895.01/9–2348
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
| Participants: | Dr. Chough Pyong Ok, Special Representative of the President of Korea |
| Mr. Chyung Yil Hyung, Counselor, Korean Mission | |
| Mr. Kim Woo Pyung, Economic Adviser, Korean Mission | |
| Mr. Robert A. Lovett, The Acting Secretary | |
| Mr. W. Walton Butterworth, Director, FE | |
| Mr. Niles W. Bond, Assistant Chief, NA |
After the usual exchange of pleasantries, Dr. Chough stated that he had come, first, to express the gratitude of the Government and the people of Korea for the assistance rendered by the United States in the struggle for Korean independence and unity, and, second, to urge that the United States not forsake Korea at the present critical moment [Page 1310] with that goal only half won. He expressed the view that the best hope for a constructive solution to the Korean problem lay in continued U.S. support for the new Korean Government until the latter is strong enough to stand alone and to serve as a nucleus for the unification of Korea on a democratic basis. As essential elements of such support, he mentioned (1) the retention of U.S. occupation forces in Korea for the time being, (2) development in the meantime of effectively trained and equipped Korean security forces, and (3) continued U.S. economic assistance to the new Government, with emphasis on the rehabilitation of electric power facilities and light industries. (In the latter connection he stated that, as a result of shortages of power and raw materials, only thirty percent of south Korea’s 5,500 industrial plants were in production.) Dr. Chough went on to say that if these conditions were met he was confident that his Government could survive to become the nucleus of a free and independent Korea which would be a bulwark of democracy in the Far East.
I asked Dr. Chough whether it was his opinion that, if all occupation forces were withdrawn from both north and south Korea at this time, the north Korean “People’s Army” would attack south Korea. He replied without hesitation in the affirmative, adding that his information was that the “People’s Army” had four divisions fully equipped with modern Soviet equipment, and that the total strength of all north Korean military and para-military organizations was between 250,000 and 300,000 men. He said that almost the entire budget in north Korea was devoted to such organizations, as a consequence of which those persons who were neither members thereof nor part of the governmental hierarchy found it difficult to live. This, he said, was one of the principal reasons why at least 4,500,000 north Koreans, including virtually all of the real leaders of north Korea, has sought refuge south of the 38 degree parallel.
Turning to the subject of UN” consideration of the Korean problem, Dr. Chough expressed confidence, on the basis of the previous attitudes of the General Assembly and the Interim Committee, that the present session of the General Assembly would accord some form of recognition to his Government. He added that even the UN Temporary Commission on Korea, after an inauspicious beginning, had finally come to take a generally sympathetic view toward that Government. In this connection he indicated that the considerable change for the better in the attitude of certain of the members of the Temporary Commission toward the south Korean police was in considerable part due to his own testimony on the latter’s behalf, delivered during the course of a 4½-hour session with the Temporary Commission.
Dr. Chough went on to say that his own police experience had convinced him of the seriousness of the Communist threat to South Korea, [Page 1311] even though Soviet occupation forces were to withdraw from north Korea. I pointed out to Dr. Chough in this regard that it had been demonstrated in several instances in Europe that once Soviet military forces were withdrawn from an area of Soviet influence, the natural antipathy of the people toward Communism was apt to make itself felt. To this Dr. Chough replied that the situation in Korea was essentially different from that in Europe and that similar results should not be expected to flow from Soviet withdrawal from Korea. There ensued a discussion of the effect of the Tito schism1 on the propaganda line being taken by the Communists in the Far East to the effect that the peoples of Asia will find in Communism a support for their aspirations to national self-determination.
In response to my question as to his estimate of the effectiveness of the Korean Constabulary, Dr. Chough, while revealing an understandable predilection for the civil police force of which he formerly was head, replied that he regarded the Constabulary as an effective security force, whose effectiveness would be still further enhanced as the present program of training and equipping was carried out. He interjected somewhat ruefully at this point that in at least one instance the equipping of the Constabulary had been carried out at the expense of his civil police, the latter having been obliged to turn over to the Constabulary all of their American machine guns, leaving only Japanese weapons for which there were no replacement parts. He expressed the view that the principal disadvantage from which the Constabulary suffered in relation to the north Korean armed forces was that, despite his own urgings as far back as 1945, much valuable time had been lost before a serious program for the training and equipping of the Constabulary was initiated in 1947.
With respect to his own plans, Dr. Chough stated that he hoped to be able to see the President prior to his departure for Paris and the General Assembly next month, and that, if time permitted, he hoped also to be able to visit Ottawa in order to pay his respects to the Government of Canada as one of the member nations of the Temporary Commission.