Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

501.BC Indonesia/10–1948: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

Batavia, October 19, 1948—10 p. m.

927. Gocus 415. I am sending this message from Jogja October 19, 3 p. m. by GOC plane pilot for filing Batavia.

Being better built for push through center than end run, I did not accept Van Kleffens’ signal (Usgoc 168²) but presented directly Hatta 12 noon October 15 Netherlands delegation letter October 14 number 2359 with oral notes I and II. After discussing this half-hour with Hatta, I went over it in turn that and following day with Darmasetiawan, Supomo, Roem, Hadji Salim and Pringgo Digdo. This group seriously disappointed and discouraged by Netherlands delegation reply, especially 2 oral notes.

I argued this presentation Netherlands delegation suggested amendments lets Republic delegation see exactly what to expect and permits planning their countermoves. Assured them whatever amendments they submit will be received and treated on equal basis with Netherlands delegation amendments and negotiations will be on basis USDel plan. Republic delegation members recall unfortunate experiences with Netherlands delegation in past and assert Netherlands delegation now playing same game in building up support in Parliament, press and public of their policy before entering conference so that withdrawals from position practically impossible. I have not minimized difficulty of negotiations but urged that Republic will be given fair treatment in free atmosphere. Have tried show their case with SC would then be stronger, in event resort to SC eventually comes, than if they refuse negotiate and depend on material now in Palar’s hands.

I breakfasted with Sukarno Sunday and talked with him 3 hours alone. I went over whole situation. He told me how Republic was being drained heavily as result Communist uprising; men being killed; munitions being exhausted; foodstuffs and other necessities being drawn upon seriously; production suffering from lack of communication as well as from war effort; Netherlands blockade becoming even tighter. Unless success achieved militarily, materially and politically in near future it will be difficult to restrain populace. People who are by no means Communist in thought will become dissatisfied to point of giving up or causing trouble; if Netherlands attempts crush Republic all Indo may flame up. Sukarno feels third world war is already in progress and that he has chosen his side. Statement from US with respect his fight against Communist uprising would be heartening. I reminded him of unfortunate experiences in other countries where reconciliation with Communists attempted (Gocus 149³). He stated positively he had chosen side against Communism and would be absolutely firm. When I found him moved by my arguments toward entering negotiations, I told him I hoped give evidence our friendly interest before long with material help, such as textiles, but that this could not be interpreted as bargaining, and should not in any manner influence his decision toward negotiating. I said he could not find friendlier forum in which cause of republic could be debated than present GOC. I said we would do our best to see Republic got square deal but would not encourage or assist Republic on any unreasonable position. The President, as also had other members his Cabinet, bitterly resented accusations of Netherlands delegation and alleged latter using fraudulent documents against them. Republicans said they had evidence of Netherlands infiltration into Republic to cause trouble. Again I said GOC offered court for production all evidence.

In no conversation with Republican leaders, including Hatta, was there any indication Republicans opposed to January elections. Foreign Minister emphasized confidence in possibility orderly elections and cited Republic desire they be held under GOC observation. Republic set up bureau this week for making preparations for parliamentary elections within Republic in approximately three months.

I conferred with Foreign Minister and Roem October 19, 9 a. m. Roem said Republic delegation voted reply favorably my letter October 14 (Gocus 413⁴). He was submitting draft reply to Hatta and Cabinet October 19 for approval. Roem said Republic delegation desires see speedily whether negotiations can succeed. I have appointment with Hatta October 20, 10:30 a. m.

Republic may request next week, until November 1, to prepare their amendments. This is reasonable and should permit USDel meantime file its proposal with GOC and get machinery in shape for negotiations. I am remaining Kaliurang for contact to full extent Republic desires, particularly in implementation assurances, so that I can tell Netherlands delegation I am convinced good faith being demonstrated therein.

