Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

711.4027/1–2749: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

secret

Washington, January 27, 1949—7 p. m.

us urgent

303. Brit reasons against use effective control clause by Turks (ur 273 Jan 22²) weak, in US opinion, since (1) danger clause might be invoked against UK and US for political or other reasons already exists and (2) clause permits unilateral action and is not arbitrable. However, if denunciation agreement were accompanied by successful Turk efforts suspend operating permits previously granted Czechs under bilateral, end objective to which UK, US and Turks all subscribe (i.e. blocking Czech flights to Turk) could seemingly be accomplished without waiting for expiration 12 months notice termination. Therefore urge Brit instruct its mission Ankara support following US views which Dept proposes convey Turks soon as Brit concurrence received:

“Immediately on receipt Depcirins Jan 5³ and in coordination Brit colleague who is receiving FonOff instrs support US views, furnish Turks text paras 3, 4 and 5 background memo accompanying cirins as info supporting Turk desire denounce agreement (Ankara’s 16 Jan 8⁴ para 5) then convey Turks fol US views: Respective positions US and Turk vis-à-vis Czech air agreement not identical present time view fact US not yet obliged consider necessity denounce US-Czech agreement since Czechs have not requested requisite permit operate ITS territory under terms bilateral. US wld not under its present civil aviation policy toward Soviet and Satellites grant Czechs such permit if requested. Most practical Turk course, in US opinion, wld be file notice intent terminate agreement under provisions Art 11 Turk-Czech bilateral without advancing any reasons for such action. If pressed for explanation and Turks consider such necessary (language providing for termination agreement US understands requires no explanation) any one or more fol reasons might be cited:

(a) Recent political developments Czech.

(b) Absence Turk desire operate Czech foreseeable future.

(c) Inability Turk airlines operate Czech foreseeable future, hence no further basis reciprocal benefits.

As soon thereafter as practicable Turks shld endeavor suspend operating rights previously extended Czech air carriers under terms bilateral on such legitimate technical grounds as Turks consider available and necessary accomplish objective. While in US view Turks in best position determine what means are available to them to find defensible grounds to suspend permits, presumably technical violations of Turk regs or flying procedures and standards could be cited with justification.”

Emphasize FonOff Depts deep concern lest long awaited opportunity which Turks have presented may be lost if US and UK support of present Turk inclinations not provided promptly. Brit concurrence foregoing urgently desired.⁵

Acheson

1. Repeated to Ankara as telegram 40 and to Bern as telegram 110.
2. Not printed. It reported the British Foreign Office reaction to the proposals outlined in telegram 148, January 13, to London, p. 184. The Foreign Office believed that it would be undesirable to urge the Turkish Government to denounce the Czechoslovak-Turkish civil aviation agreement on the basis of the effective control clause because such an action would set a precedent which could be used in the future against American and British interests. The action might also result in the Czechoslovak Government taking the case to some international body for arbitration thus forcing a public debate of political issues (760F.6727/1–2249).
3. See editorial note, p. 184.
4. Not printed.
5. Telegram 412, February 3, from London, not printed, reported that the British Foreign Office agreed to support the suggested approach to the Turkish Government as modified by the omission of the reference to political developments in Czechoslovakia as a reason for the cancellation of the Turkish-Czechoslovak air agreement (711.4027/2–349). The Department of State agreed to the modified approach. Telegram 87, February 20, from Ankara, not printed, reported a memorandum along the lines indicated here, as modified, was presented to the Turkish Foreign Ministry. The Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry commented that Turkey was well aware of the danger of the continued operation of the Czechoslovak airline in the Middle East. Turkey was considering denouncing the Turkish-Czechoslovak civil aviation agreement, but the grounds so far suggested appeared to be insufficient (860F. 796/2–2049).