Nations will not survive” if it fails to find a means of dealing with this situation quickly.
I said it now seemed to be clear that the Jews will take nothing but partition. The Arabs on the other hand will have nothing to do with partition. We must then ask if there is any other solution. If not, then the big remaining question is maintaining peace.
Parodi observed that even if we are not prepared to do anything, it is very important that we do not give this impression. If we do the Arabs will be hopeless. Even if we have no solution now perhaps we will have in a month or two.
Parodi went on to say that the Arabs have the impression we are drawing back; we must therefore do something, otherwise the situation will become more and more dangerous and finally very dangerous.
I said the situation has obviously been getting worse. We have information that preparations are going on in other countries such as recruiting, financing and the like. Does this mean anything? Is it just a bluff? Should we ignore it? If not, we cannot sit around hoping something will turn up. We will have to make up our minds to do something. I repeated that I still have hopes that all four of permanent members can agree at least on the facts.
Gromyko said the SC requested US for recommendations, not facts. The facts, he said, should be made available to the SC (presumably [Page 727] through the SYG). We had obtained some very interesting facts. The British had “admitted” that bands had crossed the frontiers, but the British are too reserved. He did not know why it was so difficult for the British to supply us with more information about these incursions.
Parodi said that he was not sure that all the information we had on these points was quite enough to indicate a real threat to the peace; that is, he said, “international peace within the meaning of the Charter.” There was a threat to internal peace, of course. We really, however, needed more information from the Arab state, perhaps reports from our consuls or from the Arab states themselves.
Parodi then went on to say very clearly that he has in mind an appeal rather than an order for a truce.
I agreed that of course we must adhere to the pacific method as long as possible. It is for this reason, I said, that we are sticking to the partition plan if we can find a way of implementing it peacefully.
Gromyko asked if I had in mind a truce order directed to the neighboring states. I said yes and to the Jews and mandatory power and anybody else concerned.
Gromyko asked what the difference was between this and the last paragraph of SC resolution of March 5, and I pointed out that that was just an appeal.
Parodi then said that perhaps we could get agreement of both parties to implement the last paragraph of SC resolution. If they did not agree there probably would be a threat to the peace. It was understood that both my proposal and Parodi’s proposal would be directed to all of parties concerned. Gromyko wanted to be particularly sure of this point.
I raised the question whether we should consult with Arab states and find out from them whether a truce by agreement would be possible. I emphasized it would not be enough to get a truce agreement with just the Jews, the Arab Higher Committee, and mandatory power. The Arab states have their organization, the Arab League, which has met on this subject frequently and taken votes in opposition to partition. The Arab League might also have an effect on the views of the Arab Higher Committee.
Parodi commented that he was not certain whether we should recognize formally the interests of Arab states in Palestine by discussing the truce with them since they had no right to engage in activities which such a truce would attempt to end.
Tsiang said that he thought the idea of trying to get agreement for a truce is a reasonable one. He thought, however, the chance was very small. He could not see the Arabs agreeing to a truce without at the same time declaring a sort of moratorium on the whole situation for a limited period.
[Page 728](Nakkleh, representative of Arab Higher Committee here, came in at this point and we did not return to or answer Tsiang’s question.)
[Here follow the discussion of the Security Council Representatives with Mr. Nakkleh of the Arab Higher Committee and the text of the communication the latter had received from the Committee “this morning” reiterating its rejection of any solution of the Palestine problem based on partition.]
Tsiang then raised the question of postponement of SC meeting which had been scheduled for this afternoon to discuss Palestine.
I raised in this connection the question of whether we should not address this question on a truce to the Arab states.
Parodi intervened that the Arab states could not be asked to agree to something affecting the internal situation in Palestine. Tsiang said that we would perhaps have to phrase the question differently.
I said that if the Arab states were not willing to agree, how could we get a truce. I added off the record that I doubted whether we can get a truce peacefully but I was willing to try. But in order to get a truce peacefully we must consult the Arab states. The time has also come to inform them that we mean business. I suggested that the President of the Council might consult the Syrian member of SC and other representatives here.
Tsiang agreed to consult the Syrian, Egyptian and Lebanese representatives. It was agreed to cancel the SC meeting today; to have a four-power meeting at 10:30 tomorrow morning in Gromyko’s office; to postpone SC consideration of Kashmir dispute tomorrow afternoon and to hold tomorrow afternoon’s meeting of SC on Palestine.