Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

861.24/10–1049

The Secretary of the Navy (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

secret

Washington, 10 October 1949.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: Now that the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Governments have formalized their agreement with respect to the return to U.S. custody of 27 frigates and 3 icebreakers now on loan to the U.S.S.R., I understand that the negotiations will soon be extended to cover a general settlement of the lend lease problem, including disposition of the additional naval craft now on loan. It is therefore urgent that I should summarize the past position of the Department of the Navy and set forth our new position, which is concurred in by the Secretary of Defense.¹

The U.S.S.R., as you know, received a total of 585 naval craft under the Master Soviet Lend Lease Agreement. The Department of the Navy, as outlined in its letter of 8 May 1947,² suggested recovery of all vessels on loan with a view to subsequent disposal to the U.S.S.R., under the Surplus Property Act of 1944,³ of 15 AGs, 17 LCTs, 4 YRs, 54 LCM(3)s, 1 ML, 1 plane personnel boat, 2 LCSs, 2 LCVPs and 6250-ton pontoon barges. The Secretary of the Navy’s letter of 11 June 1947,⁴ apparently in deference to the suggestion contained in a Department of State letter of 4 June 1947⁵ on the subject, modified the earlier Navy position in that the list of vessels to be permanently retained by the United States included only 3 icebreakers, 28 frigates, 15 LCI(L)s, 101 PTs and BPTs, and 70 SCs, PTCs and RPCs. The Department of State in its note of 3 September 1948⁶ to the Soviet Government encompassed this new position in that it offered to sell the following 242 vessels to the U.S.S.R.:

28 AMs, 30 YMs, 15 SCs, 66 PTs, 10 LCI(L)s, 17 LCTs, 50 LCMs, 4 floating repair ships, 15 river tugs, 6 pontoon barges and 1 motor launch.

The Department of State was further informed by the Secretary of the Navy on 11 October 1948⁷ that “if you consider it politically advantageous to dispose of the vessels now under lend lease to Russia, other than the Icebreakers and Frigates, the Navy Department offers mo objection to such disposition as you may deem appropriate.”

The Navy Department has always held that it was at least a moral obligation on the part of the Soviet Government to return such craft-whose repossession was desired by the United States in U.S. ports. The willingness of the Navy Department to accede to Soviet demands regarding the ports of delivery of the frigates and icebreakers, as expressed in my letters of 31 August and 6 September 1949, was motivated to a large extent by the desirability from the naval viewpoint of removing the craft from Soviet custody, by whatever means. This objective is not confined to the icebreakers and frigates alone but applies to all U.S. vessels on loan which represent a contribution to the Soviet war potential.

The Secretary of Defense is presently instituting a survey of possible methods of use or disposal of the entire list of ships, particularly with respect to our Military Assistance Program requirements, utilization by U.S. occupation forces, or as a contribution to the economic recovery of Western-oriented countries even as scrap. The desirability of removing these ships from Soviet custody, coupled with the use to which they may be put, warrants a withdrawal of the U.S. offer to sell any of the craft to the Soviet Government particularly since that Government failed to act in acceptance of our offer in a reasonable time.

It is therefore the desire of the Department of the Navy, which is concurred in by the Secretary of Defense, that the presently anticipated resumption of the negotiations on U.S.-U.S.S.R. lend lease problems be entered into with the intent of dispossessing the Soviet Government of air operable U.S. naval vessels in their custody and that certification of destruction for non-operable ships be obtained. In effecting repossession, the Department of the Navy desires that every effort be made to obtain delivery in U.S. ports. Should the Soviet Government adhere adamantly to their previously expressed opposition to such delivery, it is requested that their proposals be referred to the Department of the Navy in order that a compromise may be proposed that will hold to a minimum the operational and logistic costs of recovery.

Sincerely yours,

Francis P. Matthews

1. Louis A. Johnson.
2. Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. iv, p. 685.
3. Approved on October 3, 1944; 58 Stat. 765.
4. Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. iv, p. 694.
5. Ibid., p. 691.
6. Ibid., 1948, vol. iv, p. 1004.
7. Not printed.