893.00B/6–1548
The Consul General at Hong Kong (McKenna) to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)30
Sir: I have the honor to submit a preliminary report of some aspects of the relations of the Chinese Communist Party with Marshal Li Chi-shen and his Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee. This report is a summary of information and impressions obtained by this office to date; it is anticipated that more comprehensive information will be obtained in the future, and will be made the subject of a supplementary report.
As reported previously by this office, the KmtRC31 claims that Marshal Li in 1946 arrived at an understanding with Chou En-lai.32 The terms of this agreement between the Marshal and Chou included approval by the Communists of the future establishment by the Marshal of an organization which would aim at reform of the Kuomintang. This organization, established by Marshal Li on January 1, 1948, is the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee. The other terms of the agreement which are known to this office are as follows: first, a coalition Government will be established after the collapse of the National Government headed by the Generalissimo and the CC Clique; second, the Communists approve and will support Marshal Li for the position of head of the coalition Government; third, the coalition Government will declare illegal the present constitution and the organs which have been established under that document; fourth, a truce will be declared immediately after the collapse of the existing Government, hostilities will cease and military forces will be frozen in their positions pending decisions by the new Government as to the disposition of forces; fifth, a non-partisan National Army will be established and the great majority of the forces under arms will be demobilized; sixth, there will be complete political freedom for all political parties and groups; and seventh, the reform leadership of the Kmt will be responsible for decisions as to which members of the party will be purged.
It must be stressed that at no time have the above-listed points been set forth together, as details of the alleged agreement between Li Chi-shen and Chou En-lai; they have emerged gradually in the course of conversations of Vice Consul Service33 with Marshal Li, General [Page 306] Ts’ai T’ing-k’ai, Chou Ching-wen and C. Y. Li. Most of these points have been confirmed in separate conversations with two or more of these individuals. However, it may be assumed that there were other terms in this agreement which have not been disclosed, and which may not be revealed until and if the KmtRC’s dream is realized.
If it is reasonable to accept the existence of a basic agreement between Marshal Li and the Communist leadership, and to include the above-listed points as known elements of the agreement, it is possible to study the Marshal’s relations with the Communists with a greater degree of understanding. In view of the present strength of the Communist Party, the increasing disorganization within the Kmt, and the absence of a powerful, well-knit third political element on the national scene, it may be assumed that a coalition Government may only be headed by a leader who is acceptable to the Communists. It is the consensus of leading dissidents in Hong Kong that the Communists will consider it politically inexpedient to place a Communist at the head of a coalition Government, and there are obvious reasons why the Communists would prefer to saddle a non-Communist with this responsibility. Marshal Li recognizes his chance at the post as an opportunity to bring peace to his country, to “introduce essential reforms through rapid implementation of the theories of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and to cleanse and re-vitalize the Kuomintang Party. While he anticipates strong Communist pressure to render the coalition Government a puppet organ of the Communists, he relies heavily on the strength of a reformed Kmt to support him, and he relies particularly on the nature of the Chinese people. He maintains with strong conviction that the Chinese by nature will rally to a democratic cause in opposition to communism, as the latter system cannot afford to give the people the freedom which Chinese individualism demands. He ascribes the phenomenal success of the Communists during the past two and a half years to the failure of the Kuomintang to introduce effectively promised reforms for which the people have been waiting since 1911. Given a non-Communist reform movement, the people will accord it overwhelming support, says the Marshal.
But Marsha Li believes that the most effective method through which he can reform the Kmt is to accept the position of head of the coalition Government. To continue to qualify for that post, which has been promised to him by the Communists, he must permit nothing to compromise his standing with the CP. He submits, therefore, to considerable and constant pressure exerted by the local Communists. He signs declarations and letters prepared by Communist fellow-travelers who are members of the Revolutionary Committee, and who scurry back and forth between his home and the Communist leaders with drafts which include only declarations which have the approval [Page 307] of the Communists. He attends a luncheon meeting every Sunday at which most of the significant Communist leaders are present, and he listens courteously to their opinions. He resolutely refuses to yield to the pressure of non-Communists in his following (Chou Ching-wen, for example), who attempt to dissuade him from issuing public statements which identify him closely with the Communist line. His strategy is based on his analysis of the relative significance of certain courses of action; he can accomplish most if he is head of the coalition Government, even if this requires of him a too-cooperative and outwardly puppet attitude during this preliminary period. He reasons that this strategy is superior to an independent stand which might win him substantial support within the Kmt prior to the fall of the Government, but which might jeopardize his selection as head of the coalition Government, or which might cause the Communists to abandon as too dangerous their plans for the establishment of such a Government.
In the foregoing discussion of his submission to local Communist pressure, it must not be assumed that the Marshal does not approve of everything which is placed over his signature by the Communists. For instance, he strongly opposes American policy in China, which he considers responsible for delay in the collapse of the present Nanking regime. He opposes the present constitution, and favors a constitution based on the PCC resolutions.34 In certain other respects his views coincide with those of the Communists (and, it may be added, with those of many non-Communists), but his non-Communist associates insist that the Marshal fundamentally is opposed to Communism and to the communization of China. Marshal Li has himself pointed to his record of Communist-suppression in Kwangtung more than a decade ago as evidence of his opposition to that system. As to the possibility that the Marshal will accept a high position to become a Communist puppet, his followers argue that he could have accepted high posts as a puppet of the Generalissimo if he was inclined to compromise with his principles, or he could join the Communist Party if he wished to be assured of power. His sympathizers point to his long record as a Kuomintang liberal, the instances of his open opposition to the Generalissimo at the cost of personal position and the many occasions when he privately and publicly has advised Chiang to liberalize his policies. Although opinions vary as to the Marshal’s capacity for strong leadership of a modern state, or his ability to cope with as highly organized a party as the Communists, even those who ridicule the potential significance of the KmtRC do [Page 308] not fail to credit the Marshal with singular righteousness and strength of character.
