840.00/10–2649: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
4284. For the Secretary from Douglas.
1. In accordance with exchange of cables and telephone conversation with the Secretary on subject of economic integration of western Europe1 and adjustment in the organization of OEEC, I approached Bevin this morning.
2. I explained to him that at first I had contemplated discussing the question of OEEC and the selection of a person of international stature as a permanent director, as it were, of OEEC affairs with him and Cripps together, but I had concluded that it would be preferable for me to discuss the matter in an official and also in a personal way with him, Mr. Bevin, because I could express to him certain apprehensions which I knew were correct in a way which he would not misunderstand. I then proceeded to remind him of the speed and effectiveness with which he responded to General Marshall’s speech in the summer of 1947, of the many conversations that were held here in London on the subject of European Recovery Program prior to Bevin’s departure for Paris, of the way in which he had conducted the meeting of ministers in Paris2 and the fruitful results which it had produced, of the courage which he had displayed during the Molotov contretemps and of the extraordinary job that had been done by Sir Oliver Franks in the OEEC under his, Mr. Bevin’s, wise counsel and direction. I reminded him too of the substance of his message January 13, 1948 and of his February speech which really gave birth to the Brussels Pact and Western Union.3 I then went on to tell him of the almost unanimous view which had been given out by the many Senators and members of the House during my last visit in Washington of their regret that further evidences of economic integration of western Europe had not appeared, and that the progress toward this [Page 436] had been, however good in some respects, far slower than they had anticipated when they enacted originally the enabling legislation and of their opinion that unless substantial additional advances were made toward this objective they doubted very much that any art of persuasion could induce the Congress to continue the European Recovery Program in a substantial way into the third year of its existence. I said that in view of the shortness of the time between now and the convening of Congress, when it could commence at least in a preliminary way to consider extending the program, we needed some symbol of progress and of determination to achieve a goal, as well as substantive measures. The symbol could be had by making adjustments in the organization of the OEEC so that some European (I made it clear I was not making an issue of any particular personality) person of sufficient international stature be selected as permanent guiding spirit of its operations. I also informed him that during the forthcoming meeting on the twenty-eighth Mr. Hoffman would discuss this question with participating countries.
3. a. Bevin replied that this was a somewhat different approach than that which was aimed at the selection of Spaak. For Spaak as personality he had very highest esteem but he doubted very much whether Spaak himself was anxious to accept any post of responsibility in the OEEC not only because of the conflict that might ensue between Spaak, who could not officially represent Belgium, and Van Zeeland who was its appointed and official spokesman, but also because Spaak was doubtful as to whether the acceptance by him of an appointment of this character in OEEC would not impair his own political position and status with his own people. More important perhaps than Spaak’s personal reaction was his, Bevin’s, considered judgment that Spaak was essential to the peaceful settlement within Belgium of the thorny issue which the plebiscite on the return of the King was presenting. Without Spaak in Belgium as a powerful leader of the Socialist Party, the plebiscite might well produce something not far short of civil war. Such a schism within Belgium might create another breach through which the Soviet would not be slow to make advances.
Moreover it was not anticipated that the present government in Belgium would enjoy a life of more than six months. Under whose leadership would the ensuing government, presumably a Socialist government, attempt to govern if Spaak in the meantime accepted a permanent position with the OEEC?
b. Bevin said that perhaps Washington did not fully comprehend that Great Britain could not accept integration in western Europe on a scale which would impair its other responsibilities. She was, he said, a world power and was not merely a European power.
[Page 437]4. I immediately replied that we understood of course and took it for granted that any suggestion that the UK’s integration with western Europe should impair her relations with the Empire and the Commonwealth or undermine her position as a world power would be as unfortunate for US alone as it might be disastrous for the whole western world. This however did not imply that there were not steps of a more far-reaching character than any so far taken by the UK and the participating countries toward economic commonalty. I also agreed with Bevin that at least some of the important measures so far taken by the OEEC toward a closer economic harmony had been inspired, if not actually initiated, by the British but I said further evidence of substantial progress is necessary during the course of the next two or three months. Moreover, groupings within OEEC on economic questions may require some support or at least should not be opposed if they are not to fail. Bevin said that in regard to the recent proposals of France, Italy and Benelux, HMG, although it had been importuned by certain French interests to interfere in opposition, had completely refrained from doing so. This would be its continuing policy.
5. He was disposed to say that HMG would be very glad to discuss the issue of selecting an outstanding personality, etc. and he himself would today discuss the matter with Cripps. He felt it wholly possible that at the forthcoming meeting there might be appointed a very small working group to examine the question and to make recommendations in time to resolve the issue.
6. I am forwarding by separate cable message4 from Bevin for the Secretary in response to the Secretary’s message in Deptel 3820, October 24, 7 p. m.
Sent Department 4284; repeated Paris 816 for Bruce and Harriman, Frankfort 141 for McCloy, Brussels 184 for Kirk, Rome 181 for Dunn.
- For the text of a personal message of October 25 from Bevin to Acheson on closer European union, see enclosure to letter from the Minister in the British Embassy, p. 347.↩
- For documentation on Bevin’s role in the development of the European Recovery Program, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. iii, pp. 197 ff.↩
- For documentation on these initiatives by Bevin, see ibid., 1948, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.↩
- Not printed.↩