893.00/4–848: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received 2:57 p. m.]
630. Before leaving for Canton I called on Generalissimo and found him more cheerful than he has appeared for several weeks past. He knew General Barr82 was going with me and asked that we hurry back as he needed Barr’s advice in respect of certain studies involving [Page 185] military equipment. Also he thought there were issues connected with American aid which I should be on hand to discuss with him. Foreign Minister83 expressed similar hope to me this morning.
Generalissimo asked me to convey to Secretary his personal appreciation for Congressional action approving China aid program and for Secretary’s important part in this action.84
In explanation for his reasons for refusing to allow his name to be proposed by Kmt for President, he said:
- (1)
- He felt strongly that when the constitution was being put into effect for first time neither President nor Vice President should be military man and that only way to prevent the choice of military man for those offices was for he himself to withdraw from contest. The nation should profit, he said, by the example of misrule under militarists beginning with Yuan Shih-kai at the very inception of the republican system and should elect civilians to high office.
- (2)
- According to the constitution, the President’s powers are very limited and he would not be able to make as much contribution as in some subordinate position. He quoted a phrase from Mencius that in subordinate position he could do twice as much with half the effort. He admitted, however, that all his efforts to withdraw seemed unsuccessful and he would have to abide by the vote in the National Assembly unless he could convince the members that the stand he had taken was really to the best interests of the country.
I told Generalissimo I had been much impressed by his attitude which I knew to be sincere; yet, on the other hand, he had been so long not only the leader, but almost the symbol of China’s long struggle towards independence, unity and peace that he would still further injure popular morale within the country and weaken confidence abroad if he did not yield to the clearly expressed desires of the National Assembly delegates. I remarked on the great significance of the establishment of constitutional government at the very moment American aid was voted, and mentioned the potentialities this combination offered for progress and reform in China. I went on to say that communism was not only military, but also a social and political movement which could not be conquered in any country merely by military force, and that such things as better local government, improvements in taxation, the protection of civil rights, and popular education were equally necessary. As President he would, I thought, have more time for larger issues instead of being burdened with the incessant routine he had hitherto carried. To this he remarked that even if he became President and acted on that theory it would be necessary to go on doing that sort of thing as otherwise matters would soon begin to go wrong. I responded that it seemed to me to be part of his new function [Page 186] to attempt to delegate responsibility and to train others to accept responsibility without always coming to him; that he could not go on forever trying to administer the whole country, and that this would be a good time to train himself and others for such procedure. He replied that he supposed this was true, but that it was not easy.
The above is most depressing and indicates to us that the road to reform in China under the Kuomintang is going to be most difficult. Nevertheless the situation is so desperate and there is such a real desire for change, some progress may yet be possible. What the Chinese need as much as anything at the moment is competent advice in the various fields of activity. If, in connection with the China aid program, we can supply the qualified advisors which they urgently seek and desperately need, there is a fair chance the advice will be taken and improvement result. In implementation of the China aid program we hope, therefore, Department is giving some serious consideration to this phase of the problem.