Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

501.BC Indonesia/10–1048: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

secret
us urgent
niact

Batavia, October 10, 1948—10 p. m.

898. Gocus 406. Re Usgoc 159¹ and Hague’s 670² received 9th. Cognizant confusion in triangular exchange between Hague, Washington and Batavia, I made appointment this morning for personal talk with Schuurman alone at 12:15. I received Hague’s 682³ to Department and Department’s Niact to Hague⁴ repeated Batavia as 484 just before meeting. Hague’s 680 and 684⁵ to Department not yet received here.

I told Schuurman I thought time had come for us to have serious and sympathetic talk or our efforts would end disastrously. Said I knew he no more desirous see further bloodshed in Indonesia than I to see closely allied power called before SC. Reviewed events in some detail including my delay in presenting a plan awaiting unfulfilled hope Netherlands thinking would advance helpfully. Reminded him Hague disregard of my recommendation to Netherlands Delegation toward drawing Republic into negotiations with opportunity for entering federation on ground floor and issuing communiqué this effect. Said I drew up and presented US Delegation plan quickly after three visits to Republic convinced me situation more critical than Netherlands Delegation appreciated. Felt Netherlands Government had no intention get settlement before final arrangement with Bandung group and there might be basis for press story attributed official source that Netherlands anticipated forcing Republic into federation finally with Netherlands troops loaned federation for this purpose.

Indicated disappointment at Netherlands Delegation reply to US Delegation plan, and outlined how I thought Netherlands Delegation might have responded. Schuurman argued at length on seriousness infiltrations and failure of GOC to help implement truce.

During 1½ hours conversation Schuurman received 2 cables and finally went out consult Stuyt and Riphagen. Then asked me give him memo setting forth my thoughts which am scheduled deliver Schuurman 10 o’clock tonight. I subsequently prepared following memo:

“Reference is made to our conversation of this noon when I gave you my ideas on current situation with respect to resumption political negotiations. You requested memorandum from me setting forth my views with regard to amendments that might be taken into account in reply of your delegation to oral note which I submitted on September 10, as a draft meant for basis of negotiations. You also sought an expression of opinion on my part as to how best we can proceed, and how I feel I can be of assistance. It is a pleasure for me to reproduce herewith the ideas which I set forth orally to you.

I did not deliver your reply of October 4 since I felt it constituted an answer seriously divergent from conception which Department of State had of your prospective answer, as a result of information given Department by Netherlands Embassy in Washington and transmitted by Department to me. I told you that I would delay delivery of your reply to anyone until this and other points could be clarified. I did not criticize the substance of your reply. I feel, however, that its delivery in its present form would lead to prompt refusal by Republic to reenter negotiations. I am convinced present Republican Government could not, for instance, make announcements required in your covering letter with respect to violations of truce and remain in office. The fall of present Republican Government at this time would be catastrophic.

I suggest your letter of acceptance be limited to:

(1) Stating that you accept the US draft agreement as basis for negotiations;

(2) Including the same general conditions of acceptance as Republic’s first letter contained;

(3) Seeking assurances from Republican Government that they will (a) immediately undertake most effective means possible to insure observance of military terms of truce, (b) promptly endeavor likewise to implement the economic terms of truce, and (c) continue to ultimate success campaign against Communist uprising;

(4) Retaining in your letter compromise arrangements which you propose for meeting conditions stipulated in second letter of acceptance on part of the Republic; and

(5) Stressing urgency of achieving successfully negotiated agreement within minimum period of time, without definite specification as to time limit.

I shall be glad to deliver such a letter to Prime Minister of Republic as early as possible after its receipt. I undertake at sanie time to intercede with Government of Republic toward achieving as quickly and as effectively as possible the carrying out of undertakings mentioned in paragraph (3) above. As explained to you, I would endeavor to convince Republic that negotiations would be difficult of completion in present conditions and that the Republic should take every measure at its disposal to calm sentiment on part of Republican sympathizers and to restrain anyone under Republic’s influence or authority from acting in such manner as to disturb relations or contribute to unrest. I would indicate to Republic my idea that they have chosen wisely in endeavoring to put down Communist uprising. I cannot agree with idea that it would be effective or wise to ask Republic to outlaw communism. The government is obviously doing its best to put down uprising. Question arises whether outlawing communism is most effective measure to be followed anywhere.

I indicated to you that as early as September 10, 1 was aware of reports of increased violations of truce. Consequently, on that date I introduced a proposal at a meeting of the GOC that our military assistants recommend to committee methods for improving implementation of truce. Some material has already been received from our military assistants. This material indicates that military assistants feel that truce cannot in any circumstances operate effectively for such a prolonged period as that for which present one has been in force, and that best manner in which to revive respect for remaining duration of truce is to resume political negotiations and expedite consummation of a just agreement. Consequently, I undertake to endeavor to have GOC press forward as actively as possible in seeking better implementation of truce. My delegation has already taken initiative in drawing up draft appeal toward this end, which I plan to present to committee in near future.

It was my thought that your reply should consist of 1 letter only, and that all annexes and inclosures should be eliminated. I do not wish to be understood as proposing that your oral notes I and II be eliminated unless it is your intention actually to enter into negotiations on basis of plan set forth in our oral note of September 10. As member of GOC, it is, of course, our earnest hope that negotiations be resumed. Candour, however, would not permit us to recommend that verbal devices be adopted to cause one party to enter into negotiations on basis of my proposals, if it appears clear that in fact there are to be no negotiations on such a basis. It is my personal opinion that the changes proposed in your oral notes I and II negate the very basic pattern set forth in my proposals. If your oral notes I and II are attached to your note of acceptance of our proposals, we believe that Republic’s acceptance of what in effect are counterproposals, as a basis of negotiation, is extremely unlikely. I have urged that basic position set forth in your oral notes I and II be abandoned on ground that such a position could be regarded as being inconsonant with substance of US proposals. If, however, basic position set forth in your oral notes I and II has not or cannot be altered, then I cannot honorably or reasonably request you to remove oral notes I and II from your reply to my proposals. Your annexes, with respect to alleged violations of truce by Republic would, in my opinion, only prove inflammatory at this point.

My suggestion is that you reserve the presentation of any material, other than the reply indicated above, until the two parties may be in negotiation. I cannot specify exactly the procedure which would then be followed, since this would be committee decision, but I have worked on assumption that the two parties would be invited to submit in writing, and in article form, their ideas with respect to plan of US representative, and as to any amendments therein, which they desire.

Even though there may be important differences between two parties as to substance of plan, I am still optimistic that if the two parties accept, in good faith, to negotiate on basis of US proposals, and carry on these negotiations in a spirit of fairness and justice, an honorable agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time. It will be my duty to endeavor in every proper way to facilitate the negotiations and to bring them to an early end.” Signed Cochran.

Sent Department; Department pass to The Hague.⁶

Livengood

1. Telegram 481, October 8, p. 396.
2. October 7, p. 390.
3. October 9, p. 399.
4. Telegram 503, October 9, p. 399.
5. October 8, p. 397, and 10, p. 400.
6. This was done the same day.