Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00 Manchuria/7–648: Telegram

The Consul General at Mukden (Ward) to the Secretary of State

Mukden, July 6, 1948—2 p. m.
[Received July 9—11:05 a. m.]

282. Summary Manchurian situation first half 1948:

Military: Military activities both Government and Communists very limited since February. Major Communist accomplishments consisted bottling Government forces in isolated garrisons Mukden and Changchun and somewhat sterilizing forces in Chinchow sector. Communists accomplished this by relatively unopposed conquest Yingkow, Anshan, Liaoyuan and Ssupingkai, and Government voluntary withdrawal Kirin. Communists then had Government on knees, Wei had one week’s ammunition supply for sporadic defensive. Morale troops low and command disintegrated. For unknown reasons Communists failed capitalize their advantage after the capture Liaoyuan [and] were content to rest until middle May. Communists undoubtedly now aware mistake made in not pushing advantage and if again able place Government similar position will probably continue attack with all strength at their disposal. Military efforts until middle May consisted regrouping, reorganizing, and recruiting in strongly held Communist areas. Government activity consisted conserving strength seriously dissipated by Chen Cheng[’s]⁷⁴ military incompetency and regrouping and consolidating forces [to] fight defensive warfare. This, together with major effort stockpile sufficient military supplies and food to enable army meet any Communist attack or extended siege, remains Government policy.

Communist military possibilities consist (1) all-out attacks Changchun, Mukden and Chinchow aimed at capture and early domination all northeast, (2) closely encircle Government defensive islands and starve into submission over long period time, (3) leave holding forces northeast and commit bulk units areas south Great Wall or (4) combination two these possibilities. Present indications are Communists believe all-out attacks too costly and that ultimate aims can be accomplished by continuing siege, that immediate conquest not essential since time working their favor because Government inefficiency and corruption and difficulty Government logistics. Indications at present Communists intend pursue seemingly most logical course leaving sizable holding forces northeast in danger finding soft spots Government defenses Great Wall area by minor probing action, hit with military strength at disposal. Determined attack against Government stronghold remains possibility, and cannot be ignored. Coming months may, however, see shift military activity from northeast to North China areas.

Communists’ military limitations consist primarily of following factors:

(1) As center of fighting shifts southward from Communist strongholds and primary supply bases north Sungari River, already overtaxed Communist transportation will have to absorb additional burden transporting military supplies and food Communist armies, since believed no longer possible Communist armies live off land unless constantly on move, and certainly not possible maintain siege any period time without being supplied from rear bases.

(2) Communist food surplus seriously depleted by shipments to Russia in exchange for essential manufactured goods such as cloth and military supplies. Unless Russia willing supply such items gratis, which seems unlikely, Communists may suffer shortages military equipment such as ammunition and weapons during coming months.

(3) Communists may be faced with serious food shortages during coming winter months because reported unwillingness farmers Communist areas plant crops greater amount than essential for personal needs. Communists’ wanton requesting draft animals and pauperization of landed gentry has resulted in forced use human labor because of animal shortages, thus prohibiting cultivation large acreage, and inefficient planting and labor supervision and

(4) Time rapidly approaching when Communists must make decision whether turn for leadership to Li Li-san and his Moscow-oriented associates or to Mao Tse-tung with his non-Moscow clique. Such decision, when it comes, may well cause rift in present close unity.

Government possibilities northeast are (1) maintaining and strengthening defensive holdings Mukden, Changchun and Chinchow, stockpiling of military supplies these areas by water and rail to Chinchow and by air Mukden and Changchun, recruiting and training local forces build up strength of military even though this course action disregards welfare civil population, (2) wage counteroffensive to broaden areas around major cities now being held, or (3) wage counteroffensive to Join isolated garrisons and open up connecting land communications. Such action would again leave small Government units vulnerable attack major Communist forces almost entirely [devoid?] of knowledge that no replacements either of men or equipment can be expected should any offensive action be undertaken unsuccessfully. Believed Wei has strength to undertake one offensive action but such action would have to be perfectly timed and executed to be successful. Any error would immediately result in loss to Government of entire northeast together with large munitions factory, productive coal mines, and approximately 150,000 of China’s best trained and equipped troops.