Study of the present status of the KmtRC must include some anticipation of possible changes which might occur during the present fluid state of affairs in China. Factors which might affect the KmtRC program are numerous. Among the principal potential factors are the following: the death of Marshal Li; strenuous and effective reform of the Kmt before the collapse of the Government; and administration of the double-cross to the Marshal by the Communists before the fall of Chiang and the CC Clique.35 In the first eventuality, probably Feng Yu-hsiang36 would attempt to replace Marshal Li, and the KmtRC would lose in the exchange. As to the second eventuality, there is as yet little indication that a New Deal is possible under existing leadership in the capital.
What may be anticipated if the Communists denounce Marshal Li and his Revolutionary Committee? Although the Marshal is alleged to have complete confidence in fulfillment by the Communists of their agreement with him, there is some feeling among non-Communist associates of the Marshal (Chow Ching-wen, in particular) that the Communists are aware of Li Chi-shen’s basic loyalty to the Kmt and his unwillingness to play the role of a puppet, and that the Communists may decide to revise their plans. Chow Ching-wen recently has reported two developments to which he attaches significance. The first, and more important, is the publication here in the Hua Shang Pao on May 25, 1948, of a long Hsin Hua Sho editorial entitled “An Old China is Dying; A New China is Marching Ahead”.37 In this editorial, a copy of which presumably was received by the Embassy’s monitoring service, the official Communist news agency attacked the Generalissimo, the constitution, the National Assembly, and other aspects of the Government. It also excoriated Vice President Li Ts’ung-jen, denouncing him as a tool of the Americans, who seek to substitute for the Generalissimo a pseudo-liberal counterrevolutionary who would be expected to establish a so-called reform Government subservient to the aims of American imperialism. The statement in this editorial to which Chow attached greatest significance was the passage which declared that the Communists will not, recognize or accept any changes in the Government which are carried out from within the Kuomintang. Chow stated that this passage caused a sensation among liberals in Hong Kong, many of whom believed that this was a direct attack levelled at Li Chi-shen; Chow [Page 309] claimed that the Marshal was disturbed and angry when he read the editorial, and that the Marshal discussed the subject with him at their next private interview. On the other hand, C. Y. Li informed Mr. Service that the local Communists assured the Marshal that the editorial referred to Kmt members actively serving the National Government, and that the editorial in fact was evidence of the Communist determination to see the KmtRC assume leadership of the Kmt.
The second instance revealed by Chow Ching-wen was a remark contained in a recent speech given by Mao Tun, the leftist playwright, before a meeting of Wuhan University alumni. Chow asserted that Mao, so far as he is aware, on no previous occasion has presented a formal, prepared speech in the Colony. In this speech, Mao is alleged to have emphasized that no so-called liberal Kmt elements, such as Feng Yu-hsiang, would be permitted to participate in the new Government of China. Chow considers that Mao served as a mouthpiece of the Communists on this occasion, and that the selection of Feng Yu-hsiang as an example actually was a deliberate attack by the Communists on Li Chi-shen. Chow stated that Mao’s reference to Feng had excited great interest among liberals here.
Chow’s conclusion that the foregoing instances indicate at least the initial stages of a Communist attack on the Marshal must be treated with reserve. Chow is recognized as one of the leading anti-Communist liberals in Hong Kong, and he has informed Mr. Service in several recent interviews that he is determined to exert all of his influence with Marshal Li toward the adoption by the Marshal of a completely independent stand clearly and irrevocably divorced from the Communists. Chow is convinced that such a stand, representing accurately the Marshal’s fundamental views, would win for the KmtRC overwhelming prestige and support throughout China, would assure him of leadership of a Kmt capable, with the re-acquired support of the people, of crushing the Communists, and would provide the United States with a Chinese Government worthy of friendship and support in the achievement of the fundamental aims of American policy in China.
It is doubtful whether Chow Ching-wen’s rosy prediction of the effects of a break between the KmtRC and the Communists is as objective as it is optimistic. Is there evidence that Li Chi-shen would receive important recognition and acclaim if he broke with the Communists, or if they broke with him? Perhaps Marshal Li is shrewd when he chooses to take command of the Kmt with the blessing of the Communists.
Respectfully yours,
- Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General without covering despatch; received June 24.↩
- Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) Revolutionary Committee.↩
- Member of the Central Committee and Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party and head of the Communist delegation in the 1946 negotiations.↩
- Richard M. Service.↩
- For Resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference, January 1946, see United States Relations With China, pp. 610–621.↩
- Faction of the Kuomintang led by the brothers, Chen Li-fu and Chen Kuo-fu.↩
- Marshal Feng had been a member of the Chinese National Military Council and was abroad at this time.↩
- See United States Relations With China, pp. 859–862.↩