895.20 Mission/11–548: Telegram
The Special Representative in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State
priority
186. Cite Zpol 12916. Following from President Rhee November 2:
“Dear Ambassador: I take the honor to inform you that it is the desire of the government of the Republic of Korea to make a formal request to the Government of the United States to establish a military and naval mission in Korea now. They deem it advisable for the following reasons:
“The former constabulary of 50,000 men, now serving as the National Defense Army, is entirely inadequate in number. Reports, as well as rumors, are widely circulating to the effect that the Communist uprisings, similar to those of the recent disturbances in the south, are scheduled to break out in various cities during the winter and early spring. While the government forces are sufficient to safeguard the peace and order, an additional force of 50,000 men will create at least a moral effect in preventing any untoward attempt by the subversive elements. A military mission will be of great service in forming, training, and equipping the necessary additional force.
“The realization that an inadequate army exists for self defense against a large number of the Korean Red Army forces in the north, creates a feeling of insecurity among the people in the south and such a feeling of insecurity naturally encourages the Communist terrorists both in the north and south. A United States military and naval mission set up now will at once assure the public of its safety and protection.
“The formation and completion of a sufficient military force for national defense will remove the necessity of the retention of the United States security forces in Korea. Therefore, the sooner such a mission is in operation, the better it would be for both the United States and Korea.
“I hereby formally request the Government of the United States to take proper steps at the earliest possible moment to create a military and naval mission in Korea.
“Accept, Sir, the assurance of my continued high regard. Sincerely yours, (signed) Syngman Rhee, President”.
My reply, after consultation with General Coulter, November 5, follows:
“Excellency: I have the honor to inform you in reply to your letter of November 2, in which you request the establishment of a military and naval mission in Korea, that the present Provisional Military Advisory Group will continue to advise and assist the Government of the Republic of Korea in the development of the Korean security forces now in being.
“Your suggestion that the Government of the Republic of Korea create an additional force of 50,000 men for the National Defense Army to be trained and equipped with the assistance of the United States, and your formal request that the United States establish a military and naval mission in Korea, are being transmitted to my government for consideration and reply.
“General Coulter is submitting recommendations to CSGPO in which I concur.”1
- General Coulter’s telegram Zget, November 6, from Seoul, among other things, recommended against a formal military agreement at the present, proposed redesignating the military advisory group to be the U.S. Military Mission to the Republic of Korea, and stated the Korean constabulary could reach a satisfactory state of training by December 31. (740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–648)↩