Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

874.00/12–2249: Telegram

The Minister in Bulgaria (Heath) to the Secretary of State

confidential

Sofia, December 22, 1949—11 p. m.

1123. Reference Deptel 464, December 21.¹ I agree thoroughly Department should discontinue publicizing further exchanges with Bulgarian Government on attempted involvement Legation in Kostov “conspiracy”. I believe also we should postpone reply to Foreign Office aide-mémoire on Under Secretary Webb’s statement until we have some inkling as to Foreign Office’s next move.

As re my suggested talk with Assistant Foreign Minister Kamenov (Legtel 1113, December 20²) it was not intention to ask an interview or open an interview on subject of recent actions and declarations of Bulgarian Government against Legation and US Government. We still have pending discussions about Legation staff and housing and the proposed temporary arrangement for reciprocal deblocking of funds. Recently new Diplomatic Service Bureau demanded surrender apartment on which we hold valid lease and threatened to break in if we refused. It would be on such minor problems that I would seek an interview with Kamenov, leaving it up to him to make an opening or lead discussion to Kostov case. I will, of course, make no attempt to see him pending instructions from Department, but sooner or later I must resume contact with Foreign Office.

Surprising publication of my denial following upon Department’s forceful reaction Bulgarian’s attempt implicate me in Kostov case has been enthusiastically received by such non-Communist Bulgarians as we have been able to contact, and by practically all Western diplomats here. They unhesitatingly interpret publication my statement as a defeat and retreat—if only temporary—of Communist regime here and a—temporary—victory for US. Both diplomatic observers and Bulgarians hold that however much government may assert contrary, publication of my statement shows up essential falsity of case against Kostov whose guilt was, we believe, accepted by few intelligent members of BCP or by anti-Communist masses.

I doubt that effect of publication of my denial was nation-wide since it appeared only in local dailies and briefly over radio. But it is surprising that according to scant sampling we have been able to accomplish that even man in street in Sofia is somewhat aware of its significance.

Most of my Western colleagues share my belief that Bulgarian Government’s action was due to Kremlin’s unwillingness to have US break relations at this precise time and over this precise issue, and, I might add, in this particular country. I believe that Kremlin accepted loss of face for Communist regime here rather than do anything which might operate to handicap eventual action against Tito for which Bulgaria must be an important base. There are signs here that Kremlin may use Bulgaria in an endeavor to agitate Macedonian issue.

There are no local signs as yet of preparation for overt military attack on Yugoslavia but certainly Soviets must have considered such action as a possible last resort in case other efforts against Tito failed. They might well avoid any incident which might increase indignation in US and conceivably bring about increased American and Western support of Tito. I might add I am not so certain that Kremlin would have ordered Bulgarian Government temporarily to back down from its attacks on Legation if it felt certain that US would under no circumstances go any further—as indicated recent Deptel—than mere severance of relations.

My colleagues here with exception of British Minister³ believe that for some little time Bulgarian Government will not only not ask for my recall but will do nothing for moment to make my position untenable. British Minister, however, believes that Foreign Office may refuse to receive me, and certain Bulgarians believe regime will involve me or members of Legation in some future trial or manufactured incident.

Intentions of Bulgarian Government may become manifest when I have occasion to ask for interview with Assistant Foreign Minister or Foreign Minister. If they refuse to grant or delay unconscionably in granting interview, their intentions would be clear.⁴

Heath

1. Supra.
2. Not printed, but see footnote 5 to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry aide-mémoire of December 19, p. 377.
3. Paul Mason.
4. Telegram 471, December 27, to Sofia, not printed, authorized Minister Heath to discuss with the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry problems such as those mentioned in this telegram (874.00/12–2249). In his telegram 1137, December 31, from Sofia, not printed, Heath reported that he had conferred with Assistant Foreign Minister Kamenov that afternoon. Heath “briefly and coolly” expressed his appreciation for the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry’s cooperation in arranging for the publication of his denial of allegations against him in the Kostov indictment. Heath also took the opportunity to deny allegations made against him in Tsonchev’s testimony (see editorial note, p. 363) during the Kostov trial. Kamenov’s manner was courteous but reserved. Heath also reported that he had received a Christmas gift from Foreign Minister Poptomov (874.00/12–3149).