501.BC Kashmir/4–3049: Telegram
The Chargé in Pakistan (Doolittle) to the Secretary of State
137. UNCIP proposals April 28 still contain three features which GOP was unable accept in April 15 proposals viz (a) suggestion that India may certain circumstances post troops northern Kashmir (b) lack assurance withdrawal troops would be so ordered that at no time would either side have such preponderance as to tempt aggression or cause tension concern on other side truce line (c) reference sovereignty Jammu and Kashmir state. Regarding position trust in PA, GOP would reluctantly accept (b) and (c) but agreement principle station GOI troops beyond cease-fire line would vitiate Pakistan case. Further to view GOP to which Embassy agrees GOP surrender this point would enrage Azad Kashmiris Pathan tribes and Pakistan people themselves and even compromise stability Pakistan Government.
Thompson,1 who arrived India April 27 (mytel 129, April 252) persuaded USDel proposals about to be released bound fail above reasons and contravened UNCIP’s own earlier proposals. He suggested formula “command [Commission?] or PA event threat safety s [Page 1704] territorial integrity these areas might take such measures necessary provide adequate defense security” would meet legitimate Indian interest and not prejudice Pakistan. USDel presented this formula but Commission refused not on basis unfair inadequate, but merely as unlikely win acceptance GOI so decided present proposals which every reason expect surely fail.
GOP April 29 made counter proposal that in view certain failure present proposals Commission arrange urgent meeting Geneva Nehru Nimitz Liaquat3 object conclude truce agreement without requiring either Pakistan India record negative vote present proposals. Understand Zafrullah being asked contact USGADel and Department win support this end. Embassy favors any move likely break present deadlock. We regard present proposals as unrealistic extremely unfortunate. Embassy understands, however. Commission will first insist receiving replies by which time probably too late arrange Geneva meeting.
Reference Comkas message Embassy 136, April 304 suggestion Nimitz throw weight behind Commission’s present formula regarding possible posting India troops northern areas. Embassy convinced such action Nimitz part would gravely prejudice his position would damage American prestige.
Embassy reluctantly records impression UNCIP status as objective arbitral body weakened due seeming readiness accept extraneous GOI claims tended forfeit India respect Pakistan confidence. Only USDel still regarded by GOP as objective and as having more than superficial grasp Pakistan position. Loss Huddle as Commission’s strongest most objective member regretted. Under circumstances if present proposals unacceptable, which Embassy believes case so far as GOP concerned, and if Geneva meeting impossible arrange, we suggest UNCIP delegate arbitral functions to Nimitz who would meet GOI-GOP representatives at conference table neutral place such as Kandy, Ceylon and hammer out truce agreement based on broad principles which would not tie hands PA. In our opinion UNCIP predilection appease India rather than produce formula based on knowledge justice fair play mainly responsible for inability achieve truce agreement before now. Further great delay would increase difficulty maintain cease-fire endanger prospects ultimate plebiscite.
Sent Department 137. Pouched USDel New Delhi, London.