840.20/3–1149

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

top secret
Participants: Mr. Rasmussen, Foreign Minister of Denmark
Mr. Kauffmann, Ambassador of Denmark
Mr. Hvass, Danish Foreign Office
The Secretary
Mr. Bohlen, Counselor
Mr. Hickerson, Director, EUR
Mr. Hulley, Chief, NOE

I welcomed the Foreign Minister to Washington, expressed my great pleasure at the opportunity which his visit affords us to exchange ideas about the North Atlantic Pact, and assured him that my time is entirely at his disposal. After this preliminary talk he could have a discussion, with several of my associates tomorrow, and another meeting with me on Monday or Tuesday at his pleasure.

The Foreign Minister said he would like to outline briefly what was in his mind. The Danish Government had made a whole-hearted attempt to reach an agreement with Sweden and Norway for a Scandinavian defense pact. All political parties except the Communists gave full support to this plan which seemed to them the best solution for Denmark’s defense problem. There was wide-spread disappointment that it had not been possible to reach such an agreement with the other two countries. Now Denmark has but two choices, either unprotected isolation or joining up with the West. Five-sixths of the Lower House and nine-tenths of the Upper House are in favor of joining the North Atlantic alliance. However, the Government wants a broader support from public opinion as well as from Parliament, where it wants as much support as can be gained from two small parties which do not yet favor the Pact. He was not taking into consideration the Communists, who hold only nine of the 150 seats in Parliament.

There were some questions he would have to answer when he got back to Denmark. In the first place, was the North Atlantic Pact in complete harmony with the United Nations Charter and was its purpose solely defensive and peaceful?

I said that the drafters had leaned over backwards to keep the treaty closely in line with the United Nations Charter. Besides using many phrases from the Charter and making references to it, provision is made for reports to the Security Council. He would see from the text that the purpose is purely defensive and peaceful and when we are able to publish it in a few days I thought this question would be clearly answered.

He asked whether all Danish territory would be covered, i.e., Bornholm, [Page 194] the Faroes, and Greenland; and whether any bases on Danish home territory were contemplated. I replied that all the Danish territory he had named would be covered by the treaty, and that we do not contemplate that any bases will be required in Denmark proper.

He said he had a list of Danish requirements toward defense with him which he would like to go over with officers in the Department. He asked whether we could give any indication of the arms assistance which might be supplied to Denmark and whether if Denmark received a dollar allotment for its defense under the contemplated legislation, it would be possible to expend any of this allotment in countries other than the United States. He had in mind orders already placed by Denmark for aircraft from Britain and anti-aircraft from Sweden. I said it was not possible to be specific on arms questions until we had progressed further in our planning and in fact until we knew the outcome of congressional action on the arms legislation which is now being drafted. His latter question had simply not been considered as yet, but it might be put to Mr. Gross tomorrow for his comments.

He asked whether Denmark would be obliged to declare war or to send defense troops if outlying areas such as Alaska were attacked. I answered by citing Article 4 which provides for consultation of the parties and Article 5 which provides that in case of armed attack each party will assist the party so attacked by taking such action, including the use of armed force, as it deems necessary to restore and maintain the security of the area. I explained the thought underlying these articles and said that it was clear from the wording that the final decision on his question would rest with each member. It was my understanding that there might be circumstances in which it would be preferable for some parties not to declare war in the event of an armed attack but to take other appropriate measures to attain the purposes of the treaty.

Dean Acheson