Present is still preliminary report. I hope have Republic reply in time proceed Batavia on plane scheduled October 20. Soonest thereafter I will deliver it to Schuurman with anything additional on assurances that Republic provides or I may venture. I shall try have all this in such tight shape that there will be no further ground for exchange correspondence between Republic delegation and Netherlands delegation or chance for latter to hesitate undertake negotiations. With oral note amendments of both sides submitted for beginning of negotiations about November 1, situation will be that USDel plan is basis put each side on record as to maximum amendments desired. These will be so conflicting as to cause immediate discouragement and threat imminent deadlock.

Insert A [sic].

I feel correct tactic will be to insist within GOC on basic features of USDel draft as in itself representing reasonable and fair compromise between extreme Netherlands and Republic positions as previously disclosed. We should of course hasten to adopt suggestions as to improvements in language or in details and also such changes, basic or otherwise, called for by both parties, or to which both parties will readily agree. Department has given indications in Usgoc 141,⁵ etc., that it approves such procedure. I am convinced Republic would accept this type of solution. So far as Netherlands is concerned, however, we must recognize that neither Department’s vigorous intervention of past months with Netherlands Government nor USDel’s efforts locally have resulted in any modification of Netherlands delegation’s demands so far as substantive fundamentals of political settlement are concerned. Their position even more solidified through Parliamentary debate, official utterances and press comments on virtues Netherlands delegation counterproposals to USDel plan.

When deadlock threatens break-up of negotiations it may be that exigencies of internal situation will cause Republic to desire get into federation on most generous terms obtainable even though this may mean accepting considerable change in basic character USDel plan and adoption certain features of Bandung set-up. I have not sensed, however, any indications of weakening in this direction. On contrary, there is resoluteness that is Spartan.

Any possibility of Republic yielding beyond position taken in USDel plan would be limited not only by personal views of Republic delegation, who feel that all compromises in past have been made on their side alone, but by Republic sentiment as represented by party leaders in Cabinet and working committee who must approve and implement any agreement. It seems far more likely that breakdown in negotiations resulting from Netherlands delegation insisting on pattern basically different from that of USDel plan would rather cause Republic to proceed with its appeal to SC, now temporarily held in abeyance.

It seems highly desirable that we have campaign toward getting Netherlands be reasonable mapped out in readiness for implementation simultaneously with or immediately after announcement that parties have agreed resume negotiations on basis USDel plan. We should endeavor of course, at least for time being, to keep terms USDel plan and parties amendments secret. It would appear proper, however, for Secretary of State to express gratification over decision to negotiate and hope that honorable agreement may be reached. Other remarks of similar character might also be made in Paris by UN officials and participating statesmen, or in respective capitals of latter.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Any Department suggestions to guide me opening formal negotiations basis USDel plan would be appreciated. I feel that to get acceptable agreement, if at all possible, is infinitely better, no matter how painful the process, than is alternative of referring back whole matter to SC and making mean case against Netherlands. If we should have to carry out our threat of resuming freedom of position vis-à-vis Republic and possibly recognize it, we would be in for terrific headache. Republic would look to us for moral and financial support and be our charge to extent that would embarrass US more with Netherlands than would real fight in coming negotiations. In Paragraph three Gocus 353,⁶ I gave Department my impression Netherlands line of thinking versus Republic. In spite of difficulties anticipated then, we have seen fit to present and support a plan not in harmony with official Netherlands Government running to Department constantly with failure for this plan.

Department has recently seen and will of course discount tactic of Netherlands Government running to Department constantly with stories to blacken Republic and undermine USDel.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Signed Cochran.⁷

Livengood

1. Repeated in telegrams Gadel 259, October 21, 5 p. m., to Paris and 540, October 21, 7 p. m., to The Hague.
2. Telegram 501, October 13, p. 412.
3. Not printed.
4. Telegram 919, October 15, p. 419.
5. Telegram 428, September 16, p. 341.
6. Telegram 693, August 16, p. 299.
7. In telegrams 521, October 21, 7 p. m. (Usgoc 177), to Batavia, and Gadel 282, October 22, 7 p. m., to Paris, the Department stated it was giving most serious consideration to this telegram.