893.00/12–3148
The Consul General at Mukden (Ward) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 29, 1949 (sic).]
The Consul General has the honor to describe closing episodes in the disintegration of National authority in the Northeast, documented by a diary95 of events during the two months prior to the fall of Mukden on November 1, 1948.
The climactic military disaster at Tahusan during late October followed the familiar pattern of Government reverses, complete with last-minute command intervention by the Generalissimo himself, repudiation of competent commanders long on the scene, hasty and ill-fated reversals of strategy, lack of coordination between National forces in isolated pockets, and—most decisive of all—abject failure of fighting morale in every echelon. In this manner a veteran army of 250,000 men, in some measure trained and to a large extent equipped by the United States, fell apart without fighting seriously; there is evidence of extremely few Communist casualties at Tahusan. Red propaganda had called, “Your rifle is American, but your life is Chinese; save them both for the New China!”
Nor were the Kuomintang high officials more steadfast: in the remaining few days of grace they were intent upon their own escape, ignoring the opportunity to destroy vital military assets—important productive facilities headed by the Mukden Arsenal and the American artillery, vehicles, arms and military stores which remained in impressive quantity.
The crucial offensive from Mukden, utilizing the main strength of its garrison, which ended with disaster at Tahusan was in design the blow of a “hammer” toward the “anvil” of beleaguered National defenses at Chinchow. But the latter, under the command of General Fan Han-chieh, crumbled very rapidly before the Communist main pressure while rear guard action was detaining the Mukden forces. Military observers consider that the sudden and decisive loss of Chinchow may be attributable to the early failure of General Fan to carry out the defensive plan provided by the Northeast Headquarters. Though nominally a deputy of Northeast Commanding General Wei Li-huang, in Fan’s concurrent position as “Commander of the Border Area Headquarters” he could temporize with Wei’s orders. Indeed it is understood that the Generalissimo encouraged Fan’s individualism, despite his limited military experience and the weakness of divided council, as a political buffer between Wei and the [Page 727] North China Headquarters—further evidence of Chiang Kai-shek’s obsession with personal allegiance at any cost.
While the coup de grâce was military, the preceding two months witnessed accelerated progress in Mukden of the political and economic deterioration typical of Intramural cities, which finally overwhelmed the determined and partially successful efforts of the Wei administration to cope with its problems, most of them inherited from reprehensible predecessors in office. In mid-September the Wei regime was crippled by abrupt constriction of the last remaining measures of support from Nanking: the supply of currency was curtailed critically* and air deliveries of military food stores were cut by sixty per cent† —this at a time when the reserves of food, ammunition and raw material, the industrial efficiency of personnel and equipment, and the morale of both civilians and military were already close to the breaking point.
These alarming developments soon cut deep fissures in the political coalition which General Wei had carefully constructed behind his administration. The press flaunted censorship to blurt out the imminence of general starvation and the bankruptcy of Northeastern industry.‡ Food prices steepened their dizzy climb, despite a diminished money supply, when the Government ordered the imposition of virtual grain requisition for support of the Mukden garrisons§ The Liaoning Provincial Government, after first promising curtailment of land taxes, levied the 1948 crop without regard for the fifty per cent insect damage to the kaoliang crop and followed this with efforts, probably forcible, to “borrow” the 1949 tax║. Wei himself sought to resign, acknowledging frustration.
In short, the Nationalist cause in the Northeast was fast arriving at political and economic despair when the military debacle occurred, and its final erasure was for Northeasterners at every level of society indeed a form of “liberation,” insofar as it ended their painful experience with the economic paralysis following National military stagnation in early 1947, and with the rapacious self-seeking and gross inefficiency consequent upon extreme personalization in the Government structure, where blind allegiance to the Generalissimo as an individual was the only path to preference, and corruption the accepted means to a livelihood in office.
Certainly the Northeasterner would be embarrassed to recall the heartfelt enthusiasm with which he welcomed National forces to Mukden in March 1946, pursuing a ragged Communist army. The force [Page 728] which repelled Northeasterners from Kuomintang rule is measured by the stillborn “emancipationist” movement of mid-1948, and by the grave discontent which responsible local groups dared imprisonment to express openly¶. There were even nostalgic reflections upon the order and stability of “Manchukuo.” Now, as the Chinese Communist Party assumes control of a Manchuria unified militarily and politically, if not in sentiment and philosophy, it need not fear a popular opposition intent upon restoration of an unregenerate Kuomintang regime.
- Not printed.↩
- See Diary, September 16 [Footnote in the original.]↩
- op. cit., September 18 [Footnote in the original.]↩
- op. cit., September 24 [Footnote in the original.]↩
- op. cit., October 5 [Footnote in the original.]↩
- op. cit., October 21 [Footnote in the original.]↩
- See Diary, September 1, September 24, September 30. [Footnote in the original.]↩