893.00/6–3048
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 13.]
Sir: I have the honor to report my impressions of anti-American sentiment and other current issues as formed especially during a recent visit to Peiping, The attacks on me because of my statement55 regarding American policy in Japan have been very wide-spread and violent, chiefly among editors, teachers and students. The students of Yenching University joined in that of the Peiping Student Union which led me to withdraw my promise to speak at their Commencement Exercises on June 29. I did, however, carry out my intention to go there for my birthday a few days earlier. This enabled me to gain a better insight into student thought than would otherwise have been possible. I had several conferences with different groups of them and a final one with a delegation from the city, all of which were extensively reported in the Chinese press. The causes are essentially as I reported them in the last paragraph of my despatch no. 273 of June 14, 1948, but the feelings are much more intense than I had realized. There undoubtedly are what are now popularly described as “professional students” planted in most if not all of the leading educational institutions. They have skilfully instigated and organized the recent agitations but they could not have created the prevalent mood. The two most potent causes are probably:
- (1)
- Soviet propaganda over a long period in easily accessible and readable literature which has impregnated student thinking more profoundly than would have been expected.
- (2)
- Discontent with the Kmt Government as the source of all their woes, its corruption and incapacity to provide protection and economic relief. They are in a dispirited mood in which they have ceased to fear Communism because they imagine that nothing could be any worse than what they are now suffering.
Anti-American feeling is influenced by both these factors. The Soviet insinuations are deliberate and plausible. They want the overthrow of this Government which is being obstructed by our assistance to it. This assistance and its aims are grossly misrepresented. The case of Japan is exploited as an instance of our imperialistic tendency and of our concentration on preparing to utilize both Japan and China for our own purposes in the coming war with Russia. They seem impervious to any suggestions that they forget Japanese remilitarization, as at most a hypothetical fear in a far-away future, and employ their patriotic energies in arousing the nation to the immediate dangers [Page 329] as dramatized by the loss of Outer Mongolia and the imminent loss of Inner Mongolia, the Northeast (Manchuria), etc. The recounting to them of Russian behavior in this last-mentioned area arouses nothing but airy skepticism as to the facts or mute indifference. It is a strange psychosis but one that must be reckoned with especially if—as has usually been the case—what the students are thinking now is an index of what the nation as a whole will soon be thinking.
I had a long talk with General Fu Tso-yi which strengthened my belief in his military abilities and in his concern over the welfare of his men and their consequent fighting spirit. He is also winning the confidence of the country people, is enlisting their assistance in a policy of self-defense, and is putting into effect a simple but apparently satisfactory scheme of land redistribution. He urgently needs equipment, including ammunition, and is trying to purchase about U. S. $10,000,000 worth with a barter of local products through some none too reputable foreign brokers in Tientsin. I wish there were some way in which our Government could help him without driving him to these agents, after securing of course President Chiang’s approval. He is manufacturing certain items himself which he told me ought to begin to be available in August. In general the North China military situation seems to be somewhat more stabilized and if Fu can get supplies and CP armies elsewhere not be too largely released for moving against him he ought to be able to hold out for some time. In view of the attitude of the intellectuals in that area it is the more important that there be a strong military control. If the welfare of the country people can be improved it will tend still further to neutralize the CP political machinations. In the city of Peiping these are said to be so thoroughly organized as almost to be on a house to house basis.
There are again faint rustlings of interest among the CP in a resumption of the PCC peace talks. Curiously enough they are not making the retirement of Chiang Kai-shek a prerequisite. They seem no longer to care much about what happens to him. They hint that if we Americans are sincere in wanting peace we should demonstrate this by withdrawing all our armed forces from China, which is only one of several indications that they continue to think in terms of our mediation. I am maintaining an attitude of friendly but passive interest while assuring them that the door is still open if they care to take advantage of it.
In the capital and in Shanghai there is growing despondency of which the fantastically mounting inflation and even more fantastic rumors are symptoms. It is hard to see how things can go on much longer at this pace without a break of some sort. T. V. Soong thinks of this as inevitable and is putting all his effort upon the military [Page 330] strengthening of Kwangtung, not even trying to extend his activities to neighboring provinces until this basic objective will have been achieved.
Within this week General Barr will give me a briefing of his overall plan of operations at which Admiral Badger and Mr. Clark will be present. After discussion among ourselves I shall probably go with him to present it to President Chiang. I have already been urging him to entrust military operations to the Minister of National Defense together with a small group of responsible associates. They would of course receive suggestions from the President and secure his approval of at least major operations, but apart from this he would not interfere. He at first said he would consider this idea but later in the conversation promised that he would follow whatever is the American procedure. I pointed out that I was not concerned so much with personalities as with the system. General Barr’s over-all plan would follow along naturally with this proposed change of procedure.
Although it is more obvious than ever that there can be no improvement in military affairs without persistent American advice yet the swelling anti-American temper is a reminder that this given in disregard of other factors will merely serve to aggravate the problem. I need not comment again on the need for more progressive administrative reforms and on the possibilities in a program of rural reconstruction. But I venture to urge once again the value of having our own well-planned publicity. We are anxiously awaiting the arrival of Mr. Bryan.56 It also occurs to me that it might be very beneficial if one or more outstanding Americans could be persuaded to come here for a lecture tour which need not require more than about three months. Really well-known persons would be eagerly listened to by the intellectuals and they could be appealed to on patriotic grounds. The name of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt has been suggested. I have in mind also such names as that of Chancellor Robert M. Hutchins, University of Chicago, President Karl Compton of M. I. T.,57 or his brother now president of Washington University, St. Louis, President James B. Conant of Harvard, etc.
Respectfully yours,