501.BC Indonesia/10–1348: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
Delga 310. Following is text of important memorandum of conversation between Hayden Raynor1 and Van Roijen2 (Netherlands) on Indonesia. Department should note that Van Roijen stated basis of conversation was personal and not official. Text follows:
“During conversation on other matters, Van Roijen brought up subject of Indonesia and expressed deep concern his government over Cochran plan. He stated that all parties in Netherlands, and all shades Dutch opinion in Indonesia itself, felt that Cochran plan would lead to utter chaos and Communism. He said that even Socialists in Netherlands held this view and, in fact, everyone held it except Communists.
Two points which, according Van Roijen, seem bother Dutch most are: (1) Immediate elections, which he feels are entirely impracticable, and that there must be, at minimum, period stability 6 months preceding elections; (2) Negotiating or putting plan into effect while armistice being violated. Violations have increased from some 50 a week to over 250 a week. He thought that condition that armistice should be observed before negotiations continued was very reasonable one. He expressed Dutch view that Hatta Government is not against Communism, in fact, is pretty close to it itself. He does not believe, therefore, that this group taking over control at this time would; have any effect ending Communism. He said he did not think present Dutch Government, or any Dutch Government, could accept Cochran plan in its present form.
I told Van Roijen I was not familiar enough with Cochran plan, or negotiations, to argue with him in detail on points he made. I stated, however, that I knew my government felt Cochran plan was reasonable and should be accepted by both parties. We felt that present conditions of increasing Communism redoubled necessity reaching early settlement, which I understood was keystone of plan. I also stressed desirability immediate resumption negotiations. I said I hoped any conditions which Dutch might attach were seriously valid ones because we felt so strongly their position would be misunderstood if they delayed resumption negotiations on trivialities or technicalities.
Van Roijen made point several times that to Dutch Cochran plan seemed like appeasement, as he put it, a reward for obstreperous behavior on part of Indonesians. He said they did not like negotiate on such basis. He made special point that he was talking personally and [Page 415] off the record because he knew me and realized that I knew he was giving me his own honest opinions. He did ask me, however, to call this to attention Senator Austin or Jessup, depending upon which one might handle Indonesian question if it comes before SC, which he thinks is fair probability.
Van Roijen told me in greatest confidence, and made it clear he was not saying it with intention it would seem like a threat, that if things did not take turn for better, Dutch were considering withdrawing from Indonesia. He said this had been discussed more than once in the Cabinet on basis of whether would be better make a voluntary withdrawal, such as British made in Palestine, or make withdrawal called for by international sanctions. He said that latter was considered because if Dutch withdrew there would be great number loyal Indonesians butchered and, in a sense, their blood would be on their hands if they withdrew voluntarily.
Van Roijen has always been moderate insofar as Netherlander can on this question, and seriousness with which he spoke, and evident concern he has about present situation impressed me”.