Considerable pressure being brought upon Wei Li-huang wage early counteroffensive. Wei continues of opinion that in view his physical assets and other factors opportune moment for counteroffensive not yet arrived.

Proponents of immediate offensive action point out garrisons cannot be supplied by air for extended periods and continued defensive activity ruins military morale. Wei on other hand points out northeast presently in position unflavored child, Government attitude towards military activity northeast barely lukewarm and it has placed northeast lowest priority for aid throughout entire China, and while undoubtedly willing claim Wei victory if won would probably disclaim responsibility for his defeat. Wei believes if counteroffensive not successful he will get no assistance whatsoever. He is confident he can hold isolated garrisons of Mukden and Chinchow as long as Government itself stands. Consequently his probable policy will be to hold and build up reserves in both men and supply within the garrisons and then if counteroffensive launched unsuccessfully can rely on self for salvation. Wei realizes odds against him cannot become much greater in delaying action and may find windfall in unexpected American assistance or Communist deterioration.

Summary: Anticipated action northeast coming months indicated tightened Communist rings around Mukden, and Changchun probing action on part of Communists in Chinchow-Shanhaikwan-Chinwang-tao areas in ever-increasing number and intensity. Likelihood loss Mukden or Chinchow to Communists questionable and generally believed not imminent, and loss Changchun not likely until Government supply situation becomes more acute.

Economic: Picture northeast very dismal. Bright spots are continued production Fushan and Penhsihu coal mines which permits continued capacity operation Mukden arsenal and will afford some fuel for civil population Mukden during winter months and attempt produce as much foodstuffs as possible within Mukden defense perimeter.

Past 6 months have seen frenzied inflation both money and cost living, closure business both manufacturing and retail, deterioration of industrial equipment, and exodus of technical experts necessary to Far East economy. Embargo on remittances from northeast to China proper has had very depressing effect on value northeast currency. Corruption merchants and officials augments suffering masses. For example, 33 percent profit being made by materials distribution commission on relief flour purchased in intramural China. Civilian food shortages becoming acute. Believed that this shortage greater threat to continued Government hold on northeast than Communist armies.

Political: Maneuvering or activity conspicuously absent. Wei supreme in political and military field. No rest under dictatorship of military. Democratic practices used only when more expedient than those employed by a monarch or war lord. Local population openly state police more high-handed in actions than puppet police under Japs.

Press continues requests civilian relief by proposing demands, with no consideration of possibility implementation, which only serve arouse emotion. Old northeasterners led by Ma Chan-shan⁷⁵ continue blatant clamour for reform but offer nothing constructive. North-westerner [Northeasterners?] have displayed little if any more patriotism than other Chinese in that they have been among first to leave area after having amassed as much money as possible.

Political (Russian): Economic status Soviet population Mukden deteriorates and now critical. Soviet Government apparently doing nothing to alleviate. No employment available and have already disposed of merchantable chattels. Starvation will be prevalent this winter if no corrective measures taken. Large number unemployed Russians now returning Harbin through occupied areas.

Political (Japanese): Almost all Jap civilians have been repatriated. Only technicians remain Mukden. These technicians generally in good positions and fairly well paid. Probably in better status than any other foreign group except American and British.

Summary (political): If nothing done to increase civilian food supply, winter months will be exceedingly difficult. Starvation, disease and possibly epidemic expected. Major hopes Government lies in American relief, unexpected Government military successes central and North China, accelerated Communist difficulties and increase local Government military strength along with counter-offensive open and hold communication route to sea.

Sent Nanking 364.

Ward

74. Director of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s Headquarters in the Northeast (PNEH) until February 12, 1948 when General Wei Li-huang became Acting Director of PNEH.
75. Commander in Chief of Sungpei Pacification Army.