Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/102

Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the United States Delegation, New York, September 27, 1949, 9:00 a. m.

New York, September 27, 1949, 9:00 a.m.

secret

[Here follow list of names of persons (43) present and discussion of two prior subjects on the Delegation’s agenda.]

3. Candidacy of Yugoslavia for the Security Council

Ambassador Jessup said that he had discussed Yugoslavia’s candidacy with the Secretary yesterday afternoon, and they had come to the conclusion that it would be desirable for the United States to take the following position. We would say to other delegations who inquired as to our position that, as we saw the picture, the Ukrainian seat was to be vacated. It should be filled by an Eastern European, Slav and communist state. We understood there are two candidates, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. We were not going to campaign for anyone, but we were going to vote for Yugoslavia.

Ambassador Austin commented that certain of our friends wanted to know our position and inquired what they could now be told. Mr. Jessup explained that the Secretary had discussed the matter with Mr. Bevin who had asked for time to talk it over with his staff and who would then give us his final views. Mr. Bevin had promised to let the Secretary know by 9:15 a. m. However, Ambassador Jessup stated that the Secretary had agreed we should take this position, even if the British did not come along. The Delegation might accordingly take its decision to this effect and inform the French and British of it immediately.

Mr. Hickerson suggested that it is not at all necessary that we should agree with the British on this matter. We should answer inquiries as to our position, irrespective of what position they took. The only promise which had been made the British was to tell them our decision. He proposed that, unless the Delegation should decide otherwise, we should tell other Delegations our position after eleven o’clock. If any contrary decision was taken, the information would be gotten to all members of the Delegation.

Ambassador Austin stated his understanding of our present position to be that, under the circumstances now existing, the United States Delegation had decided not to campaign for, but to vote for Yugoslavia, and after 11:00 a. m. or before if so advised, to reply to inquiries that it was voting for Yugoslavia. Mr. Hickerson indicated there was a little more to our position. That is, we thought a Slav state should be elected; there were two candidates in the field; and given the present situation, our intention was to vote for Yugoslavia.

Mr. Ross commented that we would be asked for what reasons we had decided to support Yugoslavia over Czechoslovakia. Mr. Hickerson expressed surprise that we should have to explain why. Mrs. Roosevelt suggested we might say it was in view of the speech made by the Delegation of Yugoslavia,¹ and that, as the situation now stood, between the two states, Yugoslavia was more likely to cast an independent vote. Mr. Hickerson wondered if we had to say that. Mrs. Roosevelt said if anyone pinned us down, those were our reasons. Ambassador Austin indicated it was the standard practice of the Mission to give the reason for any decision. It was a rule in talking with the other members of the United Nations that the United States Delegation should not attempt to proselyte or coerce, but to exercise such leadership as it could by telling these members our position and the reason for it. If that appealed to them, we received their support. Otherwise, other countries would simply react by telling us what was wrong with our position. In this case, he noted that most countries already knew our reasons, but he believed we should be in a position to answer inquiries, if made.

Ambassador Jessup reported that he had just talked with the Secretary who had been in touch with Mr. Bevin’s secretary. Mr. Bevin did not feel very strongly on this matter, but if the British were asked, they would say they were voting against Yugoslavia. The Secretary had replied that if anyone asked us we would say we were voting for Yugoslavia but not campaigning.

Mr. Cohen expressed general agreement with the line of approach adopted by the Delegation but wanted to put in one caveat. He believed it was especially important, particularly in view of the difference with the British, for us to avoid letting people think that we considered this an important issue or that we were leading the fight. He thought this was already understood. Mr. Hickerson agreed.

Senator Cooper asked what were the particular reasons given by the British for their position. Mr. Hickerson replied that the British experts said it was because Mr. Bevin was a real socialist and did not think there was anything to choose between communists or anything to be gained by supporting one communist over another. Also the Yugoslavs might feel, if they get on the Security Council, that it would be implied assurance that they would get more support from the West than if they were not on the Council. Of course, this would not follow at all. The only important thing was that the Yugoslavs, having travelled this distance, should get our support. In fact, we did not attach much importance to this candidacy. Mr. Cohen remarked that we were now seeing the Yugoslavs on their good behavior. Some of the delegates could recall past occasions on which they had been even more disagreeable and intransigent than the Soviets. That fact might account in part for Mr. Bevin’s attitude.

Mr. Notter inquired whether the British matched our position on not campaigning. Mr. Hickerson said that they did.

Ambassador Austin noted that under the statute this decision was to be made by the President acting through the Secretary and the Delegation should simply carry out this mandate. Mr. Fahy said he thought it was right, notwithstanding.

Mr. McKeever commented that while Mr. Cohen was right, it would be difficult to establish our position on the basis of the feeling this was not important. He simply wished the Delegation to be aware of this problem.

[Here follows discussion of another subject.]

1. For the General Debate statement to the General Assembly on September 26 by Edvard Kardelj, Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs and Head of the Yugoslav Delegation to the General Assembly, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Plenary Meetings, pp. 66–69 (hereafter cited as GA(IV), Plenary).