Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/3–2248

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Ringwalt) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)⁶⁹

[Washington,] April 2, 1948.

There is attached hereto a despatch of March 22, 1948 from Ambassador Stuart.^69a

[Here follows summary of two earlier Embassy despatches, No. 1144, December 6, 1947, printed in Foreign Relations, 1947, volume VII, page 387, and No. 28, January 23, 1948, printed ibid., 1948, volume VIII, “U.S. Military Assistance to China” (Ch. III).

Comment: The Embassy has made an able presentation of the arguments in favor of active US military participation in the Chinese Government’s war against the Communists. Our present general approach to China’s problems seems to rule out action along the lines envisaged by the Embassy, but it may nevertheless be worthwhile to explore some of the difficulties and objections, inherent in such a line of action, which the Embassy seems not to have adequately considered.

The Embassy cites six grave handicaps under which the Government military effort operates but fails to explain how certain of these handicaps might be removed; for the removal of the others it suggests measures which appear to us to be open to grave objections. The following is our more specific comment in this connection:

(1) The Embassy fails to explain how a US planning group subordinate to the Generalissimo could break his habit of interfering with field operations.

(2) It does not state how the planning group could in the near future remove the handicap inherent in the lack of integrity and professional skill of top Government commanders. It may be assumed, however, that the Embassy expects that the Sino-US field teams would compensate to a degree for these deficiencies. Use of such field teams doubtless would require a considerable increase in the number of US military personnel in China and the direct involvement of some of them in China’s civil war. The utilization at the front of US officers for the purpose of instilling the proper offensive spirit apparently is also envisaged, for in its despatch of December 6⁷⁰ the Embassy recalls that during the Sino-Japanese war such spirit was instilled in selected divisions only through the earnest efforts of US officers, who worked with those divisions while they were engaged in actual combat operations.

(3) It fails to explain how the planning group would serve to remedy the failure of the Government to organize an effective service of supply. Almost certainly the assignment of US personnel to tasks of getting matériel to the areas of end-use, which presently cover much of Manchuria and China proper north of the Yangtze, would require a large increase of US military personnel in China and, given Chinese Communist mobile tactics, would directly involve many of them in fighting.

(4) It urges US participation in local Chinese government. The Japanese between 1937 and 1945 attempted to guide local Chinese governments in occupied areas. Japanese efforts along these lines enjoyed important advantages—similarity of the Japanese and Chinese written languages, availability of large numbers of Jap specialists in Chinese affairs, and the backing of large numbers of Japanese gendarmes and regular troops. Nevertheless their governmental activities were resented as outside interference and achieved inconclusive results. It seems doubtful that the US, lacking large numbers of available personnel who at once possess military government techniques and are intimately acquainted with China, would enjoy better success.

(5) It does not indicate how the Chinese Government’s inability to plan and execute a military training program would be remedied by creation of the proposed US strategic planning group. It would appear that the AAG as presently organized should be in position to remedy that defect to such extent as that may be accomplished by a non-Chinese group.

(6) It cites the inability of the Government to balance available resources of manpower and matériel against requirements of the situation and to organize those resources for their most efficient employment. Elsewhere it has stated that the Chinese Government evidently does not know what resources it possesses; availability of such information would appear a prerequisite for any effective planning. To obtain it there would probably be required the extended efforts of considerable numbers of competent persons who are at home in the Chinese scene, and it is not apparent where such personnel could be procured. However, granting that this obstacle were overcome and proper plans drawn up, we should almost certainly have to request withdrawal of Chinese forces from overextended garrison positions in order that sufficient troops might be available for offensive operations. Should the Chinese accede to such a request we would become responsible in Chinese eyes for the supply of matériel needed for the accepted plans as well as for the subsequent recapture of areas abandoned at our behest. Once so firmly committed, we might find the Chinese accepting our matériel and again rejecting our advice.

A[rthtur] R. R[ingwalt]

69. In a memorandum of April 5 Mr. Butterworth stated to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett): “I would suggest that the attached memorandum and file be forwarded to the Secretary who will no doubt have more leisure to read it in Bogotá or en route from Bogotá than he will in Washington. Incidentally, I am sure that despatch No. 138 of March 22, attached, from Ambassador Stuart was written by him with the idea that General Marshall would have an opportunity to see it.” Memorandum initialed by the Secretary of State: “GCM”.
70. Despatch No. 138, printed as a separate document, p. 163.
70. Despatch No. 1144; see bracketed note, p. 178.