893.00B/8–3048
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 14.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose a memorandum81 of conversation between Dr. Li Wei-kuo, Secretary General of the Executive Yuan, and an officer of this Embassy on the subject of Chinese Government propaganda. This conversation was held shortly after the rather spectacular developments in Yugoslavia82 and resulted from a conversation between the Generalissimo and the Ambassador on the subject of how the Chinese Government might exploit Yugoslav [Page 442] developments in its propaganda concerning its own internal Communist problem.
Time and again the Embassy has noticed how Chinese propaganda organizations fail to make the best use of contemporary developments for their own internal ends and that often when they do the effort is not always presented in such a way as to secure the desired objective. Conversations held with various responsible Chinese officials on the subject of Yugoslavia very quickly revealed that although it had occurred in passing to some of them to use this situation, nothing had been done. Immediately following the conversation with Dr. Li a great barrage of material appeared in all newspapers in Government-held territory. Most of the material was well prepared and quite to the point. Its effectiveness, however, was somewhat decreased by the fact that its appearance had been too long delayed; that it appeared in many places at the same time; and that too much of it was too similar. Foreign correspondents and Chinese who oppose the government were quick to seize on these facts and there was considerable ironic speculation as to how and by whom it had been inspired.
Despite this rather unfortunate timing the Embassy is, however, of the opinion that the material which appeared did have a somewhat sobering effect and served some useful purpose. In time, a number of articles appeared in opposition liberal and left-wing magazines which took a warning tone on the implications of Yugoslavia.
Whatever the motivation it is also worth noting that Chinese Communist propaganda apart from the one statement by Mao Tse-tung has been notably silent on the subject. A Communist spokesman in Hong Kong remarked to an officer of the Consulate General there that he thought Mao’s statement had been unwise and that he personally thought the Cominform action should be disturbing to the Chinese Communists.
Certainly there is no evidence as yet of an attempt by the Chinese Communists to modify various lines of policy which have been similar to those for which Yugoslavia had been criticized in line with the Cominform statement. This may be taken as further indication of a possible serious split between Mao Tse-tung and Li Li-san. Dr. Li Wei-kuo has recently said he has documentary evidence that such a split does exist and that he will shortly make this evidence available to the Embassy. One usually reliable American newspaper man has recently been in Hong Kong. He says that all the left-wing non-Communist groups assume that such a split has taken place. They cite as evidence thereof that in recent negotiations in Hong Kong between the Communists and Li Chi-shen for the convocation of a [Page 443] new PCC, the Manchurian Communists have been insisting that it be held in Harbin but that the Mao group refuses to accept the proposal. Largely because of failure of the two Communist factions to agree between them the conversations with Li Chi-shen have reached something of an impasse.
Respectfully yours,
Minister-Counselor